Security 101.

1. Cadogan opened discussion of the Spanish question in the
Security Council this afternoon stating that the United Kingdom
Government regarded the Franco Regime as the opposite of a
Democratic regime and as a Regime of a police state. Also the
United Kingdom Government did not doubt active collaboration of
Franco during the war with the Axis powers. Regarding the Sub-
Committee's report he doubted whether-
(a) The Council could interfere in the internal affairs of a state
unless it was proved that that state constituted a threat to
peace,
(b) the situation in Spain fell within chapter six of the charter.

If it were admitted that the situation in Spain fell within
chapter six, it would be expected that action under chapter six
would be recommended. However, the action recommended was one of
enforcement measures set out in chapter seven.

2. For these reasons Cadogan would prefer the Council to remit the
whole Spanish question to the General Assembly as the supreme body
of the organisation without recommending any specific course of
action. Cadogan also suggested that discussion in the Assembly
might be assisted if the Council were to request an advisory
opinion from the international court. He then moved the
substitution of the following paragraph for the last paragraph of
our resolution [1]-'It is hereby resolved that the Security
Council adopts the three recommendations of the Sub-Committee set
out above, subject to the deletion of paragraph (b) after the
words "reports of [this] Sub-Committee" and the addition of the
words "together with the minutes of the discussion of the case by
the Security Council".'
3. Dr. Evatt then replied to Soviet criticisms of the Sub-
Committee's recommendations and explained why in the view of
members of the Sub-Committee the doubts expressed by the United
Kingdom were not well founded. He pointed out that the Soviet and
United Kingdom represented two extreme and opposite views, the
latter considering the recommendations were too drastic, the
former that they were not drastic enough.

4. Although he understood fully the desire for direct action, the
Council could only invoke chapter 7 of the Charter and take more
drastic action if it were proved that a threat of peace existed.

The Sub-Committee had found that this threat did not in fact
exist. It was quite wrong to treat the case for direct action on a
factual basis that was not true.

5. Dr. Evatt continued by stating that the position of Cadogan
arose from a mistaken interpretation of [Charter. Correct
interpretation of] [2] article 2(7) was that once the matter was
proved to be not essentially of domestic jurisdiction, the
principle of non-intervention no longer applied. Clearly this was
the case when the facts indicated that a situation was one
calculated or likely to endanger international peace. The
exception to article 2(7) could not be allowed to govern this
interpretation. In any event the declaration regarding Spain which
had been made by the United Kingdom, United States and France in
March [3] and the resolution of the General Assembly in London [4]
both represented just as much an interference in internal affairs
as the action recommended to the Council. Also it was not correct
to assume that because a breach of diplomatic relations was
mentioned as a direct sanction in chapter 7, the Council was
precluded from recommending this step under chapter 6. It would be
unwise for the Council to request advisory action on the Spanish
question from the international court. This would probably mean
months or years of delay which would only be justified by some
over-riding necessity and this did not exist; the Council should
not avoid decisions on issues before it but should take full
opportunity of concluding the questions before it speedily and
effectively.

6. The Minister concluded by deprecating in advance a possible
veto by the Soviet. He stated that permanent members of the
Council should exercise their rights democratically and bow to the
will of the majority.

7. France expressed unqualified support for our resolution and
Mexico supported it subject to similar reservations as that of
Poland. The Council then adjourned until tomorrow.

8. Seven other members of the Council will probably vote for the
resolution of the Sub-Committee while the Netherlands will
abstain. It is certain that the United Kingdom amendment will be
lost and in that case, judging from the tone of Cadogan's speech
today, it seems he will not exercise the veto. His amendment was
presented rather to protect the position at the Assembly than to
defeat unanimous report of the Sub-Committee which will be
supported by the United States. The result still depends upon the
Soviet representative whose final attitude should he be isolated,
is impossible to forecast though the veto is quite possible.

9. Dr. Evatt's statement this afternoon made the greatest
impression. In addition his work as chairman of the Sub-Committee
and in the Council was highly praised by the French
representative. It is very largely due to his unremitting work
that the Sub-Committee's resolution on this highly difficult issue
has now gained the support of a clear majority of the Council and
approval of a great majority of the public and press.