1. The British Commonwealth meeting has ended after a useful
exchange of views. Most of the questions listed in our E2 [1] have
been left open and various Delegations will be free at San
Francisco to express their own views and seek amendments. London
talks have resulted, however, in a clearer appreciation of the
issues to be faced and better understanding of interests of
various parts of the Commonwealth. We have gained support on
several matters of special importance to Australia.

2. From the outset we took the initiative on many issues. The list
of questions which became the basis of discussion was largely
formulated by the Australian Representatives on the Committee of
Experts in accordance with directions of Evatt. Talks here have
underlined the fact that our objectives can best be served by
intensive work in Committee stages and by discussions.

Arrangements in which various issues are not considered separately
but as balancing one another. Our task at San Francisco is likely
to involve careful and delicate negotiation and judgment re
application of Governmental policy in face of more than forty
other Delegations. The London talks, however, have afforded
valuable experience.

3. The major issues in London concerned the membership voting
procedure and powers of the Security Council, the powers of the
Assembly, the procedure for settlement of disputes, amendment of
the Charter Social and Economic co-operation and territorial
trusteeship. The results of discussion under these headings are
summarised below.

Voting on the Security Council:-

4. Throughout the discussion on the Yalta voting formula, the
Australian Delegation stressed that this question could not be
separated from related questions such as revision of the Charter.

The removal of the great power veto on amendment of the Charter
would do much to reconcile us to a great power veto on enforcement
action. Answering questions by Evatt re the nature of the British
Commitment at Yalta, Eden said that the United Kingdom Government
was technically bound by the Yalta Agreement but the essence of
this agreement was that while great powers should possess a right
of veto this right should be limited to certain particular cases.

In his view we were not only free to discuss at San Francisco what
these cases should be but he would be prepared to reconsider the
right of veto on amendment of the Charter.

5. Discussion re the veto on the examination of a dispute to which
a great power was not a party (item 4(B) in the report of Expert
Committee) revealed that there was no reason why the veto should
apply in such cases.

6. The Dominions were prepared to give some recognition to the
fact that a compromise with Russia was necessary on the voting
procedure even while they wished to vary the proposals.

Non Permanent Members of the Security Council:-

7. Canada and Australia pressed for better representation on the
Council of 'Middle Powers' or as we have expressed it 'Security
Powers' and strength of their case was generally accepted. The
means of achieving this representation was discussed and such
criteria for selection as the war effort, war potential and
geographical location were mentioned. There was general agreement
that provision might be made in the Charter to the effect that due
regard be paid to the contribution of members towards the
maintenance of security and that the nomination of the first
Security Council and matters relating to the elections of the
Council in future should be regarded as a subject for arrangement
at San Francisco. It was recognised too that this question could
not be considered apart from the great power veto provisions for
future revision of Charter and future negotiation of special
security agreements under Chapter VIII (B) 5 of the Dumbarton Oaks
proposals.

Enforcement of Sanctions:-

8. The election of non-permanent members of the Security Council
was linked with the question whether the decisions of the Council
re enforcement of sanctions should be binding on States who had
not participated in the decisions. Canada proposed that the
decisions should be binding in the first place only on members of
the Council and on such other States as had specifically
undertaken to carry them out.

9. On this issue Australia was of the same mind as the United
Kingdom, namely that universality of the security system was of
prime importance. To remove universality from the system of
collective security would cut at the roots of the whole system and
any chance of hesitation or uncertainty re enforcement of
sanctions would only encourage the aggressor. The expectation of
complete and immediate application of collective security measures
was the chief element commending the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to
the peoples of the world.

10. South Africa and New Zealand were at first of the opinion that
non-members of the Security Council should be consulted in the
general assembly before action. Our arguments, however, strongly
impressed other Delegations.

The Peace Settlements:-

11. Canada sought information whether the Security Council should
be empowered to assume responsibility for supervision of peace
settlements with former enemy States. There was general support
for Dr. Evatt's view:

(1) That matters relating to peace settlements were governed by
the terms of the treaties and were the responsibility of powers
including Australia and other Dominions who, having taken an
active part in the war, would be principal parties to such
treaties;

(2) That the Security Council's function was to deal with threats
to peace and it would not be concerned with peace terms unless
these give rise in some way to a threatening situation.

Powers of the Assembly:-

12. On item 1 of the Expert Committees report, discussion centred
on the respective powers of the Assembly and Council in regard to
the handling of disputes. The New Zealand Delegation wished to
remove limits on the Assembly but we took the position that while
it was desirable to increase the powers of the Assembly the
question should be considered in relation to the general question
of the composition and functions of the Security Council and the
procedure to be adopted in settlement of disputes, and that due
regard be paid to necessity for leaving the Security Council
unhampered in handling immediate threats to peace.

