The United Kingdom Embassy in Washington have now received a reply
from the State Department to their protest against the decision of
the United States Government to authorise a Japanese whaling
expedition for the 1947/48 season. The reply is in uncompromising
terms and indicates that the Americans are determined to proceed
with this project.

2. We fully share your views on this unilateral American decision
and propose to inform the United States Government that we cannot
accept the arguments by which they endeavour to justify their
action.

3. However badly we may feel about this whaling expedition, I
suggest that we should consider it in the broad context of general
relations with the United States and with due regard to the
possible effects of any action taken now on the United States
attitude at the Japanese Peace Conference.

4. You will be aware that the Americans have shown apprehension
about the scope and purpose of the British Commonwealth meeting at
Canberra and their proposal for a preliminary international
conference as early as 19th August may have been considerably
influenced by this factor. In spite of the assurances given by Dr.

Evatt and by ourselves they are still very sensitive on the
subject and we are in fact still without any formal assurance that
a date will be arranged which will not conflict with the Canberra
meeting. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations will, I
understand, be telegraphing separately to you about this latter
point.

5. If the whaling paper now before the Far Eastern Commission is
pressed to a vote, the United States will unquestionably veto it;

(they have already given notice of their intention to do so). This
would of course be the first use of the veto in the history of the
Commission and that being so may well have consequence far beyond
the particular question at issue. An open breach with the
Americans coming almost immediately before the Canberra meeting
and with the Japanese Peace Conference in prospect can hardly fail
to have undesirable repercussions.

6. Moreover we cannot now prevent the 1947/48 expedition; and it
is highly probable that we shall have an opportunity for a full
discussion on this question in the Peace Conference before the
next whaling season. In these circumstances we consider that we
have more to lose than to gain by pressing the whaling paper to a
vote in the Far Eastern Commission at any rate before the question
of a date for the Japanese Peace Conference has been
satisfactorily resolved.

7. We intend of course to press for the assurances referred to in
paragraph (3) of our telegram No. 138. [1]

8. I shall be grateful for your views on the foregoing and I much
hope that in the meantime you will feel able to instruct your
representative on the Far Eastern Commission not to force this
issue to a vote for the time being.

9. I am addressing a similar telegram to the Prime Minister of New
Zealand.