INDONESIA: SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION BY SECURITY COUNCIL

We can assume that the purpose of the Dutch is to clean up the
Republic as quickly as possible, capture all influential leaders,
and install a regime in Republican territories which will be
willing to co-operate in a federal interim government established
according to Dutch plans. Their main object is speed. They hope to
be able not only to capture all strategic points but to quell all
resistance before any positive Security Council counter-measures
can come into effect. They then hope to point out that they have
restored peace in Indonesia and that any further Security Council
sanctions are unnecessary and pointless (as indeed they would be
except as a form of punishment) [and] [1] could not long be
sustained.

2. It is clear therefore that the Dutch have weighed the
consequences of their action and will take no notice whatever, at
any rate for the time being, of any orders to cease fire and
return to the status quo.

3. The chances are however that they will not be able to clean
things up quickly, but instead will get bogged down in active
guerrilla warfare which will not only help to drain their
resources but which they will not possibly be able to disguise
under a claim to have restored peace. The longer this goes on, the
more hostile will be the reaction in other countries, and the
better chance there will be for economic or other sanctions
applied early to take effect.

4. On a realistic view we might as well assume that only when the
Dutch begin to bog down will the Security Council begin to
exercise any real influence. Until that time the Dutch will simply
refuse to consider any suggestions or demands for early elections
under U.N. supervision, satisfactory guarantees for the Republic,
etc.

5. If and when that times comes, however, a combination of their
own military difficulties in Indonesia and of strong pressures
applied from without might be calculated to bring the Dutch to a
more tractable frame of mind. It is then that, perhaps under
threat of bigger and better economic sanctions, we can once again
begin to talk to them about terms of a settlement with the
Republic.

6. This suggests to me that our line of action in the Security
Council should be somewhat as follows:

(1) Cease fire and withdrawal: This is the obvious first step. The
Dutch will however take no notice of it, even if it were
immediately backed up by some hastily devised sanction. It would
be better therefore not to think of any specific sanctions in
connection with a cease fire and withdrawal order but rather to
regard sanctions as something to be worked out carefully with a
view to a possible long-term 'squeeze' effect.

(2) Sanctions: At the same time we should be making up our mind
straight away what lengths we are prepared to go to in imposing
sanctions, and how soon they should be applied. If we are to apply
sanctions they may as well be effective and the sooner they are
brought to bear the sooner they are likely to take effect.

(3) Terms of Settlement: If the Dutch achieve their purpose and
succeed in presenting a fait accompli, there will be little point
in considering terms of settlement. If they get bogged down,
conditions of settlement will become relevant again. The question
of possible terms might therefore be left for the moment and
meanwhile worked out carefully having regard to events as they
develop and to the Cochran [2] and other plans.