NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA: AUSTRALIAN POLICY

One of the items proposed for discussion at the Round Table
Conference relates to the future status of Netherlands New Guinea.

Roem, the Republican delegate, at previous discussions has stated
that the Republicans will agree to the inclusion of the item only
on the consideration that New Guinea is accepted as a part of the
U.S.I. The representative [1] of the B.F.O. has concurred in that
statement. Netherlands negotiators have, however, expressly stated
that they intend to keep the question an open one for the present
and have avoided any statements of the policy they propose to
follow.

It is quite evident that the future of Netherlands New Guinea is
of very considerable importance to Australia.

(1) The territory is at present not well developed economically
but its potentialities are great particularly as a source of
supply of oil.

(2) It occupies a position of strategic and tactical importance to
Australia.

(3) Developments in the Territory may reasonably be expected to
influence
conditions in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.

It is, therefore, important that the decision as to the future of
Netherlands New Guinea should be one which will not prejudice
Australia's interests.

While the attitude of the Netherlands Government has not been
expressed in discussion with the Republicans, it appears probable
that they are anxious to retain the territory as a part of the
Netherlands Kingdom. The people of Netherlands New Guinea itself
are not vocal and it is unlikely that the vast majority of them
have any under-standing of or an interest in the problem. Only one
voice-that of Johan Ariks who styles himself political
representative of the Papuan population of New Guinea-has been
raised, and Ariks has expressed his opposition to the inclusion of
New Guinea in U.S.I. Ariks probably speaks mainly for himself
though he seems to have the backing-tacit at any rate-of the
Netherlands Administration, and possibly the Christian community
of New Guinea such as it is, would hold a similar view.

Possible solutions of the problem:

(1) Incorporation into East Indonesia as part of the U.S.I.

(2) Retention as a part of the Netherlands Kingdom.

(3) Condominium Government by the Netherlands and the U.S.I.

The Third alternative appears perhaps the least satisfactory.

Condominium Governments rarely work very well, particularly where
the countries forming the Condominium are not in harmony.

Incorporation into the U.S.I.

1. The U.S.I. will be geographically the closest Government with
an interest in the Territory.

2. Historically the people of at least parts of the territory have
at some time in the past-18th Century-come under a form of
suzerainty of certain rulers in East Indonesia. While the
population of New Guinea is fundamentally Melanesian it shows some
signs of Indonesian blood.

3. As a long term problem the Territory has better chances of
development by the Indonesians than by the Dutch. Indonesia is
over populated and could probably settle the territory. The
alternative to transmigration from Indonesia to the territory,
might be the forcible annexation by other overcrowded Asiatic
countries, e.g. Japan.

4. Open opposition by Australia to the incorporation of the
territory in the U.S.I. might lose for Australia the good-will of
the future Government of the U.S.I.

5. The oil resources of the territory could be a useful source of
revenue to a young state.

As opposed to these considerations in favour of incorporation,
such a step would appear to have certain positive disadvantages.

A. From the point of view of the indigenous population.

(i) Notwithstanding 2 above the population of New Guinea is quite
distinct racially from that of Indonesia. New Guinea has further a
distinct history and is geographically separate from the other
parts of Indonesia. Racially it links rather with the South
Pacific Area.

(ii) For practical purposes New Guinea would for many years be a
'colonial' part of Indonesia, and the Indonesians have had no
experience in governing colonial peoples.

(iii) The U.S.I. will not have the financial resources to develop
the territory satisfactorily. On the other hand the Dutch have
shown ability in the development of colonial territories.

(iv) The U.S.I. for some time to come is likely to be in an
unstable condition. It is unlikely, therefore, that it could bring
stable conditions to the territory. This would discourage overseas
investments which would help to develop New Guinea, without which
the living standards of the native people cannot be raised.

(v) The Indonesians are predominantly Moslem, whereas such natives
in New Guinea as are not animistic are Christian.

B. From Australia's point of view.

(i) It is possible that the Indonesians might introduce the
general Asiatic tendency towards hatred of the white man into the
territory. Only the very artificial boundary exists to prevent any
such sentiment infiltrating into the territories of Papua and New
Guinea.

(ii) Unstable conditions in the territory would attract extremist
and Communist influences.

(iii) It would bring Asia right onto Australia's doorstep.

(iv) Useful Dutch research etc. which is valuable to Australia's
territories through the medium of the South Pacific Commission
would be largely lost.

(v) Collaboration between the Papua and New Guinea Administration
and Indonesian New Guinea would probably be slight.

(vi) Any hopes for a Melanesian nation at some future date would
be considerably diminished. It would seem that the incorporation
of Netherlands New Guinea into Indonesia would widen what is
really a purely artificial distinction between the two parts of
New Guinea.

C. From the Netherlands point of view.

(i) Holland faces grave overpopulation problems which can only be
solved by increased industrialisation and by emigration. There are
several organisations encouraging emigration to New Guinea and
studies into the possibilities of large scale emigration have
been, and are being made by the Netherlands Government. The point
should not be overstressed, however, as admittedly Netherlands'
interest in New Guinea appears slight at present.

(ii) Netherlands interests have put a considerable amount of
capital into the development of oil in the territory. In this
regard it is to Australia's advantage that this source of supply
should be developed as rapidly as possible. Stable conditions,
which, it is submitted, can only be provided by the continuation
of Netherlands control, will aid in this rapid development.

Conclusions.

It seems that on balance the disadvantages of the incorporation of
Netherlands New Guinea into the U.S.I. outweighs the advantages.

Whether Australia can influence the ultimate decision is, however,
doubtful. We might advise the Netherlands Governments informally
that we should like to see the territory remain a part of the
Netherlands Kingdom, and assure them of our support in its
development, e.g. close co-operation between the Netherlands New
Guinea and the Administration of Papua and New Guinea, use of
communication facilities on the Australian side of the boundary
etc. In return we might seek assurances regarding the welfare of
the indigenous inhabitants, the use of military facilities and,
possibly, economic concessions.