We suggested that on taking over handling of a dispute the
Security Council should give some indication to the Assembly that
the matter was being placed under the Council's jurisdiction and
having been so notified the Assembly should be precluded from
dealing with the matter on its own initiative until, by an agreed
procedure, the Security Council had ceased to have sole cognisance
of the matter. This should be the sole exception to the Assembly's
general competence to discuss matters affecting International
Security and it should not affect-
(A) The power of the Assembly to consider a dispute if the Council
were unable to do so owing to exercise of great power veto or
(B) The right of the Assembly to express disagreement or make
recommendations in subject after the Council had relinquished
jurisdiction. There appeared to be general support for our views
from the United Kingdom and Canada.

Settlement of Disputes:-

13. The immediately preceding question was closely related to
later discussion of procedure for settlement of disputes and it is
obvious that two questions cannot be decided apart from one
another. On item 8 of the Committee's report, Dr. Evatt's analysis
of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was generally accepted. That
analysis revealed some ambiguity in draft but it was agreed that
the desirable end was to give the Security Council power to
recommend conditions of settlement of a dispute, the continuance
of which was likely to endanger security and to determine
conditions of settlement if that were necessary to maintain or
restore peace and security.

14. As regards the third point of item 8, it was generally agreed
that the Council should be empowered to consider disputes, the
continuance of which did not threaten security, only if both
parties to the dispute so requested.

15. We also succeeded in obtaining a large measure of support for
principles which are implicit in the questions asked in item 9 re
the basis of action of the Security Council and question in item
10 re territorial integrity and political independence of members.

The meeting accepted Dr. Evatt's suggestion to amend political
independence Chapter 11 (4) of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal to read
'All Members of the Organisation shall refrain in their
International relations from threat or use of force against
territorial integrity or political independence of another State
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
Organisation'. It was recognised that if any State violated this
obligation it would surely be impossible for the Council to decide
a dispute in its favour. Any case of wilful aggression would thus
be a clear breach of charter and, coming under the Security
Council's jurisdiction, would be met with enforcement action. This
was a preferable method than an attempt to define aggression or to
make a general declaration that aggression should be met by force.

Amendment of Charter:-

16. The case presented by Australia re revision of the Charter can
fairly be regarded as one of the most notable contributions to the
Conference. We pointed out that the process for amendment must
have an important bearing on acceptance of the charter by some
Countries and it was impossible to accept the present position
under which the Three Great Powers, China and France, were not
only given a special position in organisation but were also
allowed unrestricted power to veto any subsequent proposal for
change. Further, periodical revision of the charter would be
necessary to ensure that the World Organisation developed to meet
changing world conditions. The process of amendment should not be
too easy and there should be adequate safeguards, but the present
great power veto on the change was unacceptable. The possibility
of setting a term of five or seven years after which the charter
should come up for revision by a Constituent Assembly was
discussed and generally favoured.

Regional Arrangements:-

17. The main discussion in item 11 centred on the present
requirement that no regional enforcement action shall be taken
without the approval of the Security Council. Attention was drawn
to the importance some Countries, including our own, placed on
having a Regional Security System as a second line of defence
should a world system of security fail. Attention was also drawn
to French views re application of the Franco-Soviet Pact. It was
pointed out that enforcement action by the World Organisation
might be prevented by the veto of a single great power which was
itself interested in the region where a threat to peace arose and
in that case threatened Nations would have to fall back on other
arrangements.

Permanent Court:-

18. There was a general discussion on the permanent court but it
was agreed to await the outcome of the Washington Conference on
this subject. We made strong points for increasing the use of the
court in settlement of justiciable disputes or in fact-finding for
the benefit of the Security Council.

Military Arrangements:-

19. Discussion under item 12 was mainly directed to political and
constitutional aspects of negotiations of the Special Security
Agreement, e.g. whether multilateral agreements should be
negotiated and whether the Security Council would initiate
negotiations. The Military aspect was not considered except that
we pointed out that the provision in Chapter VIII (B) 6 re air
forces to be held immediately available to the Security Council
was inapplicable to the Pacific where task forces of Combined
Naval and Air Units would be required.

