Departmental Dispatch 26/1948 BATAVIA, 15 September 1948

THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE REPUBLIC

An attempt is made in this Despatch briefly to trace the main line
of development in the present political crisis in the Republic and
to give some account of the issues involved and of the disposition
of the conflicting groups. I add as an appendix [1], a short note
on the history of Communism in Indonesia, largely borrowed from
the researches of the British Consulate-General. Sources for the
body of the Despatch are press reports, conversations and common
surmise.

1. The Development of the Crisis
2. You will remember that the Left wing parties refused Hatta's
offer, when he formed his Cabinet at the beginning of February, of
three seats in the Government. [2] Their refusal was of course,
understandable, since to have participated in a Cabinet, to the
Presidential character of which they strongly objected, having
earlier fought hard for the Parliamentary Cabinet, and which was
so dominated by the Conservative parties to which they were
opposed, would have considerably weakened their position.

Furthermore, the overthrow of Sjarifuddin's Government over the
Renville Agreement and the subsequent acceptance of this Agreement
by Hatta's Government, rankled. However, it did not appear at the
time that the Left contemplated nonparticipation in the Government
as a long term policy but expected that the conservative
composition of the Cabinet would be modified and more substantial
representation offered. If this were so, such expectations were
not realised; Hatta maintained his offer for a time but did not
increase it. The Left continued in its refusal and was
consequently excluded from the Government.

3. Previously the Masjumi had likewise refused to co-operate in
the Left wing Government of Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin. However, it
usually had in fact been represented (by such people as Mohammed
Natsir and Mohammed Rum), even though it disclaimed responsibility
for its members in Cabinet. Moreover, despite the opposition to
preceding Governments' policies towards the Dutch, it had never
constituted an active opposition within the country. These things
could not now be said of the Left wing. Only two members of Left
wing organisations had joined the Cabinet, Supeno, (Pesindo) and
Kusnan (Labour), but in doing so they severed their party
connections and were listed as 'non-partisan'. Hatta, who has
socialist views, was by virtue of his position above party
platforms. The Left then, was separated from the Government in a
way in which the Masjumi had never been. Furthermore, where the
Masjumi had been content with a more or less passive role on
domestic issues, the Left, despite Hatta's announcement that it
had agreed to support his Government's programme, began to develop
as a dynamic Opposition.

4. Until this time, domestic programmes had never become important
issues within the Republic. For the conservative parties this was
natural enough since no significant changes had threatened, to
provoke them. On the other hand, the Left wing parties, from
whence change was to be expected, had always been closely
associated with the Government and so distracted from domestic
issues by the tasks of maintaining the national revolution and
reaching some settlement with the Dutch. Domestic conflicts had
largely been obscured in the exigencies of national policy. Now,
independent of governmental responsibilities and of obligations to
other parties in coalition, the Left was free to develop its
position.

5. The state of the country was increasingly favourable to Left
wing agitation. After the Japanese occupation and nearly three
years of national revolution, plus the losses suffered during the
July 'police action' and the effect of the Dutch blockade, the
economy was in a critical condition. Now there were the additional
losses involved in the withdrawals under Renville and the added
pressure of troops moving in from the Dutch-occupied areas and of
evacuees. Shortages were widespread and severe, costs were
soaring, while wages remained at a level that had not been raised
since the Japanese occupation. Hardship forced many into looting
and brigandage. These conditions were bound to force domestic
issues to the fore in Republican politics. The Government
recognised the situation and expounded policies of rationalisation
and reconstruction with which it planned to build up a more
favourable economy. However, these did not satisfy the Left and it
accused the Government of neglect of the peasants and workers and
demanded the formation of a new Government which would be
interested to 'secure the fate of the working class'.

