INDONESIA INFORMAL MEETING OF ASIAN REPRESENTATIVES NEW DELHI 13TH
APRIL 1949

Heads of missions representing those countries who attended the
Asian Conference in New Delhi last January met at the Ministry of
External Affairs this morning under the chairmanship of Mr. Nehru.

The Prime Minister of Burma (Thakin Nu), is here on a short visit
and was present, but he took no part in the discussion. Sir Girja
Bajpai assisted the Indian Prime Minister, and Mr. K.P.S. Menon
and officials of the Ministry attended. The High Commissioner [1],
accompanied by the Official Secretary [2], went along on behalf of
Australia.

2. The meeting followed Bajpai's statement to us of 4th April,
reported in our telegram 255 [3], that Mr. Nehru felt that the
countries concerned should have an informal talk on Indonesia on
April 16th before his departure for London. Subsequently, as
reported in our telegram 261 [4], this was put back to April 13th.

3. On 5th April, Bajpai confirmed that discussion would be
confined to Indonesia. He was not very precise about the agenda,
merely saying that the Governments concerned might desire to send
additional instructions to their representatives at the General
Assembly. He also said that the meeting might perhaps examine the
question of imposing sanctions if a solution through the United
Nations should not be forthcoming. This we reported in our
telegram 261.

4. A week later, on April 11th, Bajpai told us the meeting would
discuss-
(i) whether the Dutch should be denounced before the General
Assembly in the event of no satisfactory treatment of the issue;

(ii) whether the Governments concerned should press the Security
Council to adopt economic sanctions. (He remarked that such action
as cutting off transit rights could be taken without reference to
the Security Council.)
As we have also reported, in our telegram 273 [5], he said there
would be an informal exchange of views on Dr. Maramis's letter [6]
of 29th March, which sought financial aid for the Republic from
the countries who attended the Asian Conference.

5. On the evening of April 11, the Ministry of External Affairs
sent us the accompanying 'Memorandum on Indonesia' [7] and last
night the accompanying copy of a letter [8] to the Indian
Government from the Acting Secretary-General of the Indonesian
Foreign Affairs Ministry which is now located in Delhi. This
document, like the Maramis letter, dealt with financial aid.

6. The third annexure, being a draft joint resolution of which we
were given no notice before the meeting, confronted us when we
entered the conference room this morning. This recited that the
representatives present at the meeting represented to their
Governments-
(a) that, if no agreement should be reached in Batavia, the
deliberate failure of the Dutch to give effect to the Security
Council's resolution [9] of January 28th, should be condemned
before the General Assembly.

(b) that each Government should actively examine a recommendation
to the Security Council-
(i) that economic sanctions be applied against the Dutch,
(ii) that all transit facilities by land, sea or air be denied to
the Dutch in or over its territory.

7. The agenda covering the draft resolution is attached as a
fourth annexure. [10]

8. It is doubtful whether anyone had bargained for a resolution.

Certainly we had not. In bringing it forward, Nehru said that all
the meeting could do was to tell the Governments concerned to
express themselves with vigour. In saying this he obviously did
not appreciate that while he was speaking as a Prime Minister on
his home ground, others present were only agents. At this point,
and after the Egyptian Ambassador had made a vague reference to
the universal conscience of the world, Bajpai remarked that the
Asian Conference had brought the matter before the Security
Council, but that the Council had not achieved much. Hence the
present discussion. Nehru then referred to the initiative of India
and Australia in taking the matter to the General Assembly. He
said that it was curious the way things happened before the
Security Council. Speeches were delivered, and resolutions passed
which were weaker than the speeches. Then efforts were made to
tone down the resolutions. Then there were further resolutions,
explaining the earlier ones away. It amounted to a progressive way
of doing nothing. The position in Indonesia was deteriorating.

There was danger of complete chaos which neither the Dutch nor
anyone else could control. The position concerned everybody.

9. Bajpai then read a telegram from the Indian Consul-General [11]
in Batavia quoting Mr. Critchley as feeling that a settlement must
be effected within a month in order to prevent complete disruption
of the Republic by Communists. Critchley was also reported as
saying that only the Republican forces could control the
Communists and the Daro-l-Islam group; that the Dutch could not
cope with them. The fear of increasing Communism was preoccupying
the Republican leaders.

10. The Afghan and Iranian Ambassadors expressed themselves in
various ways. The Iranian said his government had handed a note of
protest to the Netherlands and read it out. It contained an
expected reference to Muslim nationalism. He thought that the
Assembly should go into the whole problem, and that Asian
countries should support the Australian and Indian initiative.

