Following are essential parts of Baruch's opening address to be
made to Atomic Energy Commission this morning.

'Terror' is not enough to inhibit the use of the Atomic Bomb. The
terror created by weapons has never stopped man from employing
them. For each new weapon a defence has been produced, in time.

But now we face a condition in which adequate defence does not
exist.

Science, which gave us this dread power, shows that it can be made
a giant help to humanity, but science does not show us how to
prevent its baleful use. So we have been appointed to obviate that
peril by finding a meeting of the minds and the hearts of our
peoples. Only in the will of mankind lies the answer.

It is to express this will and make it effective that we have been
assembled. We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic
energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war.

To that end, we must provide immediate, swift and sure punishment
of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the
nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a
feverish interlude between wars. And, too, the United Nations can
prescribe individual responsibility and punishment on the
principle applied at Nuremberge by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom, France and the United States-a
formula certain to benefit the world's future.

The United States proposes the creation of an international atomic
development authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of
the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw
material and including
(a) Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy
activities potentially dangerous to world security.

(b) Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic
activities.

(c) The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.

(d) Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative
character intended to put the authority in the forefront of atomic
knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to
detect, misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the authority
must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge
and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the
great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge. I
offer this as a basis for beginning our discussion.

But, I think, the peoples we serve would not believe-and without
faith nothing counts-that a treaty, merely outlawing possession or
use of the atomic bomb constitutes effective fulfilment of the
instructions to this commission. Previous failures have been
recorded in trying the method of simple renunciation, unsupported
by effective guarantees of security and armament limitation. No
one would have faith in that approach alone.

Now, if ever, is the time to act for the common good. Public
opinion supports a world movement towards security. If I read the
signs aright, the peoples want a programme not composed merely of
pious thoughts but of enforceable sanctions-an international law
with teeth in it.

We of this nation, desirous of helping to bring peace to the world
and realising the heavy obligations upon us, arising from our
possession of the means of producing the bomb and from the fact
that it is part of our armament, are prepared to make our full
contribution towards effective control of atomic energy.

When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including
the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and
put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for
violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as
international crimes, we propose that:

1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop.

2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of
the treaty, and
3. The authority shall be in possession of full information as to
the knowhow for the production of atomic energy.

Let me repeat, so as to avoid misunderstanding:

My country is ready to make its full contribution toward the end
we seek, subject of course, to our constitutional processes, and
to an adequate system of control becoming fully effective, as we
finally work it out.

Now as to violations:

in the agreement, penalties of as serious a nature as the nations
may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as
possible, should be fixed for:

1. Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;

2. Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable
for use in an atomic bomb;

3. Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed
by the authority;

4. Wilful interference with the activities of the authority;

5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner
contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the
international control body.

It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself,
were I not to say to you and to our peoples, that the matter of
punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system.

It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes
straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United
Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The
Charter permits penalisation only by concurrence of each of the
five great powers-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The United
Kingdom, China, France and the United States.

I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto
power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no
veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to
develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.

As matters now stand several years may be necessary for another
country to produce a bomb, de novo. However, once the basic
information is generally known, and the authority has established
producing plants for peaceful purposes in the several countries,
an illegal seizure of such a plant might permit a malevolent
nation to produce a bomb in twelve months, and if preceded by
secret preparation and necessary facilities perhaps even in a much
shorter time. The time required-the advance warning given of the
Possible use of a bomb-can only be generally estimated but
obviously will depend upon many factors, including the success
with which the authority has been able to introduce elements of
safety in the design of its plants and the degree to which illegal
and secret preparation for the military use of atomic energy will
have been eliminated. Presumably no nation would think of starting
a war with only one bomb.

The process of prevention and penalization-a problem of profound
statecraft-is, as I read it, implicit in the Moscow statement,
signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
States and the United Kingdom a few months ago. [1]

In the elimination of war lies our solution, for only then will
nations cease to compete with one another in the production and
use of dread 'secret' weapons which are evaluated solely by their
capacity to kill. This devilish programme takes us back not merely
to the dark ages, but from cosmos to chaos. If we succeed in
finding a suitable way to control atomic weapons, it is reasonable
to hope that we may also preclude the use of other weapons
adaptable to mass destruction.