6. The position of opposition and agitation adopted by the Left
wing groups under Sjarifuddin and Setiadjit, caused an early split
in the Socialist Party and on 11th February a new 'Socialist Party
of Indonesia' (Partai Socialis Indonesia) was established under
the leadership of Sjahrir (though he himself was absent from
Indonesia at the time). it included the two cabinet members who
had earlier broken away, Supeno, and Kusnan. In explanation of the
move, Sjahrir stated that he and his followers wished to prevent
the sharpening of class antagonisms and the disunity in the
national ranks which must follow. (He later attacked Sjarifuddin's
group for concentrating only on Left Wing followers and ignoring
the feudal classes.) At the same time there were, and are,
important differences between the new party and the old: the
socialism of Sjarifuddin's party is predominantly working class
socialism and the party looks for its support among the workers'
unions, the seasonal labourers, the dispossessed, the peasants,
and sections of the youth movement; Sjahrir's group on the other
hand, is predominantly doctrinaire and since it seeks solutions
rather than the promotion of special interests, is of a moderate,
'middle of the road' character, happier, I suspect, in the solid
atmosphere of a national revolution than in the rough and tumble
of party politics. Typical of the intellectualising tendencies of
the group is Sjahrir's theory of the development of the Asian
nationalist movements into a third world bloc holding the balance
between Soviet Communism and American Capitalism. One has the
impression that the party lacks a grudge; it certainly lacks a
popular following. However, though it can never become one of the
major parties within the Republic, the influence of its members in
high political circles should not be underestimated, particularly
at this time when their opposition to Communism and the class war
places them behind the Government.

7. Sjarifuddin shortly organised a number of Left wing groups, the
Socialist, Communist and Labour Parties, SOBSI and the Farmers'
Union, into a union called the People's Democratic Front (Front
Democrasi Rakjat) and began a tour of the Republican provinces in
Java, organising and agitating among workers, peasants, evacuees
and demobilised personnel at mass meetings and in the towns and in
the villages. He seems to have had little to say on national
issues and to have concentrated on the domestic front, plugging
the general leftist line of democracy in Indonesia for the workers
and peasants. Specific targets of attack were the Masjumi Party,
as representing the conservative landowning and business class,
the Government's lack of a constructive and progressive approach
to the economic crisis, its policies of economic rationalisation
and army reorganisation, and its stubborn refusal to do away with
the Presidential Cabinet and offer representation to the Left. The
tour was a success and by the end of April the F.D.R. commanded a
lively and well organised movement in active opposition to the
Government on a number of clear and important issues.

8. As the Left grew in strength and coherence, the authority of
the Government, weakened by the continuation of the economic
crisis, the failure of the negotiations with the Dutch and by the
continued agitation from the opposition for its resignation,
steadily declined and there were persistent rumours of internal
crisis and the resignation of the Cabinet. Whether in genuine
alarm at the division in the country or in an effort to smother
the Left by insistence on national issues, the P.N.I. and the
Masjurni resolved early in May to open a National Unity campaign.

It is not clear if Sukarno intervened at this stage, as some of
the more impressionable Republican newspapers declared; however,
there were exchanges between the Government parties and the F.D.R.

which enabled them all to produce a joint message on 20th May, the
fortieth anniversary of the Nationalist movement, in which they
promised to bury their differences and unite in the national
struggle. A fortnight later, all-party meetings began for the
formulation of a National Programme and these continued, with only
a few minor crises, until the Programme was accepted on 15th July.

However, though agreement was reached on policies, little else
appears to have come out of the discussions. While it was
generally held that Hatta should continue as Premier, the
differences over the Cabinet remained irreconciled, the Left
continuing to press for the Government's resignation and the
establishment of a 'national' Cabinet, the Right conceding no more
than that minor changes might be effected and warning of the
crisis that any major changes might precipitate. 'To complete the
national revolution', said the Masjumi leader, Sukiman, 'it is
imperative to line up the whole masses of the people behind
national aspirations. National unity first and above all, No party
politics!'
9. While the conflict was being lulled in the meetings on the
National Programme, the strike at Delanggu among the employees of
the Government Textile Board broke out and feelings ran high once
again. [3] There were bitter exchanges on the political front when
Sjafruddin, Masjumi Minister for Economic Affairs, charged that
the strike was politically inspired and when the F.D.R. came out
in support of the strikers. The atmosphere became tense when the
striking workers supported by peasant unions clashed with strike-
breakers and Masjumi Hizbullah troops. The strike was settled, but
by the end of July the situation appeared once more to be
critical. It was reported that Hatta was conferring with the
F.D.R., the P.S.I.I. (the left wing Masjumi group) and the
People's Revolutionary Front (a new Organisation led by supporters
of Tan Malacca's unsuccessful coup of 1946, whom Sukarno had
released from prison under the August Anniversary amnesty).

