AN APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
OCCUPATION FORCE

Reference is made to my memorandum of 15th April, in which it was
advised that the question raised in Cablegram No.29 dated 22nd
February, from the Prime Minister of New Zealand, relating to the
value of continued British participation in the occupation of
Japan, was being considered by the Defence Committee.

2. A summary of the views of this Department against the
withdrawal of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force is
embodied in paragraph 3 of this Department's memorandum of 15th
April.

3. The Defence Committee, augmented by representatives of the
United Kingdom, India and New Zealand, has now completed its
examination of an appreciation of the military aspects of B.C.O.F.

prepared by the Joint Planning Staffs. In its consideration the
Defence Committee took into account the views set out in the draft
cablegram prepared by your Department as a proposed reply to
cablegram No.29, and forwarded to this Department for comment. The
suggestion of the United Kingdom authorities in Dominions Office
cablegram No.3 that the port and district of Kobe be included in
the B.C.O.F. area, which is commented upon in your draft
cablegram, has been mentioned by the Defence Committee in its
appreciation. A separate memorandum is being forwarded to you on
this matter [1]

4. A copy of the 'Appreciation of the Value of B.C.O.F.' submitted
by the Defence Committee (Extended) is forwarded herewith for any
comments which you may have from the political aspect, before
action is taken to arrange for it to be sent to New Zealand. In
view of cablegram No.3 from the Dominions Office expressing the
desire of the United Kingdom authorities to participate in any
discussions taking place on the question raised by New Zealand in
cablegram No.29, it is also proposed to send a copy of the
appreciation to the United Kingdom.

5. An additional copy of the appreciation is enclosed which the
Acting Minister for Defence considers might be forwarded by air
mail to the Minister for External Affairs while he is in Japan.

Enclosure

Defence Committee Minute 137/1947 22 April 1947
(JCOSA No.588), Appendix A

TOP SECRET

DEFENCE COMMITTEE (EXTENDED)
AN APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE OF B.C.O.F.

INTRODUCTION:

1. In this appreciation the economic and political aspects, which
are inseparable from the purely military object and role of BCOF,
have been considered in the light of the views expressed by the
Department of External Affairs in their draft telegram to New
Zealand, with regard to the proposed reduction of the New Zealand
Army Component. (External Affairs memorandum of 28th February,
1947 refers.) Views expressed by the Government of the United
Kingdom concerning the economic importance of the Kobe area have
also been taken into account.

2. The decision to send a British Commonwealth Force to Japan was
made by the British Commonwealth Governments concerned not at the
request of the United States Government, but with its concurrence.

The details of the consequent agreement between the British
Commonwealth Governments concerned and the United States
Government are embodied in the Memorandum for Record (commonly
referred to as the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement) signed at Tokyo
on 18 December, 1945 [2], as modified by the provisions set out by
the United States Government in its note dated 22nd January, 1946,
to the Australian Legation at Washington. [3]

OBJECTS AND ROLE OF BCOF:

3. The objects of BCOF are set out in the directive to Commander-
in-Chief,
BCOF, are as follows:-

(a) to represent worthily the British Commonwealth in the
occupation of Japan;

(b) to maintain and enhance British Commonwealth prestige and
influence in the eyes of the Japanese and of our Allies; and
(c) to illustrate to, and impress on, the Japanese people, as far
as may be possible, the democratic way and purpose of life.

In addition, the establishment of BCOF and its control and
administration, which includes provisioning and maintenance, are
regarded as constituting a further development in British
Commonwealth co-operation.

4. The military role of BCOF was agreed by the British
Commonwealth Governments concerned to be, under the direction of
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within the area
allotted to BCOF:-

(a) the safeguarding of all Allied installations, and of all
Japanese installations awaiting demilitarisation;

(b) the demilitarisation and disposal of Japanese installations
and armaments; and
(c) military control; this does not include military government.

STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE PACIFIC:

5. The present Allied occupation of Japan and the consequential
control of her resources, economic development, and war potential,
maintains for the United States and the British Commonwealth a
favourable strategic position in the Pacific. Whilst it is
unlikely that the withdrawal of BCOF would jeopardise the United
States Forces in Japan, it would certainly rob them of a valued
contribution to their security and, from a military point of view,
could not be regarded as an act conducive to co-operation in
matters affecting the Pacific.

