I have been asked to let you have the enclosed message from Mr.

Attlee, setting out the views of the United Kingdom Government on
our future policy towards the Indonesian problem.

ENCLOSURE

TOP SECRET

INDONESIA

MESSAGE FROM MR ATTLEE

The passage of the recent Security Council resolution [1], and the
recent announcements of Dutch policy in regard to Indonesia mark
an important stage in the development of the Indonesian issue.

2. It seems to us therefore that we should endeavour to clear our
minds as to policy and procedure.

3. The objectives, in our view, can be defined as:

(a) The achievement of a just and lasting settlement in Indonesia
on the basis of the recognition of the nationalist aspirations
(which has for three years been our aim) and
(b) Upholding and strengthening the authority of the United
Nations in regard to this as to other disputes.

4. There are several dangers-
(i) That the Dutch may ignore the Security Council resolution and
general world opinion, and seek to effect a settlement on terms
which will be interpreted by the Security Council and by the world
in general as evasion of the spirit of their own declarations and
of the resolution. Such a policy on the part of the Dutch might
result in demands for sanctions, and perhaps in the Dutch refusing
facilities to the United Nations Commission, or even in their
withdrawal from the United Nations.

(ii) That the Indonesians may not only fail to come to agreement
between themselves, but may tend to shelter behind the United
Nations Commission and fail to appreciate the need for the most
careful advance planning if constitutional changes are to be
effected smoothly and without lasting repercussions on the
stability of Indonesia; and
(iii) That prolongation of the dispute, and the bitter public
controversy which it excites, may weaken the prestige of the
United Nations, thus playing into the hands of the Soviet.

5. This is the situation as we see it, and I shall be glad to know
whether you are in general agreement as to the objectives and as
to the dangers. If this statement of the situation is accepted, it
is to be considered what action can be taken to implement this
policy and to meet these dangers.

6. Despite strong criticism which we have had to meet from the
Netherlands Government (reinforced to some extent by other members
of the Western Union), I think that we can fairly claim that our
representations in Holland still carry weight, and in so far as
the dangers outlined above can be obviated by action which the
Dutch Government can take, I think it is our duty to use such
influence as we have with the Dutch to that end. One difficulty in
bringing pressure to bear on the Dutch is of course that they have
a Coalition Government with considerable internal stresses, and
that it is by no means easy for the Dutch Cabinet to agree on a
common policy. Nevertheless we can but try to impress our views on
them.

7. In the first instance, therefore, we are instructing the United
Kingdom Ambassador at The Hague [2] to impress on the Dutch the
need for speed in announcing their plans, and for the fulfilment
of their programme and of the Security Council resolution. We are
drawing special attention to the position of political prisoners
and to the adverse impression that will be created unless it is
known that the imprisoned Republican leaders are fully and freely
associated with the negotiations. We are impressing also on the
Dutch that whatever plans they announce now for the immediate
future, i.e. the interim period, they must plainly be designed as
part of a larger programme which will fulfil their own
declarations of policy and the spirit of the Security Council
resolution, and will lead to effective self-government in
Indonesia within the time limit stated.

8. We are taking the same line with other members of the
Consultative Council for Western Union, and are also asking the
United Kingdom Ambassador at Washington [3] to tell the State
Department of our analysis of the situation.

9. In so far as the dangers referred to above can be avoided only
by action to be taken by the Indonesians, I feel that until they
are assured that the programme announced by the Dutch and the
Security Council resolution will be implemented they will not take
kindly to advice, at any rate from us. On the other hand, general
instability in the Far East (for example China and Burma) and the
very great potential importance of Indonesia in Asiatic and world
affairs make it imperative that when the transfer of power is
effected, Indonesia should not emerge as a centre of instability
which would play into the hands of Communists.

10. Unless Indonesians begin to shoulder their responsibilities,
there is a danger of a weak and inexperienced administration being
set up in nominal control in Indonesia which would be unable to
discipline its armed forces or to exercise effective control over
its vast territory, with the result that a long period of disorder
and weakness would ensue.

11. In these circumstances we should, I submit, use every channel
to impress on the Indonesians the difficulties that lie ahead and
that in the long run their salvation is in their own hands,
however much sympathy and help they may get from friends outside.

12. We very much hope therefore that you will feel able to support
the policy which I have outlined above, and in particular will use
your influence with the Indonesians to impress on them a sense of
responsibility and of urgency.