However, nothing came of these talks and shortly afterwards, with
the return of Suripno from Eastern Europe and the veteran
Communist Muso, from Moscow, the situation reached a new stage.

II. The Present Crisis
10. Suripno and Muso arrived in Java some time early in August
and, judging from articles in the Republican Press, lost no time
in instructing their countrymen as to how a national revolution
should properly be run. A National Front was necessary; a
government dominated by the Right was just as useless as one
dominated by the Left, Muso explained simply. Shortly they had
gained control of S.O.B.S.I. and organised a merger of the F.D.R.

and the P.K.I., which the Pesindo soon afterwards joined. At the
end of August the new enlarged Communist Party established a
'politbureau' which was organised as a Cabinet and Government
secretariat, Defence going to Sjarifuddin for example, Foreign
Affairs to Suripno, and which was nothing less than a state within
the State. In official pronouncements the new Communists were
fairly restrained and did not associate themselves with the
extremist demands of their satellite groups for the immediate
break off of the negotiations with the Dutch and the prosecution
of the national revolution against the 'fascist-imperialists'.

Nevertheless, it was apparent that they were not content with
Hatta's declared four-point policy for a settlement with the
Dutch, and that their emphasis was on the achievement of the
Republic's independence whatever else might take place in the
Indonesian archipelago. By direct attacks on America and the
'Western' nations and support for Russia they sniped at the
Committee of Good Offices and Hatta's policy. It was left to
S.O.B.S.I. to deliver the full charge against the Government,
which it did in the following statement:

'1. The third meeting of the SOBSI (Central Organisation of
Indonesian Labour) Presidium, held at Jogjacarta on August 22,
1948, attended by representatives of 32 trade unions' general
committees,
After having ample discussions on the weaknesses of the present
National Revolution,
Is of the opinion: that the SOBSI has committed principal mistakes
by overestimating the imperialist powers and underestimating the
anti-imperialist power, and by pursuing a compromise policy with
regard to imperialism, resulting in:

a. the fact that the National Revolution is not led by the labour
class, which is consistent in its revolutionary, anti-imperialist
attitude and which is allied with the peasants and enjoys the full
support of the whole people;

b. the fact that the colonial administration machinery has not
been replaced and that the remnants of feudalism have not been
annihilated;

c. the non-existence of distinct efforts to improve the fate of
the labourers and peasants;

d. the non-existence of a National Front which is consistently
anti-imperialist;

e. the recognition of agreements of colonial character.

Considering: that the SOBSI must need take distinct steps to make
good aforesaid principal mistakes,
Decides:

a. to recognize the faultiness of pursuing a compromise policy
towards the imperialists and to pursue in future a consistently
anti-imperialist policy;

b. to urge the Government:

(i) to withdraw the Political Manifesto of November 1, 1945 [4];

(ii) to annul the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements;

(iii) to reject the American-Australian compromise proposals;

(iv) to negotiate based upon full sovereignty of the Republic of
Indonesia;

(v) the immediate initiation of the exchange of Consuls with the
Soviet-Union and to foster the recognition by states where
people's democracy is prevailing, such as Czecho-Slovakia, Poland,
Hungary, Yugo-Slavia, Albania, Rumania and Bulgaria;

(vi) to nationalize the property of whomsoever is hostile to the
National Revolution without any compensation;

