PMM(46) 12th Meeting (extract) LONDON, 6 May 1946, 3.30 p.m.

TOP SECRET

Military Bases in the Pacific
(Previous References: P.M.M.(46) 5th Meeting, Minute 1 [1], and
P.M.M.(46) 11th Meeting, Minute 1. [2])
1. The Meeting had before them a note by the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom (P.M.M.(46)22) [3] covering a telegram from the
Foreign Secretary (No- 53 of the 2nd May from the United Kingdom
Delegation in Paris).

MR. ATTLEE said that Mr. Byrnes had not reacted favourably to the
approach made to him by Mr. Bevin on the basis of the statement of
the views of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and
New Zealand appended to the Minutes of the 5th Meeting. There
appeared, in fact, to be no prospect of the United States
Government agreeing to enter into discussions linking the grant of
rights in Pacific islands with the establishment of regional
security arrangements in the South and South-West Pacific. But to
break off discussions altogether seemed undesirable. The result
might be the withdrawal of the United States from all defence
commitments in the islands concerned, whereas it was the agreed
view of British Commonwealth Governments that it was desirable for
the United States to be associated with the defence of the area.

Moreover, the United States' claim to sovereignty over certain
islands in dispute would be likely to be renewed. And British
Commonwealth Governments would have to assume responsibility for
the upkeep of the military installations at present maintained by
the United States in British islands. Finally, the breaking off of
discussions would have a bad effect on our general relations with
the United States. it seemed, therefore, that a basis should be
found for continuation of negotiations and he suggested that it
would be necessary to some extent to meet Mr. Byrnes's desire to
limit the scope of the discussions.

DR. EVATT said that he agreed that Mr. Byrnes's reaction should
not be allowed to lead to a complete breaking off of the
discussions. He thought this could be avoided as he had apparently
said that he would be happy to discuss the subject with Mr. Nash
and himself in Washington.

Mr. Byrnes was reported to have said that he was 'not interested
in establishing any system of regional defence in the South-West
Pacific and that their own defence interests lay further North'.

Dr. Evatt said that he found this difficult to understand. If Mr.

Byrnes admitted that he had no defence interests in the area, why
did the United States want rights there? If they were to be given
valuable rights they must assume certain obligations. The
Australian people would not agree to the grant of rights on any
other basis. The subject was one of considerable political
importance in Australia.

When this matter had been discussed at an earlier meeting, it had
been the unanimous view that we should resist a piece-meal
approach. Mr. Byrnes had brushed aside this view. He was prepared
to undertake no obligations. Dr. Evatt said that the British
Commonwealth could not justify acceptance of such an attitude. He
had discussed the matter with Mr. Chifley and Australia's view was
we should hold to the general principle that rights should be
granted only on the basis of reciprocal obligations.

He doubted whether Mr. Byrnes's views were his last word. He
appreciated that Mr. Byrnes might be afraid of difficulties with
the Senate over any tight formal regional agreement. But Australia
was not wedded to forms or words. There were informal means of
reaching a satisfactory understanding which would not require
reference to the Senate-witness the informal but, he believed,
satisfactory arrangements for mutual defence between Canada and
the United States. Some similar understanding might be worked out
for the South-West Pacific.

Dr. Evatt said that he adhered to his earlier view that it was
most important that the Commonwealth Governments concerned should
act together and that they should not give any rights to the
United States unless they assumed some degree of obligation. We
should not give away any rights separately, and should not give
any away, even if we acted together, until some obligations were
accepted. Mr. Byrnes wanted complete rights over the Japanese
Mandated Territories. If he were more reasonable with us, we could
help him to get them, but we could not allow him to pick up bases
from an ally merely to add something to the bag. We could not
justify such an attitude.

For the moment, Dr. Evatt suggested that we should not close the
door. We should take advantage of the offer of discussions in
Washington. As regards Tarawa, he was glad that the United Kingdom
Government had not accepted the suggestion that it should be ceded
to the United States. [4] We should keep to our view. He would
think it proper to set aside some area on the island for the
United States to use as a memorial to the men of the United States
Marines who had fallen there, but he could not agree to the
surrender of the whole island to them.

MR. NASH said that some of the islands over which the United
States had asked for rights were important to New Zealand for
other reasons besides defence. The three islands, for instance,
over which she asked for exclusive rights, namely, Funafuti,
Canton and Christmas Island, were three major stepping-stones
across the Pacific between New Zealand and the United States-or
Canada. New Zealand would be very reluctant to see the United
States given exclusive rights in these islands. Her own commercial
aviation should not be dependent on other people's consents. But
she would be quite ready to see the United States have rights
there which would be equally available to the United Kingdom as
well as to New Zealand herself. She would willingly adopt this
course in the case of the islands in Western Samoa, for which New
Zealand herself was responsible. He agreed with Dr. Evatt's view
of Mr. Byrnes's statement that the United States were not
interested in establishing any system of regional defence in the
South-West Pacific. He did not doubt that the United States had in
fact a defence interest in some of the islands. it had been very
useful for her in the last war to be able to cross the Pacific by
way of these islands and the Marshall and Caroline Islands, and it
might be so again.

