Verbatim Minutes (extracts) CANBERRA, 1 September 1947

The Conference resumed at 10.10 a.m.

Machinery for Enforcement (Contd.)-
DR.EVATT: We come now to the method of enforcing the terms of the
Treaty, or of taking action to induce the Japanese Government to
carry out the terms of the Treaty. I think that as the Conference
has progressed we have, in the course of discussion of a number of
items, discussed the question of machinery. Sir Rama Rau has,
throughout the Conference, reminded us of the difficulties of
enforcement in the event of breach of the restrictions imposed. I
notice that a section of the press has emphasised that some
breaches might be comparatively trifling, while others might go
right to the root of the Treaty. In defining the functions of the
supervisory body, I do not think we can usefully do more than to
provide that this body shall supervise the implementation of the
Treaty by the Japanese Government. At a later stage it will be
necessary to turn our attention to the Treaty to examine the
nature of the obligations to be imposed and the action to be taken
in the event of breach; and related to that is the matter of the
force to be kept in reserve. Paragraph 32 of 'Preliminary Notes on
Provisional Agenda' prepared by myself sets out certain
alternatives. Those alternatives are not by any means exhaustive,
but they indicate that there is a number of possibilities. These
alternatives appear to include:-

(1) Japan to be occupied by forces of the Allied countries until
the Supervisory Commission decided these forces should:

(i) be limited to certain points in Japan, or
(ii) be evacuated altogether.

Meanwhile the occupying forces not to be restricted to any
specified areas. These forces could, at the discretion of the
Supervisory Commission, be supplemented by forces garrisoning
adjacent island bases;

(2) Small garrisons of the Supervisory Commission for Japan might
be placed at certain designated areas in Japan. These forces might
be supplemented by forces garrisoning adjacent island bases;

(3) All Allied troops to be withdrawn from the main Japanese
islands. Garrison forces under the control of the Supervisory
Commission to be stationed in adjacent island bases. The
Supervisory Commission for Japan to have the right to land forces
in Japan for the purpose of preserving order or ensuring
compliance by the Japanese Government with the terms of the
Treaty; and full rights to patrol Japanese waters and the air
above Japan with its naval and air forces.

The alternatives set out do not purport to cover the number of
possibilities. I am most emphatically of the opinion that we
cannot advance very far without frank discussion with the United
States. That country, because of the major part it has played in
the occupation of Japan, must be consulted and its views
ascertained before we can proceed farther in discussion of this
aspect.

In discussion of paragraph 20, relative to the establishment of a
Supervisory Commission for Japan, the consensus of opinion was
that the Supervisory Commission should be representative of the
countries which will make the Peace. Paragraph 21 describes the
Commission's functions in very wide terms, while paragraphs 22, 23
and 24 set out possible occasions for action by the Supervisory
Commission. Paragraph 26 deals with the possible failure of Japan
to fulfil her economic obligations, and suggests consultations
with the Japanese Government. Paragraphs 27 and 28 deal with the
type of machinery to be constituted. Paragraph 29 deals with the
cost involved, suggesting that the expenditure of the Secretariat,
Inspectorial Staff and Military Occupation Force should be borne
by the Japanese Government, and salaries and allowances of
representatives on the Commission by member governments appointing
them.

Those suggestions are put forward simply as a basis for
discussion, but in the absence of representatives of the chief
participant, the United States, it is difficult to formulate a
plan. For instance, supposing when the Peace Treaty is signed, the
Government of the U.S.A. determines that it will not be necessary
to maintain a force in Japan. My Government has not come to any
decision in anticipation of such a happening, other than to
express its determination to bear its full share of
responsibility, but my personal opinion is that it will be
necessary to maintain some force to support the Supervisory
Commission in Japan. I look to the Supervisory Commission to be,
in the main, an advisory body, working in close co-operation with
the Japanese Government.

I think we should now have a general discussion of the two
questions which are so inter-connected. We have already discussed
the constitution and voting method to be adopted by the treaty-
making body, and we agreed that there should not be a right of
'veto' because of the danger of stalemate. The main function of
the Supervisory Commission will be the implementation of the
Treaty. I do not think it is necessary for us to formulate any
precise definition of the Commission's function; I think it will
be left to the commonsense, wisdom and restraint of its members.