(vii) to discontinue all negotiations with the Dutch as a protest
against the shooting by fascist Dutch at children, boyscouts and
girl guides who were celebrating the third anniversary of the
Independence of the Republic of Indonesia at Jacarta, while the
negotiations can be continued only on the condition as laid down
in (b), (iv);

(viii) to renovate the structure of the whole State's machinery,
which proves to be colonial remnants, and to place manpower which
is consistently anti-imperialist.

c. to accept and carry out the National Program;

d. to vanguard the formation of the National Front in a democratic
way; the membership of which is individual;

e. to urge the Head of State to dissolve the present Cabinet and
to replace it by a responsible National Front cabinet on the
following terms:

(i) to be founded on the National Program;

(ii) the ministers should be persons who have approved the
formation of the National Front and who are members of it.

f. the SOBSI participates in forming the National Front cabinet;

g. to intensify the preparations for a scorched earth policy and
the people's defence by equipping the whole people;

h. to support the struggle of the peasants who demand 'land for
those who till it';

i. to uphold above decisions actively and to be prepared for the
consequences.

Urges: people in the occupied territories to adapt their struggle
to this decision.

(This resolution is submitted to:

a. the President;

b. the Government;

c. the Working Committee of the Provisional Parliament;

d. parties and/or organisations;

e. press and radio;

f. W.F.T.U.)'
11 The question arises as to how the Communists managed to capture
the initiative in this way, for hitherto they had been an active
but never very influential party and moreover, since the end of
May, had been subject to opposition from the Trotskyist People's
Revolutionary Front (Tan Malacca's followers). It seems probable
that Muso had some success with the standard themes of the Soviet
as the workers' and peasants 'Utopia and as the friend and
protector of national revolutions. His account of the current
Soviet-American conflict would also carry weight with the Leftist
movement and enable him to argue the futility of hoping to achieve
anything through negotiations with a 'fascist-imperialist' power
such as the Dutch, especially when such negotiations were
supervised by 'Western' nations whose natural sympathies would be
anti-revolutionary. Such arguments could be forcibly pointed by
the actual failure of the negotiations with the Dutch, especially
in regard to the blockade, and by the current series of incidents
in Batavia: the shooting at the Republican Headquarters at
Pengangsaan, the occupation of the Republican hospital and the
order expelling Republican officials. The Communists were in a
strong position to challenge Hatta and his Government on the
grounds that they had done nothing to remedy the internal
situation in the Republic and could only report failure on the
national front. They could demand with some righteousness that new
policies be adopted and that the Government make way for a
national coalition which could effectively safeguard the Republic.

12. This development provoked a stiff reaction from the Right Wing
parties, to whom the introduction of Communism was highly
unacceptable. Hitherto, though the conflict between Left and Right
had been bitter and had marked the end of the happier days of
national unity so earnestly desired by Sukiman and Sjahrir, it had
never appeared that there could not be a measure or compromise on
both sides sufficient to allow of the establishment of an
authoritative Government. Now, the conversion of the Left to
Communism struck deeply at the most cherished interests of the
Conservative movement. Briefly, and very simply, the basic issues
between Left and Right are twofold: there is the normal
socioeconomic conflict between the haves and the have-nots,
aggravated by the existence of feudal remnants, widespread
hardship consequent upon the economic crisis, a racketeering
merchant class supported by its own private armies and frequently
by an officialdom that is sometimes corrupt and nearly always
conservative (the P.N.I. is largely an officials' party), and by
anxiety over that national struggle against the Dutch; then there
is the moral conflict between Islam and the Western notions of
economic and social Organisation advocated by the Left. On both
these counts Soviet Russia is the satanic force in the modem world
for the conservative landowner and businessman and for the
conservative Mohammedan, and it is such people who comprise the
core of the Right Wing in the Republic. The identification then,
of the Left with the Soviet Communism constituted a major threat
to nearly every thing the Right wing represented, both materially
and spiritually. Co-operation or compromise with such a force was
out of the question. The Republic became divided into two camps,
both of which were armed.

