CO-OPERATION IN BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE
DISCUSSION WITH FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY

I am recording, for your information, an outline of the
discussions which I had with Field Marshal Montgomery at your
request.

2. In Canberra on 2nd July, the Field Marshal commenced by
proposing that Australia should assume the responsibility for
strategical planning for the same area as that covered by the
joint Intelligence Bureau on Intelligence. This is shown on Map
'A'. [1] He suggested that, in war, Australia should also accept
responsibility for the operational control of this area. I have
also had marked on the map the boundaries of the Southwest Pacific
Area and the Southwest Pacific Zone under the special Defence Act
of 1943.

3. I pointed out the important distinction to be drawn between the
expressions used in the United Kingdom and Australian documents
submitted to the Prime Ministers' Conference:-

UNITED KINGDOM

P.M.M. (46) 4 and 20:

'While each member of the Commonwealth would, of course, organise
its own defence policy, it would also assume the main
responsibility for joint planning within its own regional area.'

P.M.M. (46)5:

'Each member of the Commonwealth therefore should agree to take
all steps, political and military, in those areas in which they
are directly concerned, so as to maintain conditions favourable to
the Commonwealth in peace and to accept joint responsibility for
their defence in war.'

AUSTRALIA

P.M.M. (46) 7 and Prime Minister's Observations at Fourth Meeting

'Responsibility for the development of the defence aspect of
matters relating to regional security in the Pacific should be
assigned to the Australian Government machinery.'
4. I emphasised the significance that was to be attached to the
form of words used by the Australian Prime Minister. They were
designedly used in order to conserve to the Australian Government
the absolute right of interpreting the extent to which it was
prepared to go and the commitments which it was prepared to
accept. I also added that the Australian expression was considered
preferable to cover aspects which extended beyond planning, such
as practical steps for the development of Australian resources as
a potential source of supply for British Empire requirements East
of Suez.

5. We had a preliminary discussion of the following memoranda
recently forwarded by you to the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom:-

Co-operation in British Commonwealth Defence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in Australia.

Field Marshal Montgomery stated that the Chief of the Naval Staff
and the Chief of the Air Staff in the United Kingdom were opposed
to the Australian idea of a single United Kingdom Service
representative in Australia with a Joint Service Staff. They
wished to maintain separate Naval, Army and Air representatives as
at present exists on J.C.O.S.A. I said that, as outlined in the
Defence Committee Memorandum on J.C.O.S.A. and supported by the
experience of the Defence Department, the J.C.O.S.A. set up was
top heavy, cumbersome and extravagant. The Australian Chiefs of
Staff and myself were unanimous about the need for a change to a
single representative with a Joint Service Staff. If the United
Kingdom Services wanted representation to the corresponding
Services in Australia, this could be provided separately in the
same manner as Australia had done in the United Kingdom.

Alternatively, the Defence Department and members of his staff
could also be accredited to the Australian Services as
representatives of the corresponding United Kingdom Services.

However, in so far as representation on the Defence Machinery was
concerned, the essential consideration was one Joint Service
Representative with an integrated joint Service Staff. It was
understood that this principle had been followed with United
Kingdom representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
Washington. I pointed out that it was difficult to justify having
an R.N. Admiral and staff for participation in J.C.O.S.A. for the
control of B.C.O.F., the Naval element of which consists of a
naval port party at Kure of a strength of 334, which is in process
of reduction to 95. The naval vessels of the Occupation Force are,
of course, under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, British
Pacific Fleet, Hong Kong. Field Marshal Montgomery said that he,
personally, was in agreement with the views of the Australian
Government. It was agreed to continue the discussion in Melbourne
on 4th July.

6. At the next talk, Field Marshal Montgomery asked me to comment
on a draft of the reply which the United Kingdom Government
proposed to make to your letter of 28th May on Co-operation in
British Commonwealth Defence. I pointed out that the United
Kingdom draft reply opened by referring to the agreement of
Australia to undertake the planning of the strategic zone
surrounding it, and the co-ordination of defence measures in this
region. As mentioned in paragraph 2 above, Field Marshal
Montgomery had suggested more precisely that this region should be
the largest one shown on Map 'A'. I observed that the expression
which had been used in your letter and the enclosure were
identical with those used by you at the Conference of Prime
Ministers and as quoted in paragraph 3 above. I felt sure that the
Australian Government would insist on the use of its own
expression and the interpretation of its meaning. As a sovereign
Government, it must retain the right of deciding its own Policy
and the commitments which it was prepared to accept. Furthermore,
the constitutional history of the British Commonwealth had shown
that the correct process in all these matters was an evolution.

The machinery should be established as proposed by the Australian
Government, and allowed to develop in an evolutionary manner as
problems were tackled. This process could be retarded or even
frustrated by an anxiety to hasten too quickly or by a desire to
push too much on to the Australian Government. The approach had to
be gradual and realistic. Field Marshal Montgomery expressed
complete agreement with these views.