LORD ADDISON: As to the location of the force, our view is that,
clearly, when the Treaty is drawn up and the control machinery is
established it will be undesirable to have a force in Japan
itself. We believe that that would make difficult Japan's recovery
and would present a good many other difficulties which are obvious
to all of us. So that, whatever striking force may be deemed
desirable or necessary, our view on the whole is that it will
certainly be desirable that that force should be outside Japan.

Another point which I regard as important is, as to whether the
Supervisory Commission should be competent to call upon the
striking force so as to give to it any form of direction. It is
evident, I think, that whoever provided the striking force would
claim that the use of its military forces must be at its own
direction and not at the direction of somebody else, although the
Supervisory Commission might represent to an appropriate body what
its necessities were. That would necessarily raise the question as
to whether, in the Treaty, there should be one instrument or two
instruments; that is to say, a Treaty as such, and some other form
of inter-allied body or agreement as to who should give directions
regarding the use of the striking force. Supposing that the
U.S.A., which is highly probable, provided the greater part of the
striking force. I believe that they themselves would wish their
command to decide how, when, and in what form that force was to be
used if it were used, and that they should not be at the direction
of somebody else. Therefore, I believe that there would
necessarily be some body of persons to whom the Supervisory
Commission would make its report, and who would be responsible for
issuing directions, or at all events of conferring upon the method
of use of the striking force. I can understand that the
inspectorial and other functions mentioned by Dr. Evatt would be
precisely as he has described them.

DR. EVATT: What Lord Addison has said about the second matter
throws us back upon the matter of voting at the Supervisory
Commission. Supposing no forces were available except those of the
U.S.A., it is quite certain that they will not agree to accept a
majority vote of the Supervisory Commission binding them to use
their forces. They will have to consent to the use of their
forces, I should imagine. These matters are related. We cannot yet
see how the force will be composed, and the views of the U.S.A. on
the matter are not known.

MR. CLAXTON: I believe that we agree very generally with the main
line of your approach to this subject. Also, we certainly feel, as
you do, that it is one of the most important and also one of the
most difficult subjects that we have to deal with in making peace
with Japan. I believe that in the relationship of the Supervisory
Commission to any agency to execute the terms of the Treaty will
be found an extraordinarily difficult area of matters which will
probably have to be worked out, as you suggest, according to the
good sense of the parties concerned. Unquestionably, since the
U.S.A. will have the main if not the sole responsibility for
carrying out the provisions, it will want to ensure that if it is
to pay the piper to such a great degree it will be in a position
to call the tune in regard to executive action. I do not think
that anything that we can say can help very much in the approach
to the negotiations which will have to go on when the conference
meets. It would seem to me, for example, that the matters
indicated in your paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 26 tie in all along
the line with the work of carrying out the Treaty, and that there
might have to be a pretty wide area in which there will have to be
reliance on the desire to co-operate and the good sense of the
parties concerned. Here, we are dealing with three main objects in
the Peace with Japan; first, demilitarisation; secondly,
democratisation; and thirdly, the restoration of a viable economy.

It may be that the functions of the Supervisory Commission and its
powers may vary in regard to each of those three matters, but
generally speaking it would seem to me that the Supervisory
Commission should largely be an agency which would be fact-finding
and advisory but which probably it will be found desirable should
not have very much executive power in the major fields of
implementing the Treaty. There again we come to the relationship
with the executive power, whatever it may be. We are very
interested in the suggestions that have been made by New Zealand
in regard to tying in this arrangement with the United Nations.

Without going into details, I believe that our view is that it
would be generally desirable that that should be done as closely
as it can be workable without bringing ourselves or the
Supervisory Commission or anybody else within any of the veto
provisions. It seems to us that the time during which the
Supervisory Commission and the occupation are to last, is a very
important matter. I know that our advisers hold the view that the
occupation should last for possibly twenty years or something
approaching that, which most people seem to agree will be
necessary to complete the democratisation of Japan.

LORD ADDISON: Occupation by what-a Supervisory Committee or a
military force?
MR. CLAXTON: Not necessarily by troops within the country, but
along the lines which you have suggested. Speaking personally, I
seriously doubt the possibility of any democratic nation or group
of such nations continuing to occupy or even to supervise a great
power so as to enforce during that period a peace treaty which
will not give a former great power a viable economy.