He called attention to the fact that Mr. Byrnes had modified very
considerably the rights for which he now appeared to be asking in
Manus. Now he said that 'the United States Navy only wanted to
call in at Manus for minor repairs'. This confirmed him in his
view that Mr. Byrnes had not said his last word on other points.

He agreed with the course of action which Dr. Evatt had suggested.

He thought there might well be advantage in discussing the matter
with Mr. Byrnes on their way through Washington.

With regard to Tarawa, he also agreed with Dr. Evatt. He pointed
out that before the United States ever came to the island, New
Zealand had suffered considerable casualties there and a number of
her subjects had been murdered by the Japanese. New Zealand had
raised a memorial to them, and if part of the island was to be
dedicated to the United States for a memorial he would like
another part to be dedicated to New Zealand.

FIELD-MARSHAL SMUTS said that, while he had no special knowledge
of the area, he would urge the importance of taking a long view.

It was surely very much to the interests of New Zealand and
Australia to maintain and ensure the interest of the United States
in the area. Should we not throw out a bait to catch the fish? it
might be true that at the moment she was only asking for rights
and was reluctant to assume obligations, but the rights given to-
day would involve obligations to-morrow. Australia and New Zealand
were, he suggested, very exposed to the North. The Australian
Continent, largely uninhabited, was uncomfortably near a part of
the world with a colossal population. To-day, perhaps, this need
not disturb us; we had just won a great victory. But the situation
might change. He suggested that it was very much to the interests
of Australia and New Zealand to build up a protective wall to the
North. That protective wall could not be provided without the help
of the United States. To give her bases in the area might mean
very little now, but it might mean everything over the next
hundred years.

As regards Tarawa, it might be relevant that Tarawa was on the
flank of the Marshall Islands and Caroline Islands, which were
likely to be allocated to United States administration.

LORD TEDDER said that the views of the Chiefs of Staff remained as
previously expressed (P.M.M.(46)3, Annex III). On the one hand, it
would be a great advantage to involve the United States in
defensive arrangements in the South and South-West Pacific; on the
other hand, the British Commonwealth rights in the islands should
not lightly be surrendered. He could not help suspecting that in
the case of Funafuti, Canton island and Christmas Island, the
fundamental objective of the United States was to obtain
facilities for civil aviation. As regards Tarawa, while the island
might be of some military use, it was open to question whether it
was of much strategic importance to the British Commonwealth.

Replying to a question by Mr. Attlee, MR. MASON said that he had
attended Mr. Bevin's talk with Mr. Byrnes on this subject. Mr.

Byrnes had been placed on the defensive by press reports
suggesting that British Commonwealth Governments designed to take
advantage of the United States Government's approach in regard to
use of bases to 'entice' her into a regional security arrangement.

Mr. Byrnes had intimated that he was not prepared to undertake any
such commitment. The Foreign Secretary considered that the latest
United States proposals represented a considerable advance, beyond
which it might be impossible to secure further United States
concessions. In particular, Mr. Bevin considered that Mr. Byrnes's
readiness to agree to grant to British Commonwealth Governments
civil aviation rights in Funafuti, Canton island and Christmas
Island constituted an important modification of previous
proposals. Mr. Bevin considered that it was the intention of Mr.

Byrnes that the civil aviation rights in question should be
available at all times, both in peace and in war, even if the
United States were neutral.

DR. EVATT said that no answer should be sent to Mr. Byrnes which
by implication suggested that we were prepared to alter our views.

Any suggestion of giving bases without any consideration in return
would be met by deep resentment by the Australian people. It was
true that Canton and some of the other islands were a long way
off, but they were part of a vital link between Australia and the
United States. We could not go back on the formula agreed upon,
and he was sorry if Mr. Byrnes had been given the impression that
we would do so. The suggestion of ceding Tarawa should not be
pursued. The proposal had been made by Lord Halifax two or three
years ago, and Australia and New Zealand had then objected to it.

Dr. Evatt thought that the procedure which the United States were
adopting was objectionable. They had insisted on negotiating with
the members of the Commonwealth bilaterally, and we knew they had
done the same with the French and the Dutch. We should stand
together. This was not Mr. Byrnes's last word, and he suggested
that the case for our proposals should be put more forcefully to
him.