Social and Economic Co-operation:-

20. The meeting eventually reached general agreement on the points
put forward by the Australian Delegation re economic and social
cooperation. It was agreed that the Social and Economic Council
should be one of the principal organs of world organisation. We
also gained support for inclusion in charter of a definite pledge
by members to take action both National and International for the
purpose of securing for all peoples including their own, improved
labour standard, economic advancement and social security, and as
part of that undertaking to take appropriate action through the
instrumentality of a General Assembly, Economic and Social
Council, the I.L.O. and such Bodies as may be brought within the
framework of the International Organisation, and to report
periodically to the organisation on steps taken to carry out the
pledge.

21. Our Delegation continued to stress that a pledge without
machinery and recognised procedures to give effect to it may be
valueless. We agreed that the Economic and Social Council should
have power to initiate conventions on social and economic
conventions and this view was generally endorsed. It was agreed
that further attention should be given to the functions of the
Council, and its relationship to the Assembly and to specialised
bodies.

Territorial Trusteeship:-

22. Two early sessions of the conference were devoted to
statements of the views of the Governments and general discussion
of trusteeship; Colonel Stanley outlined the United Kingdom
position. The main points which emerged were:-

(1) That the enclosure with despatch D.125 [2] of December last
had never been submitted to Cabinet and did not carry Cabinet
approval and would now be withdrawn;

(2) By the Yalta decisions the United Kingdom was bound to discuss
the subject with other Great Powers before the San Francisco
Conference and it was implicit in the Yalta decisions that
discussion at San Francisco would be limited, and
(3) The United Kingdom Cabinet would oppose the Yalta proposal for
voluntarily placing the Colonies under Mandate and if there were
such a system no British Colonies would voluntarily be placed
under Mandate (see telegram D429 [3]). New Zealand and Australia
protested against a firm decision having been reached before the
Dominions had been consulted and pressed their case for
trusteeship. Before final session of Conference matter was
considered by United Kingdom Cabinet.

23. At the final session Cranborne attempted to crystallise
discussion under the following headings:-

(A) The Mandate system should be continued with respect to
existing Mandates and territories taken from the Enemy as a result
of the present war;

(B) Inadvisability of multiple or joint administration;

(C) No existing Mandate to be surrendered by Nations of the
British Commonwealth;

(D) Modifications of detail were required in existing Mandates
system;

(E) Limitation of San Francisco discussions to a general formula
leaving details to be arranged subsequently between Colonial
Powers;

(F) Exclusion of Regional Colonial Commissions from the San
Francisco Discussions, Regional arrangements to be made between
the Powers concerned after San Francisco.

Cranborne also stated that the United Kingdom Cabinet wished to go
as far as possible to meet the Dominions views and therefore would
accept the principle of the Yalta proposal that parent States
might voluntarily place territories under Mandate. They did not
intend, however, to apply this principle to their own territories.

24. New Zealand, Australia and India protested most strongly that
this was not a compromise and urged the necessity for Britain to
take a lead towards some recognition of duty to dependent
territories at least to the extent of reporting periodically. We
pointed out that the United Kingdom Government had made complete
departure from Stanley's memo of last December and we were not
content to end the Debate with a summary of points which for most
part had been accepted before London talks began. All three
Delegations expressly reserved the right to take their own line at
San Francisco.

25. There was also much discussion on Point E above. The
Australian Delegation throughout took the line that they did not
wish to embarrass the United Kingdom but in their judgment
discussion on Colonies at San Francisco was unavoidable. In that
discussion the primary Australian concern would be to ensure that
the Charter of the World Organisation was wide enough to cover
trusteeship and to allow room for effective future action in this
field. We stressed that our ultimate concern was not about what
was likely to be raised at San Francisco but what was to be done
by the British Commonwealth about Colonial peoples. At the
conclusion Mr. Forde emphasised the importance we attached to the
welfare of native peoples and our wish to see the United Kingdom
give a lead to other nations.

26. Additional points to be noted are:-

(A) Our views on trusteeship do not apply to more advanced
Colonies such as Malta and Ceylon which are approaching self
Government but only to Dependent territories;

(B) Besides welfare of Native Peoples improved administration of
dependent areas is necessary for security.

27. Throughout the debate the New Zealand Delegation took an
equally firm stand maintaining the policy declared in the
Australian/ New Zealand Agreement. Fraser feels very strongly on
the subject.

28. You will realise from the foregoing that the Colonial question
is in a delicate phase. The line to be taken at San Francisco will
depend on circumstances, especially the results of the preliminary
five Power talks in Washington and the way in which the subject is
raised at the United Nations Conference.

29. On the whole Australia took the most prominent part in the
London talks and there has been a pleasing recognition of our
Delegation's contribution to the success of the meeting.