13. On September 2nd, Hatta dealt with the situation in a firm
statement before the Working Committee of the Provisional
Parliament (copy of his statement is
attached). [5] Much of the speech dealt with the Government's
efforts to fulfil its programme and with the difficulties it had
to meet, but most significant at this time were Hatta's warnings
that the Republic's struggle should not be reduced to a mere
factor in the international conflict and of the danger for the
Communists of placing loyalty to Russia even before the interests
of national independence, believing as he does that the victory of
Russia will inevitably bring about such independence. Hatta called
for unity in the supreme interest of Indonesian independence and,
emphasising that the Government would deal strictly with any
developments which should threaten the national security,
concluded by declaring that since the parties which had subscribed
to the National Programme had proved unable to co-operate in the
formation of a new Government, the present Cabinet would remain in
office pending general elections.

14. The Masjumi Party held a special emergency session on 4th and
5th September and then issued the following statement:

'Masjumi's Council meeting, attended by representatives of
Sumatra, Java, Madura, Borneo, the Celebes, the Moluccas and the
Lesser Sunda Islands, held on 4th and 5th of September 1948 in
jogjacarta,
After having heard the explanations of the Chairman of the
Political Council concerning the party's policy, which has
received a vote of confidence,
Having heard also the three preliminary advices and having paid
the fullest attention to the opinion of its members,
Taking into consideration that the Islam does not approve of
communism and imperialism,
Has determined the outlines of the struggle as follows:

1. Internal affairs:

a. approves the Government's policy during the past period as
expressed by its representative in the KNIP (Provisional
Parliament) Working Committee's session on 2nd September 1948;

b. maintains and strengthens the State based upon Divinity;

c. extends and deepens the Islamic spirit in order to repulse all
trends which endanger the Religion and State;

d. stands behind the Government which speedily and firmly will
take action against disturbers of the peace of the State;

e. recognises the private rights of foreigners and nationalises
industries important to the State.

2. Foreign affairs:

a. perfects the relations with and intensifies the representatives
in Islamic countries and other countries which have recognised the
Republic of Indonesia;

b. reciprocates goodwill missions to countries that have sent
their representatives to the Republic;

c. extends information in foreign countries, particularly in the
principal countries;

d. the State to take steps to establish a link between the
Republic and the outside world in the economic field, so that the
Republic can contribute the produce of its wealth to world
prosperity.'
15. During the debate on Hatta's statement in the Working
Committee, Communist speakers have missed no opportunities to
attack and discredit the Government. However, Government
supporters have rallied and replied with an authority which during
the year they have rarely commanded. A mass meeting of the P.N.I.

an Masjumi parties on 11th September declared its full support for
the Government and both parties have rejected a Communist
invitation to attend a conference on ways and means of
strengthening the national unity. At present there are no
indications of any approach between the groups and the crisis
continues. It is not likely that the proposal to hold general
elections 'as soon as practicable', as announced by Hatta in his
Government statement, will help to ease the tension at this time.

III. The Disposition of the Parties
16. However, more important in determining the outcome of the
crisis than the prospect of general elections will be the prospect
of a settlement with the Dutch. In this regard the crisis has
produced some interesting changes of front.

17. Throughout the history of the Republic the most important body
of extreme opinion on the negotiations with the Dutch has been the
Right wing Masjumi Party. It rejected both the Linggadjati and the
Renville Agreements and has consistently advocated a radical line
of settlement which would permit of no compromise on the position
of the Republic as a sovereign and independent nation. Only
recently it reaffirmed earlier resolutions calling for an
extension of the Republic's foreign relations. It is certain then,
that were it secure in its internal position it would not be
content with Hatta's present policy for a settlement. The question
arises now as to whether the party, or the more conservative
elements in it, will be prepared to abandon its previous position
of non-compromise with the Dutch and be interested to reach some
settlement which will strengthen it in its domestic conflict. In
reaching such a decision the party would run considerable risks
for it would endanger its support among nationalist followers and
would invite a general charge of treachery to the national
revolution. It is hard to conceive of such a change of front
throughout the whole party, but the fanatical opposition of
sections of the Masjumi to Communism and to a Socialist movement
is a powerful force; it is safe to say that some elements of the
Masjumi are now considering selling the Republic out either to the
Bandoeng Federalists or directly to the Dutch.