In further discussion, it was agreed that the reply to be sent to
Mr. Byrnes should be of a friendly nature. It was agreed that Mr.

Bevin should be informed that his telegram No. 53 had been
considered by the Dominion Ministers, that they had noted Mr.

Byrnes's view as expressed in paragraph 13 of that telegram, and
that Dr. Evatt and Mr. Nash would be glad to discuss these matters
with Mr. Byrnes on their way back. Mr. Bevin should be told that
the view reached at the meeting was that the United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand, while desirous of agreeing to
arrangements which would be satisfactory to the United States as
well as to themselves, must have regard to their common interest
in the South Pacific area.

Mr. Bevin might be asked whether he thought that it would be
useful to Mr. Byrnes for a statement on the above lines to be
issued in London. If so, a separate paragraph could be included in
it about Tarawa, to the effect that it had been among the subjects
considered by the Dominion Ministers and that special provision
might well be made in that island to commemorate its capture by
the United States Marines in 1943.

DR. EVATT said that he must reserve his position as to the issue
of a statement on the lines indicated.

Procedure in the Peace Settlement
2. DR. EVATT expressed concern at developments in regard to the
preparation of the draft peace treaties with Italy, Roumania,
Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. He recalled that the Report of the
Potsdam Conference establishing the Council of Foreign Ministers
provided that the Council should draw up treaties with a view to
their submission to the United Nations. It was the view of the
Australian Government and also, he thought, of the other Dominion
Governments, that either the Council of Foreign Ministers should
have been broadened to include the active belligerents who had
made a substantial contribution in the prosecution of the war, or
the proceedings of the Council should be regarded as only the
prelude to a wider Conference. Australia, Canada, South Africa and
New Zealand had all issued public statements to this effect in
September last. The United Kingdom Government had concurred in the
view that the Council should only be the prelude to a wider
Conference. It had subsequently been accepted by the United States
and Soviet Governments; and at the Moscow Conference of December
1945 it had been agreed that, when the preparation of the draft
treaties had been completed by the Council of Foreign Ministers,
the Council would convoke a Conference of the twenty-one
belligerent countries, on the clear understanding that it would be
within the competence of this Conference to put forward proposals
for amendment of the draft treaties submitted to it. The essence
of the agreement was that the Conference had to be called before
the 1st May, but that had not been done.

Dr. Evatt said that he would be glad to know what arrangements
were contemplated for the convening of the Conference, and, in
particular, by whom and at what date it would be convoked. It was
most difficult and embarrassing to Dominion representatives who
had come long distances to attend the Conference, to remain in
complete uncertainty whether or not the Council intended to call
an early meeting. He added that, if the Council of Foreign
Ministers should be unable to reach agreement on draft treaties,
it was the view of the Australian Government that the convening of
the Conference should not for this reason be postponed; for it was
fundamental to the Moscow Agreement that the Conference of twenty-
one countries should be held. The provision of the agreement that
a Conference should be convoked when the preparation of the drafts
had been completed, should not be construed in the sense that, if
it proved that the Council of Foreign Ministers could not complete
the drafts, there could not be a Conference. It should surely be
possible to circulate to the Conference alternative texts of
certain parts of the drafts. On a related point, he said that the
Australian Government were opposed to the revision of armistice
terms, since this might be used as a pretext for delaying the
conclusion of the peace treaties.

MR. NOEL-BAKER said that the Moscow Agreement provided that the
Conference would be convoked by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The invitations would presumably be sent out by the French
Government. As regards the action to be taken if the Council of
Foreign Ministers failed to reach agreement on the draft treaties,
he understood that the action to be taken in this contingency had
not yet been considered.

MR. NASH expressed his general concurrence with the views of Dr.

Evatt. It was essential that all the active belligerents should
participate in the peace settlement. As, regards the suggested
revision of the Italian armistice, while the New Zealand
Government agreed with the United Kingdom Government that this
might be done and in the terms of the draft proposal, he expressed
concern that this might give opportunity for further delay in the
peace settlement.

FIELD-MARSHAL SMUTS suggested that the views of Dominion Ministers
should be conveyed to Mr. Bevin in Paris.

In the course of discussion it was pointed out that the Russians
had taken the view that the Conference should not take place until
the Council of Foreign Ministers had themselves agreed on the
draft treaties. It was agreed that the United Kingdom must not
allow the Russians to manoeuvre her into a position whereby, in
order that the Conference might take place, she had to agree to
their draft of contentious parts of the treaties.

MR. ATTLEE said that there was general agreement at the meeting
that all countries who had made a substantial contribution to
victory should participate in the peace settlement. He said that
the Foreign Secretary would be informed of the views expressed in
the discussion and requested to supply information on the
prospects of convening the Conference in the near future.

[matter omitted]