6. The withdrawal of BCOF from Japan might lead to a public demand
in the United States for the withdrawal of the United States
Forces in conformity with the withdrawal of the British
Commonwealth Forces. Whilst such a demand might embarrass the
United States Government we are of the opinion that it would not,
of itself, cause the withdrawal of the United States Forces from
Japan. However, should any combination of reasons cause the United
States Government to withdraw its troops, Japan would be less able
to resist propaganda from her most powerful neighbour-Russia, and
powerless to prevent any military infiltration or occupation that
Russia might be disposed to initiate. In this case, the favourable
strategic position referred to in paragraph 5 would be reversed.

In fact, strategically any decisions to withdraw BCOF will react
against the best interests of the British Commonwealth as a whole,
and against Australia and New Zealand in particular.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS:

7. Participation by members of the British Commonwealth in BCOF
gives some tangible evidence of their willingness to share in the
obligations involved in the maintenance of security in the
Pacific. Participation in the occupation of Japan by them will
strengthen their undoubted claim to participate as principals in
the peace settlement. The withdrawal of any country at the present
stage would tend to weaken United States/British Commonwealth
influence in Japan and so provide an opportunity for an increase
in Russian political influence.

8. It is believed that the importance of membership of the Far
Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan is
considerable. The position of the British Commonwealth Members of
these bodies is strengthened by the fact that the Occupation of
Japan is not entirely an American commitment.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS:

9. The presence of British Commonwealth Forces in the Allied
Occupation Forces in Japan ensures that the value of the British
Commonwealth as a factor in developments in the Far East is not
underrated or overlooked. In this regard, the more widespread and
influential the sections of the Japanese public who have the
advantage of contact with these Forces, the greater will be
British Commonwealth economic and social influence with Japan in
the future.

10. We would emphasise at this stage that the recent reductions
which have taken place or have been agreed upon in BCOF because of
extreme manpower difficulties, and any further reductions which
may take place for similar reasons, render it all the more
important from the political, the economic, and the military
viewpoints that BCOF should be in occupation of an area which is
of real significance. It follows, therefore, that the smaller the
size of BCOF, the greater the importance which attaches to the
area occupied.

11. With the imminent re-entry of Japan into the world's economy,
it is clearly important for the trade of all British Commonwealth
countries that the British Commonwealth acquires a direct
responsibility in the control of a suitable port of entry for
trade, e.g. the Kobe area. (United Kingdom Saving telegram No.3,
dated 12th February, 1947, refers.) This economic aspect, though
not stated in the directive to Commander-in-Chief, BCOF, since the
directive may be read by other nationals, is none the less
implicit as one of the reasons which induced the British
Commonwealth Governments to participate in the occupation of
Japan. Having regard to the discussions which have taken place
between the United Kingdom, the Dominions and the United States
Governments concerning the level of Japanese merchant
shipbuilding, it appears that the Japanese export trade will be
carried largely by ships of other nations for many years to come.

12. From a long-term aspect the occupation by BCOF of a port such
as Kobe will be of great assistance to the British Commonwealth
Mercantile Marine in obtaining its share of Japan's overseas
carrying trade.

13. Against these advantages must be set the fact that the
maintenance of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force involves
an economic strain on the countries concerned, principally in
manpower, and to some extent in shipping and finance.

CARRYING OUT OF MILITARY ROLE:

14. The demilitarisation and disposal of Japanese installations
and armaments has virtually been completed without resistance from
the Japanese. But the safeguarding of all Allied installations,
and equipment and goods to be used for reparations, still remains
a task while Allied forces or British Civil Missions, requiring
Allied military protection, remain in Japan. SCAP has stated his
opinion that so long as there is not sign of disunity or break-up
among the United States/British Commonwealth contingents, and the
Allied front is maintained with properly balanced forces, there is
no possibility of the Japanese giving trouble. Properly balanced
Occupation Forces should therefore be retained in Japan so long as
there is a military commitment.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF BCOF:

15. It is desired to stress the importance both now, and in the
future, of the objects of BCOF as given in sub-paragraph 3(b) and
3(c) above. These objects are largely civil. We wish to emphasise
that the present Force is attempting militarily (with some
success) to achieve these objects:-

(a) by providing the military backing for the United States
Military Government in the BCOF area;

(b) by efficiency, smartness of turn-out and by the standard of
equipment arid drill;

(c) by preservation of the dignity of all ranks on or off duty;

and
(d) by the influence and conduct of the Provost Courts which deal
with Japanese offenders against occupation rules. At these open
Courts the Japanese public can see democratic law and justice
functioning in practice. These Provost Courts, composed of BCOF
personnel, are a potent factor in impressing upon the Japanese the
control exercised by BCOF and the fair dealing which true
democracy represents.