18. The other Right wing party, the P.N.I., which has likewise
opposed previous efforts to conclude an agreement with the Dutch,
is in much the same position as the Masjumi, though its attitude
is probably not quite so stiff. An additional factor is that there
is an influential group within this Party which believes that the
best way to oust the Dutch is to encourage the Americans. (The so-
called 'Fox Contract' [6] concluded by Maramis, derived from this
policy). It seems likely that with the rise of Communism in the
Republic, this group will be anxious to please the Americans by
showing willingness to compromise with the Dutch and by taking a
firm stand against the Communists. This group too, faces the
difficulties of compromising its own nationalism and winning
support within the Party for a moderate policy towards the Dutch
and of incurring the risk of being generally accused of betraying
the revolution. Maramis, incidentally, left again last week for
America.

19. At the same time there are groups within both the Masjumi and
the P.N.I. to whom a favourable settlement with the Dutch comes
first and these might well be prepared to meet some of the Left's
demands in the interests of maintaining national solidarity. It is
not yet clear in what direction the Right is resolving these
internal conflicts.

20. Meanwhile the Left wing appears strongly entrenched in its
opposition to Hatta's Government and his policy for a settlement
with the Dutch. In the light of the substantial movement which it
represents within the country and of the recent pressure applied
by the Dutch to the Republic, its demands for a place in the
Government and for a firmer national policy are not at all
unreasonable. However, while it remains Communist there seems
little hope of a rapprochement with other Republican Parties and
of a working unity being restored within the States.

21. The policy of the P.K.I. appears to have been directed rather
to capturing the Left-wing movement than to converting it, but
until August, though growing in influence as the crisis developed,
it had been unable to gain its object. In August, Muso and Suripno
could not, as suggested above, have returned at a more opportune
time. Frustrated on both the domestic and the national fronts the
mood of the Left was extremist; but in relation to the demands of
the national movement for solidarity, its moral position was weak.

Any militant action it might decide upon could merely be
'insurrection'. Muso and Suripno could offer more than this; they
could offer extremism a rational basis backed by all the moral
authority of the world-wide revolution led by Soviet Russia.

However, though the Communists were thus able to fortify the Left
Wing and so capture it, I do not believe that this means that they
can hold it indefinitely.

22. The Left wing has a number of loyalties which cut across
continued Communist domination, but the most important of these at
present is the loyalty to the Republican nationalist movement as
represented by Sukarno and Hatta. To what extent Hatta has lost in
authority becoming involved in party politics is not yet evident,
but I believe that Sukarno's influence for national solidarity is
still extremely strong and that he could swing substantial
portions of the Left behind a reasonable settlement with the Dutch
by Hatta, particularly if, as suggested above, the Right wing were
to get around to meeting some of the Left's more urgent demands.

The position of some of the Left wing leaders is important here,
for it is reported that all are not happy about the Communists'
triumph and, though they scrambled onto the band waggon in August,
they would scramble off again did they sense an opportunity of
rejoining the national movement on reasonable terms, even should
they remain Communist in name. Despite Amir Sjarifuddin's recent
announcement that he has been a Communist since 1935 and his
undoubted Communist sympathies, I am inclined to consider him a
case in point and to doubt that he has been an active Communist
all this time, but made his move largely to maintain his position,
and would switch again for the same reason. In reports of typical
Leftist bickering about who missed the party line back in 1945 or
1946, there are also signs of dissension among Left wing leaders.

Furthermore there are three non-Right wing groups actively
agitating against Communism and for solidarity with Hatta and
Sukarno; the Socialist Party of Sjahrir, the Trotskyist People's
Revolutionary Front and the P.S.I.I., the Moslem group which with
the rise of Communism has recently set up an Islamic Front with
the Masjumi and modified its opposition to Hatta's Government.

