Washington, 22 December 1950

1163. Secret Immediate

For Minister from the Ambassador.

Korea

Your 711.¹

Bearing in mind your comments on (a), what might be done in the event of a cease–fire in Korea and the settlement of the Korean problem, and (b), what further steps might be taken should the Chinese reject the cease–fire, I saw Rusk today and sounded him out on the present thinking of the United States. I was able to elicit the following information:

(a) Rusk told me of the broadcast from Peking which rejected the cease–fire proposal.² He said that the North Korean Forces in the vicinity of the 38th parallel had recently increased their probing attacks against the 8th Army and that the Chinese communist forces had moved South into the forward areas. There was considerable speculation that a large scale attack would be launched by the Chinese communists on Christmas Eve. In the event of a full scale attack from the North he said that the United Nations forces would not be routed but that they would have to give ground and withdraw to defensive positions. He did not state to what positions the United Nations forces might withdraw. As far as the Hungnarn Beachhead, the evacuation was on the point of completion and the forces from this area had been landed in South Korea. Rusk did not say, but earlier it was anticipated that they would be at Pusan.

(b) In the event of an attack intended to expel the United Nations forces from Korea, Rusk said that the United Nations would have to consider their next step calmly. He thought that the six–power resolution should first be adopted by the General Assembly. If, after two or three days the Chinese communists persisted in their attack, he then thought they should be named as aggressors and the matter brought before the Collective Measures Committee.³ The United States would not want the Collective Measures Committee to take any rash or ill–advised action and regarded it as essential that the Committee should steer a middle course, bearing in mind global strategy and the undesirability of becoming overcommitted in the Far East on the one hand and on the other, the fact that China's act of aggression in Korea could not be condoned. In reply to a question as to what sort of collective measures the United States might suggest, Rusk referred in a general way to the economic and political sanctions, e.g. a restriction of exports to China by other members of the United Nations and the non–admission of Communist China to the United Nations. As for countries breaking off diplomatic relations with Communist China, he remarked that this presented problems. He added that the imposition of political and economic sanctions on China would not have much effect in practical terms but that this would have some moral value.

(c) The United States had made it known to the cease–fire committee, the Indians and the British that they would, in the event of a peaceful settlement in Korea, be prepared to discuss broader Far Eastern issues. I gathered that countries such as the United Kingdom and India with representatives in Peking had been asked to acquaint the Chinese Communist Government of the United States' willingness to discuss other problems affecting the Far East. Rusk said, however, that the United States would not be prepared simply to discuss issues such as Formosa which Communist China might raise, but that they would also wish to discuss other matters, for instance, Indo–China and Tibet.

(d) Rusk said that it was his personal opinion that there was a considerable possibility of Chinese Communist intervention in Indo–China. He then posed the following questions, which he emphasised represented his own personal thinking and not that of the Department:

1. If, as the British think, Indo–China is the key to the security of South East Asia, and if South East Asia is the key to Australia's security, and if Tonkin is the key to Indo–China's security, should we not give some thought to stopping any southward move of the Chinese Communists by establishing defensive positions in Tonkin. In this connection he mentioned the possible use of Thai forces.

2. Rusk indicated he would appreciate your comments on the aspects raised in the course of our conversation.

[matter omitted]

[NAA: A1838, TS852/20/4/2, i]

1 Document 25.

2 The Chinese, in a statement of 22 December, declared the cease–fire group 'illegal', and also announced that 'as a basis for negotiating for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem ... American aggression forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan, and the representatives of the [PRC] must obtain a legitimate status in the United Nations'. See Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 7, 1950, pp. 1594–98.

3 The Collective Measures Committee was established under a General Assembly resolution of 3 November (see footnote 2, Document 20) to study and report on methods that could be used to 'maintain and strengthen international peace and security'.