MR. CLAXTON: I do not think that it will work, but that does not
mean that it should not be tried. I cannot envisage large bodies
of troops remaining in occupation almost indefinitely. I do not
desire a soft peace, but a long term view leads me to that
decision. We may either plan for a shorter term, or follow the
interesting suggestion of Dr. Norman [1] that provision should be
made in the Treaty, or in some supplementary document, for the
Japanese to free themselves progressively from some of the
provisions of the Treaty as they demonstrate to the satisfaction
of the Supervisory Commission, or some other agency of the United
Nations, that they have in good faith carried out the provisions
of the Treaty. Some kind of escalator to freedom would provide an
incentive to the Japanese, and might also show the other nations
that occupation or control for the full period of twenty years may
not be necessary. That aspect of the Treaty should be carefully
examined at Washington, or wherever the next conference is held,
because it may be one of the most efficient ways of inducing Japan
genuinely to accept and work under a democratic system.

DR. EVATT: Mr. Claxton's last point is not dissimilar to paragraph
24 of my preliminary notes on the Provisional Agenda. It follows
Dr. Norman's line of thought-hope as well as fear.

DR. CLAXTON: At this stage, it is difficult for us to go into
detail. All that we can do is to exchange views on general
objectives.

[matter omitted]

MR FRASER: In what way is it proposed to prevent the Japanese from
doing something forbidden by the Peace Treaty?
DR. EVATT: You mean that when the Treaty forbids the Japanese to
engage in the manufacture of aircraft, for instance, how are we to
ensure that she does not, in fact, manufacture them?
MR. FRASER: That is the kind of thing I have in mind. It is not
proposed that we shall accept responsibility for the running of
Japan or for its economic welfare. We will help Japan, but the
Japanese Government must accept final responsibility.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to ensure that Japan does not
infringe the provisions of the Treaty by doing those things that
would make possible a military or naval resurgence.

MR. CLAXTON: Mr. Fraser has expressed the opinion of the Canadian
Government on this point.

SIR RAMA RAU: There is a fundamental difference between the
present situation in Japan, and the situation which may develop
after the signing of the Peace Treaty and the withdrawal of the
occupation force. At present, when the Supreme Commander gives an
order it is readily complied with because the Japanese are only
too anxious to get rid of the occupation force. Once that force is
withdrawn the Japanese might not exhibit the same willingness to
observe the provisions of the Peace Treaty. I am very much
attracted by the idea of remote control by a military force
situated on Okinawa or some adjacent Island.

MR. DEDMAN: I think we can gain some helpful information by
studying the present methods of control in Japan, and by
considering how they can be most effectively replaced. The Supreme
Commander exercises control now by issuing orders which are
enforced by the Japanese Government, and all the time his
authority is backed up by the presence of a considerable
occupation force. After the signing of the Peace Treaty the
Supervisory Commission will take the place of General MacArthur
and his forces. To what extent the functions of this Commission
will be purely advisory, or to what extent it will be able to
dictate terms to the Japanese Government, I do not know, but I
imagine that its functions will be chiefly advisory. It will not
be possible to maintain the military occupation of Japan for any
considerable time. The Supreme Commander has already indicated
that, in his opinion, the occupation forces should be withdrawn
about June next, and the Australian Government is of the same
opinion. For my part, I do not think that it is necessary to keep
a military force in Japan in order to ensure that the plans of the
Supervisory Commission are given effect. I believe that once the
Commission is functioning, we can rely upon the control of
Japanese exports and imports to ensure the obedience of the
Japanese Government to the directions of the Supervisory
Commission. It is true that this might involve the application of
economic sanctions, enforced perhaps, by a naval blockade. But
apart from this, there should be no need for a large military
force either inside Japan or outside it. The question would then
arise whether a naval force should be set aside especially for the
purpose of ensuring the observance of the Peace Treaty, or whether
use should be made in case of need of such general security forces
as it was deemed advisable to maintain in the Pacific area. If a
special force were organised and maintained to enforce the Treaty
the U.S.A. would have to supply the bulk of it, but Australia
would like to be associated with it and so, probably, would New
Zealand. Such a force might be stationed at Okinawa or thereabout,
and might be a purely naval force, or a combined naval and air
force. Personally, I do not think it would be necessary to set up
a force just for this purpose, and I incline to the belief that
the functions we have in mind could quite well be exercised by a
general Pacific security force. Indeed, I see nothing wrong in
using the need for a force of some kind to ensure Treaty
observance in order to secure as soon as possible the organisation
of a Pacific security force.

SIR RAMA RAU: It is assumed that there will be a military or
police force maintained in Japan itself in order to enforce
compliance with import and export restrictions? It would be very
difficult for a force stationed outside Japan to attend to matters
of that kind.