I now submit the following measures as representing the
fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to certain
of the conclusions which I have epitomised.

1 . General-the authority should set up a thorough plan for
control of the field of atomic energy, through various forms of
ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research and
management by competent personnel. After this is provided for,
there should be as little interference as may be with the economic
plans and the present private, corporate and state relationships
in the several countries involved.

2. Raw materials-the authority should have as one of its earliest
purposes to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information
on world supplies of uranium and thorium and to bring them under
its dominion. The precise pattern of control for various types of
deposits of such materials will have to depend upon the
geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in
different situations.

The authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will
have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium
and thorium. Only after all current information on world sources
of uranium and thorium. is known to us can all equitable plans be
made for their production, refining and distribution.

3. Primary production plants-The authority should exercise
complete managerial control of the production of fissionable
materials. This means that it should control and operate all
plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and
must own and control the product of these plants.

4. Atomic explosives-The authority should be given sole and
exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic
explosives.

Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are
essential in order that the authority may keep in the forefront of
knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfil the objective
of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining
its position as the best informed agency will the authority be
able to determine the line between intrinsically dangerous and
nondangerous activities.

5. Strategic distribution of activities and materials-The
activities entrusted exclusively to the authority because they are
intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed
throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and
fissionable materials should not be centralized.

6. Nondangerous activities-A function of the authority should be
promotion of the peacetime benefits of atomic energy.

Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research
reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of
nondangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent
the production of power should be open to nations and their
citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the
authority.

Denatured materials, whose use we know also requires suitable
safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the authority
under lease or other arrangements. Denaturing seems to have been
overestimated by the public as a safety measure.

7. Definition of dangerous and nondangerous activities-Although a
reasonable dividing line can be drawn between dangerous and
nondangerous activities, it is not hard and fast. Provision
should, therefore, be made to assure constant re-examination of
the questions, and to permit revision of the dividing line as
changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

8. Operations of dangerous activities-Any plant dealing with
uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of
dangerous use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and
competent inspection by the authority, but its actual operation
shall be under the management, supervision and control of the
authority.

9. Inspection-By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities
exclusively to the authority, the difficulties of inspection are
reduced. If the authority is the only agency which may lawfully
conduct dangerous activities, then visible operation by others
than the authority will constitute an unambiguous danger signal.

Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing
functions of the authority.

10. Freedom of access-Adequate ingress and egress for all
qualified representatives of the authority must be assured. Many
of the inspection activities of the authority should grow out of,
and be incidental to, its other functions, important measures of
inspection will be associated with the tight control of raw
materials, for this is a keystone of the plan. The continuing
activities of prospecting, survey and research in relation to raw
materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative
development functions of the authority, but also to assure that no
surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw materials field
by nations or their citizens.

11. Personnel-The personnel of the authority should be recruited
on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an
international basis.

12. Progress by stages-A primary step in the creation of the
system of control is the setting forth, in comprehensive terms of
the functions, responsibilities, powers and limitations of the
authority. Once a Charter for the authority has been adopted, the
authority and the system of control of which it will be
responsible will require time to become fully organized and
effective. The plan of control will, therefore, have to come into
effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in
the Charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the Charter
for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the
resolution of the United Nations Assembly which created this
commission.

13. Disclosures-In the deliberations of the United Nations
Commission on atomic energy, the United States is prepared to make
available the information essential to a reasonable understanding
of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be
dependent, in the interest of all, upon the effective ratification
of the treaty. When the authority is actually created, the United
States will join the other nations in making available the further
information essential to that organisation for the performance of
its functions. As the successive stages of international control
are reached, the United States will be prepared to yield, to the
extent required by each stage, national control of activities in
this field to the authority.

14. International control-There will be questions about the extent
of control to be allowed to national bodies, when the authority is
established. Purely national authorities for control and
development of atomic energy should to the extent necessary for
the effective operation of the authority be subordinate to it.

This is neither an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation
of national authorities. The commission should evolve a clear
demarcation of the scope of duties and responsibilities of such
national authorities.

And now I end. I have submitted an outline for present discussion.

Our consideration will be broadened by the criticism of the United
States proposals and by the plans of the other nations, which, it
is to be hoped, will be submitted at their early convenience.