7. I showed Field Marshal Montgomery a map of the boundaries of
the Southwest Pacific Area and the Southwest Pacific Zone as
defined in the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act of 1943. The
approach to the definition of a zone for which Australia would
accept the responsibility for the development of the defence
aspect had to be considered carefully. In regard to the area
suggested by the Field Marshal, I pointed out that this commitment
involved the question of resources to defend it, which Australia
certainly did not possess. He replied that the United Kingdom
would make contributions to it, but I mentioned that, prior to the
war, the United Kingdom had given assurances of providing for the
impregnability of Singapore and sending a fleet there which would
safeguard Australia against invasion. Australian Defence Policy
had been based on these assurances, but, owing to commitments
elsewhere, the United Kingdom had not been able to fulfil its
promises. Any plans would therefore have to be subject to an
agreement on the political level as to the forces to be provided,
and the approach of Governments to prior commitments was always
very cautious. Also, the provisions of Australian legislation
relating to service outside Australia, and national sentiment as
expressed at referenda and elections, should not be overlooked.

Finally, there would need to be a close examination, in relation
to any such commitments, of Australia's manpower resources to
ascertain what forces we could raise and maintain in war, the
manpower requirements for sustaining the economy on a war footing,
and those needed for supply commitments which might be undertaken.

In the last war, we had become over-committed, and created for
ourselves a manpower problem from which we had not extricated
ourselves in 1945, though we had commenced to seek a solution as
early as June 1943.

8. I also pointed out that the United Kingdom draft reply rejected
the Australian idea of a single United Kingdom Service
representative in Australia as mentioned in paragraph 5 above, and
put forward plausible arguments for separate Navy, Army and Air
Force representatives which had been proved fallacious by the
experience of J.C.O.S.A. I said that the Australian Government
would be adamant on the question of United Kingdom representation
in Australia, and, if its view were not accepted, I was quite
certain that the Prime Minister would throw the whole matter back
into the lap of the United Kingdom Government, who would then have
to accept the responsibility for the inability to establish
machinery for Co-operation in Empire Defence. I referred to the
following occasions on which Australian proposals relating to
Empire Co-operation had proved fruitless-for those of Mr. Lyons in
1937, those of Mr. Menzies in 1941, and Mr. Curtin's in 1944. If
Mr. Chifley's proposals of 1946 and 1947 were rejected, the United
Kingdom Government would be in an awkward position. I also said
that Australia was well ahead of the other Dominions in its
practical measures for Empire Co-operation, and any rebuff to the
Government would be unfortunate. While the United Kingdom
Government could lay down the conditions under which the
Australian liaison would be established with its own machinery in
the United Kingdom, it was for the Australian Government to say on
what conditions United Kingdom liaison would be established with
the Australian Machinery, though the soundness of the latter, as
mentioned in paragraph 5, had equal validity to their application
in both countries. The Field Marshal expressed general agreement
with these views.

9. Field Marshal Montgomery asked if we were agreeable to
accepting United Kingdom officers to work with our Joint Planning
Committee. I said that the Memorandum on Co-operation in Empire
Defence proposed that the staff of the United Kingdom Joint
Service Representative would be invited to attend meetings of the
Joint Service Machinery subordinate to the Defence Committee and
Chiefs of Staff Committee. They would not be members of the
subordinate committees, but consultants on the aspects in which
the United Kingdom was interested. This principle had been
followed in the past with the Australian Defence Representative in
London, and it was proposed to observe it in future. On the other
hand, the Australian Memorandum relating to J.C.O.S.A. proposed
that overseas officers should be attached to the Australian
Services and given definite appointments therein, being
responsible solely to the Australian Government. I suggested that
the desirability of these principles should be affirmed, but the
decision should be left to the country concerned. He agreed with
this view.

10. I enclose a letter from Field Marshal Montgomery covering a
copy of a cablegram to the Chiefs of Staff Committee in London
expressing the views agreed upon. Having established agreement
with the Field Marshal, it is important to take a firm stand on
the matter and support him in London.

11. Finally, Field Marshal Montgomery said that he understood that
New Zealand would desire responsibility for a separate strategical
area and that United Kingdom and Australian liaison staffs should
be established in New Zealand reciprocally with New Zealand staffs
in the United Kingdom and Australia. He asked for my views on
this. I said that New Zealand is in the same strategic zone as
Australia, and her defence plans were inseparably linked with
those for which the Australian Machinery would assume the
responsibility. Nevertheless, I would not advise him to attempt to
coax New Zealand away from its desire to have a separate area
under their own control. The arrangement would not be as
satisfactory as if they joined in the wider concept of a strategic
zone in which the planning and operational control was done by the
Australian machinery with their participation. There would
certainly be a subtraction of the total forces that would
otherwise be available to the Australian zone, and a demand for
logistic support from the Australian zone because of the limited
resources of New Zealand. Field Marshal Montgomery agreed with
this view and said he would try 'to jolly' them along, but I
pointed out that, as a Self-Governing Dominion, they were equally
entitled as Australia to lay down the basis on which they were
prepared to co-operate. They had been 'sticky' about the basis of
their participation in a simple thing like the Joint Intelligence
Organisation, and it would not be wise to try to force them into a
conclusion which they did not reach entirely voluntarily.