23. However strong these forces for union might eventually prove
to be there are, unfortunately, no indications at present that the
crisis is on the wane and that either side is prepared to relax
its uncompromising attitude to the other. So far fighting has only
broken out at Solo, for a long time a centre of dissident
elements, and though this is reported to have been settled by the
Government, there are still possibilities of a major clash,
primarily over the question of weakness towards the Dutch. Should
a clash develop Hatta has a good majority in the K.N.I.P. and at
present, the certain support of the Right wing parties, the
Masjumi and the P.N.I. and their satellites, and of the parties of
the Centre, Sjahrir's Socialist Party, the P.S.I.I., the People's
Revolutionary Front and minor groups such as the Catholics and the
Christians. The Communist front, consisting of the Communist Party
proper, Sjarifuddin's Socialist Party, the Labour Party, Pesindo,
the Labour Unions, and satellite groups, commands a large and
militant popular following and would probably be supported by
certain lawless elements and a number of irregular bands which
have been actively opposing the Dutch and all attempts to treat
with them ever since August 15th, 1945. Both sides have private
arms, but the deciding factor would of course be the T.N.I. In the
Solo area it seems certain that the T.N.I. would support the Left.

The disposition of the bulk of the force is doubtful and I can
only state some of the factors which might influence it to go
against the Government. In the first place, some of our Military
Observers report that the mood of the T.N.I. is at present very
aggressive and it is eager not merely to come to grips with the
Dutch in defence but in attack. This attitude is more in line with
the Communists than with Hatta. Secondly, there have been reports
throughout the year suggesting that the T.N.I. has not been
unsympathetic to Leftist criticism of the Government's domestic
and national policies. Thirdly, Army Sjarifuddin, Minister for
Defence under Sjahrir and in his own Cabinet and popular choice
for the post in Hatta's Cabinet, had considerable influence with
the Army and is said to have retained its sympathy by his attacks
on Hatta's demobilisation and re-organisation policy, which he has
charged could only weaken the State. [7] It can be said then that
the T.N.I. is not without its own conflicts over its allegiance
and that Sukarno and Hatta will have to take urgent steps to
ensure its support.

IV. Dutch Reactions
24. The reaction of the Netherlands East Indies authorities in
Batavia to the crisis is confused. The military, well backed by
commercial interests, are anxious to take all advantage of the
present confusion by military action against the Republic. In
other Government circles the supporters of the Lieutenant
Governor-General, Dr. van Mook, are against military action for
the present and it has been stated that such action will not take
place except for the following reasons:

(a) Assistance called for by Dr. Hatta;

(b) The position getting entirely out of hand in the Republic;

(c) Any large scale attack on Dutch military positions.

In any case it seems obvious that the Dutch will endeavour to take
full advantage of the crisis in the Republic to implement their
own plans. However, there are complications in regard to this,
particularly in respect to the growing differences between the
present Provisional Government of Indonesia, created by Dr. van
Mook, and the Bandoeng Conference (Heads of created Negaras)
Delegation, sponsored by Van Mook and now sitting at The Hague in
conference with the Dutch authorities for the creation of an
Interim Government for Indonesia. It is also known that there is
some co-operation and collusion between the members of the
Conference and members of the Republican Government. The result of
the demands of the Delegation at The Hague must influence the
course of action the Dutch can take with the Republic.

25. The position of the Lieutenant Governor-General is
interesting; the report of his resignation was followed by threats
of resignation by some of his top-ranking supporters in Batavia,
and it is now reported that the Provisional Federal Government in
Batavia has asked the Government at The Hague for his return as
Lieutenant Governor-General, to cope with the present crisis in
the Republic.

26. Dr. Louis Beel, who has now arrived at Batavia as Crown
Commissioner and to be head of the Dutch Delegation, is said to be
only remaining in Indonesia for a short term. It was considered in
many quarters that he would become the first Dutch High
Commissioner on the early formation of the proposed new Interim
Government for Indonesia and thus replace Dr. van Mook in his
present position of Lieutenant Governor-General.