11. Nehru thought that the present meeting should suggest to the
Governments represented that they express to the General Assembly
their disapproval of the Dutch action, and that they should press
for the Security Council resolution of 28th January to be
implemented. At this point, he read out Bajpai's draft resolution.

The Pakistan representative considered it did not go as far as the
Asian Conference resolution. [12]

12. Apart from the phrasing of the first part of Bajpai's draft,
about which we were not entirely satisfied, we saw no advantages
in the second half which recommended that Governments represented
should actively consider recommending to the Security Council that
economic sanctions be applied.

13. The Australian representative explained that we had come to
the meeting in the belief that it was merely to be an informal
exchange of views. We were not prepared for a resolution and had
no instructions with respect to it. Nehru said that the resolution
was only a recommendation to Governments and would not be made
public. Bajpai referred to the Asian Conference Resolution I
paragraph (b) which appeared to us to have no direct relevance.

14. The Ceylon representative claimed that a resolution on
economic sanctions had been deliberately dropped from the Asian
Conference. Bajpai said that the present resolution was addressed
not to the Security Council or to United Nations delegates but by
representatives to their own Governments. Either one sat back or
adopted some course of action. Again quoting his Consul-General at
Batavia, he claimed that Mr. Critchley desired to press during the
preliminary talks in Java for a procedure whereby the Republican
Government could return to Djokjakarta; that if the Dutch did not
agree, Critchley considered that the United Nations Commission
should recommend to the Security Council the immediate application
of sanctions.

15. The Ceylon representative said that since the draft resolution
was not being made public or communicated to the Assembly there
could be no objection to representatives recommending that their
Governments consider it. The Government of Ceylon was profoundly
dissatisfied with the impasse before the United Nations. He had
been in touch with his Government and his instructions were that
they would be prepared to go to the extent of denying facilities
for the transit of Dutch troops and material. As regards
sanctions, he would have to consult his Government again.

16. The Australian representative said at this stage that we would
convey the views of the meeting to the Australian Government but
repeated that, in the absence of instructions, he could not
participate in the resolution. He was, however, in favour of the
general feeling of those present which would likewise be reported.

17. Somebody then suggested splitting the resolution into two, the
second part to deal with economic sanctions and transit
facilities. Nehru thought it better to keep to one resolution.

This was done. In the result no vote was taken but nobody
expressed dissent and the resolution was accepted in this way
except for ourselves.

18. The question of financial aid was then dealt with, Maramis's
letter being taken as a basis. Opening the discussion, Nehru said
that 'we can't do much about it'. He said that Djojakarta had
progressively deteriorated, and would be a liability rather than
an asset. He considered that the Dutch should supply the
facilities sought and that the United Nations ought to point this
out.

19. The Australian view was now stated, and was well received.

Nehru asked whether any other representatives had any other ideas.

If they had, Maramis could be informed of them. There was no need
for a resolution. Nevertheless the issue was an immediate one.

20. We pointed out that there were two or three stages, the
question of a loan being long term. This was acknowledged.

21. The Egyptian representative thought that financial assistance
should be a condition imposed by the Security Council which should
require that when the Republican Government is restored, it be
given all economic help to use its powers and functions as a
Government.

22. Bajpai thought the Australian expose a helpful one. He showed
much interest in the good[s] and textiles now stored in Batavia.

23. Nehru said that the important point was that the Dutch are
primarily responsible for assistance. He appeared to regard the
Australian views as satisfactory, and he suggested that each
representative should elsewhere examine Maramis's letter in the
light of them. He asked that a letter and a precis of the
Australian views be circulated to the representatives present.

24. Bajpai thought that a loan was the responsibility of the major
powers as well as those represented around the table. The needs of
the Republican Government should be brought to the notice of the
Security Council.

25. This finished discussion on economic aid. Nehru then brought
forward a draft press communique attached as the fifth annexure
[13] which to our mind was too expansive. After discussion it was
agreed to cut it down and it was finalised in the form of the
sixth annexure. [14]

26. Our estimate of the meeting as a whole is contained in our
telegram No. 281 [15] of 13th April, which is repeated here as our
seventh annexure.

27. A copy of this memorandum, without annexures except a copy of
our telegram No. 281, is being sent to the Australian High
Commissioners at Colombo and Karachi. Dr. Burton is being handed a
copy with all the annexures at Calcutta.