MR. DEDMAN: That would come under the heading of inspection.

DR. EVATT: Let us take that as a good test of the problem
following upon what Mr. Dedman has said. I think everybody
appreciates the force of the point that, as Japan is so dependent
upon imports, it is through imports that we can perhaps effect the
greatest measure of control by prohibitions and restrictions. The
aircraft industry, for instance, could not be carried on without
the importation of certain raw materials from overseas. I
understand that Japan has no bauxite, or materials of that kind,
for the manufacture of aluminium. How is import control to be
policed? Not by military police, but by the inspectorate of the
Supervisory Commission. It is not suggested that the officers of
the Commission should be located at the wharves, as arc customs
officers, but that they should have access to all ships and be
able to find out what is going on. I do not think it is proposed
that there should be a military force to carry out any particular
injunctions against the landing of any specified consignments. I
emphasise the point made by Mr. Dedman, namely, that a good deal
will depend on the attitude of the United States of America. I
should like to make clear what the Supreme Commander told me. As
you perhaps know, he thinks the time has come to make a peace
settlement with Japan. He thinks the peace settlement should be
made not later than the middle of next year. He hopes that it may
be earlier. He contemplates that the present occupation by a large
body of troops in Japan will no longer be continued. I think it is
consistent with his view that there may be some relatively small
force in Japan itself. This is my own view on the matter: If the
Supervisory Commission requires a force of, say, a battalion, such
a force would be no more than an indication of the authority of
the Commission which represents a number of governments. I should
have thought that that would possibly be what the United States of
America would wish. The force would be completely different in
numbers from the present force. Then you come to the question as
to where the reserve force is to be located. That would depend, to
some degree, on the territorial provisions of the Peace Treaty. It
may be that the United States of America would wish to control the
situation exclusively. I think that would be a very bad thing for
the Pacific as a whole. It would be for the benefit of countries
like Australia and New Zealand not to be excluded from such a body
if one of its duties is to look to the enforcement of the Treaty.

When you come to economic sanctions, involving the use of naval
vessels, you must face up to the fact that countries other than
those which were at war with Japan are associated in some way with
the problem. There will be some obligation imposed by the Treaty
on the Japanese Government not to trade contrary to the terms of
the Treaty with certain countries which did not declare war on
Japan.

Mr. Dedman has raised the very important question of regional
arrangements in the Pacific. Eighteen months ago or more the
American Government suggested a four power treaty for protection
against Japanese aggression for a period of, I think, 20 years.

Nothing has been done in connection with that. It may be that that
proposal will be dealt with by the Peace Treaty on a somewhat
different basis. The Australian viewpoint would be that an
undertaking should be made against aggression in the Pacific, from
whatever source the aggression may come, rather than that an
instrument should be directed against Japanese aggression.

MR. DEDMAN: I cannot see how anything we have discussed here in
relation to the Supervisory Commission would require a military
force in Japan itself. The work of the Commission would mainly
include civil inspection of what is going on. If, for instance, as
the result of its investigations the Commission came to the
conclusion that Japan was surreptitiously trying to revive its
aircraft production industry, the Commission would advise that the
importation for materials required for that industry should not be
allowed. Then, the force, however it may be constituted, would be
used to see that no importations of such materials were made. I
should much prefer this to be linked up with general security
arrangements in the Pacific. On occasions the enforcement of the
provisions of the Treaty might require a very large force; it
might require the stationing of vessels at every port around the
coasts of Japan to ensure that prohibited imports were not being
landed; but for the greater part of the time the force would have
nothing to do. The nations of the Pacific jointly could, at
request, provide the requisite forces.

MR. FRASER: That will have to be watched with great caution.

Nobody could undertake that task except the Security Council. I
think it is desirable to have security on a regional basis, but
the nations agreeing to the Treaty cannot be construed as agreeing
to regional security. It is a question as to whether there can be
such a thing as regional security, and whether we should not
regard it as world security. We cannot overlook the growing
antagonism in Russia and America and the fact that the press of
both countries misconstrues and places the worst complexion upon
everything done by the other. We should keep ourselves as free as
possible to deal with any situation that may arise. In order to
achieve security we must reach agreement not only with the
principal nations but also with China, India, and even Mexico and
most of the South American countries.

DR. EVATT: That links up with your previous point that we must
work through the United Nations. If you have economic sanctions
you might have a legal right to impose them under the Treaty, but
you might get into great difficulties unless they are brought into
the jurisdiction of the United Nations.