IMMEDIATE

Security Council 22nd December Agenda adopted without debate and
Australia, India, Indonesia and Netherlands invited to table. [1]
Palar represents Indonesia and Van Royen Netherlands.

Van Royen was only speaker this morning. He began with statement
from his Government reiterating Dutch policy which was
(1) Independence for Indonesia.

(2)Co-operation between Indonesians and Dutch.

(3) Sovereignty for USI.

(4) Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

This policy had been hampered by extremist elements. Steps had
been taken in accordance with article 2 of Renville agreement [2]
on December 18th to form Interim Government. This would guarantee
in conjunction with other steps that had been taken the
preservation law and order and freedom of the choice of the
people. Dutch Government would keep Security Council informed of
steps it was taking to make Indonesia a sovereign member of U.N.

Having read this statement Van Royen then made long statement
along following lines.

The dispute in Indonesia was not whether Indonesia should secure
independence; this question was already settled. The issue was
whether the USI should be inaugurated under the dominance of an
undemocratic extremist minority or not; whether the state should
be unitary or federal; whether it should be undemocratic or not.

The Renville prohibitions on inflammatory broadcasts had been
repeatedly violated. Instances of exhortations by Republic after
Renville to sabotage of truce were cited. On their side
Netherlands had 'allowed 30,000 troops to withdraw'. Lull after
Renville soon evaporated. The tactics of infiltration used by the
T.R.I. were officially sanctioned as instanced. by the order 'to
attack Netherlands posts and sabotage railway line'. Negotiations
towards a political settlement were broken off by the Republic in
July.

Cases of violation of truce then [quoted]. [3]

Indonesians intended to start large scale operations on January
1st. Japanese member T.R.I. had been captured with documents
showing intention to start mass resistance. In South and East Java
movements called '[January] First' had grown up, that in East Java
having code name 'Wingate'.

Establishment of separate states was not at variance with Renville
which recognised principle of Federalism. They are only
provisional. Establishment of separate states best method of
satisfying demand for self-government. Netherlands will not stifle
such demands when they arise in the people as is specifically
enjoined by Article 2 of Renville.

The real issues were independence, form of government and co-
operation in Netherlands-Indonesian Federation. As soon as
Netherlands put forward concrete proposals Indonesians failed to
agree because the Republic wants the whole of Indonesia.

Netherlands has made complete proposals for settlement but no
counter proposals have been received. November 10th Aide Memoire
[4] from Hatta encouraged Dutch to send their Foreign Minister to
Djockjakarta. But when he arrived Hatta retracted most of what he
had suggested, for instance, Republic was prepared to recognise de
jure the sovereignty of Holland in the Interim period but not de
facto.

On armed forces the Republic wanted the withdrawal of Dutch but
the preservation intact of T.R.I. which would take over. T.R.I.

would not be incorporated in Federal force which had been
recognised as necessary in principle and would merely have under
Republican proposals an increasing superiority which would confirm
the fears of the remaining two thirds of Indonesia.

The main reasons on surface for disagreement were the powers of
the High Commissioner, the Army, the new states and the truce
violation. But these were only symptoms of a larger disagreement,
the desire for dominance of all of N.E.I.

Hatta letter to Cochran [5] was 'rough and informal', and ignored
truce violations, unified command and existence of T.R.I. They
were no basis unless officially endorsed by Government. On
December 16th Dutch proposals [6] were rejected and Soekarno visit
to India would have meant no possibility of Governmental
endorsement of Hatta. Conclusion was that Republic did not want
agreement.

Netherlands have never contended that Republic controlled by
Communism but do claim that it relied partly on Communists with
all attendant dangers of coup d'etat. Communism established in
governmental services, army, labour, and youth movement. [Hatta
has upheld the legality of Communism as political movement] and
affirmed position of U.S.S.R. as champion of Colonial peoples.

Suppression of Musso revolt does not mean that [Re]public has
suppressed Communism as, in order to do this, Republic had to rely
on another Communist, Tan Malaca, and so called suppression was
only a switch. Soerakata is in hands of Communists and the aims of
new Communist party along traditional lines leave no doubt as to
their objectives. Relations between them and Malayan Communists
close and they are all directed from the same centre. Situation
could not be allowed to continue indefinitely. First task was to
endow non Republican areas with structure guaranteeing
independence. This was done by decree of December 18th setting up
Interim Government without Republic. Federal nature of Government
supported by many Indonesians who fear expansionist nature of
Republic. While common existence under Netherlands has created
common nationalistic tendencies amongst varying Ethnic groups,
local autonomy must continue. Centralised concept would give
dominance to one group, a minority. Federalists have only been
able to come to the fore in non Republican areas because within
the Republic this would cost them their lives. They are not
puppets and follow an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary
line. The Republic controls only 35% of people. Moderates outside
Republic are no less sincere and nationalistic as was proved by
the Bandoeng conference. They believe the best way to independence
is through the Netherlands.

Places in the Interim Federal Government will be held open for
Republican areas and principles of Lingadjarti and Renville will
be followed. Netherlands could not have denied to rest of
Indonesia a Federal Democratic structure any longer. Stability of
Society was threatened by ever increasing murder and sabotage.

Republic could not control violence and Netherlands faced its
intention to take over whole of N.E.I. The alternatives were
either Communism, violence and incompetence which would follow
giving in to Republic or giving up useless attempts to agree and
proceed on its own authority with measures to create orderly
conditions for achievement of independence.

These measures involved formation of an Interim Government and the
purging of Indonesia of Republican armed bands. The first
principle of Renville agreement [7] gives right to Netherlands to
proceed along these lines.

Unrest and insecurity have become unbearable and measures already
long over due could not be deferred. The decision was made by
Dutch cabinet on Saturday morning December 18th and whole Dutch
nation stands behind it. Decision was made with the greatest
reluctance but having once taken it then nation will carry it out
no matter what the consequences or the cost. Security Council
should give Dutch a chance to prove what they can do.

This brought Van Royen to a long discussion of competence of
Council which he categorically denied.

'The Good Offices Committee had been accepted in a spirit of good
will and in hope of a solution.' This did not admit competence of
Security Council. Committee had failed and Security Council must
face question whether it can take any further action. The answer
must be no, because the letter and spirit of charter forbid it on
the three grounds.

1. The charter applies only between Sovereign states (Article
2(1)). [8]

2. Domestic jurisdiction (Article (2) 7). [9]

In this connection Van Royen quoted extracts from Hasluck's book
[10] in which he makes reference to original Council consideration
of question.

3. The situation does not endanger peace and security.

This view was tacitly supported in 1947 by United Kingdom, United
States, Belgium, France, Brazil, China and despatch of G.O.C. made
no difference because use of services [of] Committee was only on
express request of parties themselves. Competence has never been
recognised by Netherlands or decided by Council. When Security
Council has failed so often in matters of which it has competence
it would be wise to refrain in interests of prestige of U.N. from
attacking problems outside its jurisdiction.

Netherlands however, would not object to a reference of this
matter to international Court.

The Netherlands should be given a chance to set up a United States
of Indonesia on a[n] orderly and democratic basis. Their acts will
bear out following promises.

(1) To restore real peace.

(2) Rapid establishment of independent U.S.I. as a member of the
Netherlands Indonesian Union and a member of U.N.

(3) Strict adherence to principles of Renville and Lingadjarti.

(4) Nothing will deflect Netherlands from this course.

End of statement.

This afternoon's proceedings will be reported at conclusion of
session. So far following speakers are on list: Indonesia,
U.S.S.R., China, India, Australia. It is therefore, possible that
we will not be reached today.

[matter omitted]