CO-OPERATION IN EMPIRE DEFENCE
SOUTH EAST ASIA

The Australian Memorandum

The accompanying memorandum is the outcome of the Prime Ministers'
Conference in London in 1946. It embodies the Australian reaction
to certain British proposals, which proposals, Mr. Chifley said at
the time, would be examined in Australia, after which a
memorandum, based on conclusions reached here, would be prepared
for consideration at an inter-governmental level. Before
submitting the memorandum to the Prime Minister for his approval,
Mr. Dedman requests the views of Dr. Evatt on whether paragraph 7
is satisfactory from the External Affairs aspect.

United Kingdom Proposals

2. Paragraph 7 recites the British proposal, made at the
conference, 'that each member of the British Commonwealth agrees
that it is in their (its) strategic interest to assist both
politically and militarily in maintaining our (the British
Commonwealth) interest in those protective areas which directly
effect the security of their (its) territories and
communications'.

3. The general principle is to be implemented by each member
agreeing 'to take all steps, political and military, in those
areas in which it is directly concerned so as to maintain
conditions favourable to the British Commonwealth and to accept
joint responsibility for their defence in war'. Here again the
proposal is a British one.

Implications of the Proposals

4. As the memorandum remarks, the practical application of these
proposals involves important considerations, and impinges on the
sovereign control of policy. It therefore seems desirable that
some of their implications be closely examined.

5. In the first place, do the proposals as they stand mean a
transfer to Australia of the political initiative on behalf of the
British Commonwealth in South East Asia, such initiative being
shared with New Zealand.

6. If this is the intention, it is to be presumed:-

(a) that the initiative will be ours in a real sense. Especially
in relation to Indonesia, instances have occurred where a Foreign
Office policy, based largely on non-area considerations, has
supplanted the possibility of any other policy. It is true, with
respect to Indonesia, that Australian policy was only infrequently
expressed and then only in narrow contexts, e.g. the sale of arms
to the Dutch. In these cases, however, the United Kingdom attitude
has sometimes been emphatic to the point where it virtually
excluded any policy but its own. The same remark might be applied
to Sarawak, although here the complaint is initially on the score
of consultation.

(b) that the initiative will embrace the whole field of policy,
including in particular such problems as recognition which have
important practical consequences. Here again the United Kingdom
and Australia approaches to the Indonesian situation provide
examples of divergence.

(c) that no unilateral actions will be taken by other British
countries, which in practice means by the United Kingdom.

7. On our side, a genuine acceptance of the initiative would
presumably carry with it the understanding-
(a) that the formulation of area policies will be expedited.

(b) that our representation in the area will be expanded, and in
some places, considerably strengthened.

(c) that there will be a full transmission of regional information
from Australia.

(d) that there will be an adequate measure of consultation on area
problems.

(e) that Australia will undertake primary responsibility for the
handling of defence problems arising from the application of
Australian policy to particular areas.

8. If the proposals contemplate the transfer of political
initiative, this should more clearly be brought out in the
Australian memorandum, assuming that we are ready to accept the
responsibility. The above understandings should at the same time
be expressed in some way. If, on the other hand, the United
Kingdom intends to retain the initiative, there should be some
clearer indication of that intention than is at present the case.

Any failure, here or in the United Kingdom, plainly to recognise
the nature and degree of our respective responsibilities in South
East Asia from this point onwards can only have the most damaging
results.

9. An entirely distinct question is this: Is Australia prepared to
accept as a fundamental ingredient of her area policies the rule,
embodied in the second proposal, that those policies must at all
times be such as to ensure not, it is to be observed, conditions
favourable to Australia alone but conditions favourable to the
British Commonwealth as a whole? If we are ready to accept this
formula, it seems desirable that these additional understandings
should be recorded in the Australian memorandum or in some other
way-
(a) that Australia must be the ultimate judge of what in South
East Asia does or does not ensure 'favourable conditions to the
British Commonwealth as a whole'.

(b) that in estimating what are 'favourable conditions', full
regard will be paid to obligations imposed by the United Nations
Charter.

Machinery for Consultation

10. The proposals finally imply that, whatever other reading is
given to them, the machinery for consultation on political as
distinct from purely defence questions will be improved.

11i. Present methods leave much to be desired. There is an
insufficiency of consultation on political subjects of regional
importance to us. This partly derives from inadequate machinery.

No area problem can be competently handled by the United Kingdom,
if it retains the initiative in South East Asia, or by Australia
if it takes over that initiative, unless the present political
machinery between here and London is radically improved. The
initial requirement seems to be that our political representation
in London should be overhauled to keep pace with the considerable
changes which have been made in our military representation at
that centre. The important thing is that nothing should be lost to
us through anomalies in channels of communication or through the
inability of political staff, on account of inadequate numbers or
otherwise, to maintain contact on an appropriate level, exercising
an astringent influence where necessary, with British political
departments, especially with the Foreign Office, the Dominions
Office and the Colonial Office where there is sometimes evidence
of a frame of mind altogether out of keeping with the inevitable
changes that are occurring in South East Asia.

Conclusion

12. The British proposals raise implications which are so
important that both these and the reply given in the Australian
memorandum to them should be the subject of Cabinet discussion. No
doubt the present memorandum as a whole will be considered by
Cabinet in due course, before it goes forward. Paragraph 7,
however, is altogether inadequate from our point of view and it is
suggested that an examination of it, posing the above questions,
be embodied in a letter from Dr. Evatt to Mr. Dedman. Before
preparing a draft of this, however, it would be helpful to have
your views and, if possible, an indication of any recommendations
which you feel might be conveyed directly or obliquely. [1]