16. With regard to 15 (a) above, the British Commonwealth of its
own wish, as
expressed in the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement, does not exercise
the functions of military government. BCOF has, however, small
teams attached to all the United States Military Government
organisations operating in the BCOF area. Thus, although it is
true that BCOF has no direct responsibility in framing military
Government policy, it is not entirely divorced from what the
United States authorities are doing, and can therefore influence
them to some extent.

17. Having regard to its size, and the little time it has been in
Japan, the evidence points to BCOF achieving a reasonable success
in illustrating to and impressing upon the Japanese people the
democratic way and purpose in life current in the British
Commonwealth countries concerned.

18. With the virtual conclusion of the demilitarisation and
disposal of Japanese installations and armaments, Commander-in-
chief, BCOF has been reviewing the size and composition of his
Force. Whilst it is clear that any reductions found possible can
be made under the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement, it should be
noted that unilateral action by a British Commonwealth Government
to reduce its forces, without full consideration of the problems
of the other British Commonwealth Governments concerned, is likely
to produce an unbalanced Force and is contrary to the spirit of
British Commonwealth co-operation which it was hoped BCOF would
develop. Such unilateral action would throw an extra strain on the
other participating countries.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CO-OPERATION:

19. BCOF affords a useful experiment in the integration of British
Commonwealth Forces and is therefore valuable from the point of
view of present and future British Commonwealth Co-operation. For
this reason, Commander-in-Chief, BCOF was directed to foster the
maximum integration of Services and personnel. This maximum
integration can only be achieved if each participating country
provides its quota of personnel. Those participating countries
which would otherwise lack an opportunity for overseas service for
their forces are provided with this opportunity by BCOF. This is
particularly valuable from the administrative point of view as
problems of maintaining a force overseas in peace are similar to
those which occur in war.

CONCLUSIONS:

20. The Defence Committee (Extended) concludes that, in spite of
the economic difficulties in maintaining a British Commonwealth
Force, BCOF is of value to the British Commonwealth in general and
the participating countries in particular for the following
reasons:-

(a) The contribution of BCOF assists the United States Forces in
the present necessary Allied occupation of Japan. This military
control must continue at least until the signing of the peace
treaty has been concluded, satisfactory guarantees for its
fulfilment established, and assurances exist that Japan will not
become an easy mark for exploitation which Russia might be
disposed to initiate. The British Commonwealth should therefore
continue to play its part in order to fulfil the obligations
incurred when they decided to participate in the occupation of
Japan.

(b) The withdrawal of BCOF might embarrass the United States
Government politically and strategically and reduce the degree of
co-operation being achieved with them in the Pacific, with adverse
effects on the British Commonwealth.

(c) The withdrawal of BCOF would greatly lessen British
Commonwealth prestige in the eyes of the Japanese as well as in
the eyes of the United States, and other countries, especially
those in the Pacific. This loss would strengthen any tendency to
underrate the value of the British Commonwealth as a whole, as a
factor in the security of the Pacific area, and, in particular,
would damage the prestige of Australia and New Zealand, as powers
in the Pacific.

(d) Presence of BCOF in Japan supports the claim of the British
Commonwealth as a whole, and of the participating countries in
particular, to take part as principals in the formulation of the
Japanese peace treaty.

(e) Presence of BCOF in Japan strengthens the position of the
British Commonwealth representatives on the Far Eastern Commission
and on the Allied Council for Japan.

(f) Presence of BCOF in Japan ensures that the British
Commonwealth's value as an economic and social factor in
developments in the Far East is not overlooked or underrated.

(g) BCOF and its associated problems afford valuable experience in
British Commonwealth co-operation and provide administrative
experience and overseas service to such participating countries as
would otherwise lack them.

(h) Withdrawal of BCOF would eliminate Japanese contact with
British Service personnel and would end the illustration of the
British Commonwealth way of life which an appreciable section of
the Japanese population see in the everyday work of the Force.

Chairman:

G. JONES
Air Marshal
Chief of the General Staff