London, 14 February 1955

395. Secret

From Tange to Plimsoll.¹

Formosa

1. The department should examine carefully the effect of the public position² we have taken insisting that the future of the Offshore Islands be regarded as quite distinct from the future of Formosa upon–

(a) The logic of our own position in continuing to recognise Chiang as the Government of China.

(b) The objective of maintaining international political (and if necessary military) support for the retention of Formosa out of Communist hands.

2. So far as the first is concerned we are in a more difficult position than the United Kingdom whose formula you know. They argue that Formosa is not China, that Chiang and his government and the refugees are there by political and moral right and that China has no claim. It may be that we should explain our attitude to Formosa in the following terms.

(a) The Chinese Communists have no legal or political claim to Formosa or the Pescadores.

(b) These territories were divested from the Japanese under the peace treaty³ and their permanent status has not been finally determined.

(c) The Government of Chiang Kai Shek has full legal authority.

(d) In any case it would be unthinkable to surrender these people and territories to the Communist regime in Peking including many refugees from mainland China and from Korea who have elected against submitting themselves to Communism.

(e) Australia, therefore, welcomes the firm support which the United States is giving Chiang Kai Shek in the face of Communist threats to attack Formosa.

3. We only reach a logical position when we recognise Chiang as the Government of Formosa and Peking as the Government of China and its properly accredited representatives in the United Nations. But in the current atmosphere it appears to me that we must think twice before in pursuit of logic we succeed in giving Chiang nothing more than the status of Synghman Rhee⁴ in Korea without any seat in the United Nations at all while Peking attains the status of a permanent member of the Security Council. I do not see much present prospect of Communist agreement to the seating of Formosa. We have to consider not merely the effect on morale in Asia of which the Americans speak (which is admittedly difficult to assess) but also the possibility that a step by step acknowledgement of the so called facts of life may cause opinion elsewhere (for example, in Western Europe) to waiver at the later point where the Americans will need support for a policy of defending Chiang in Formosa with force.

4. In other words I think that at a time when we are propounding the view that the Offshore Islands must go we should propound no less strongly the case for supporting Chiang in Formosa. We need a formula to explain our curious juridical position. Presumably we should not put too much emphasis on the strategic necessities.

5. I have discussed the foregoing with the Prime Minister who wishes the department to give this problem close study and to provide us in London with considered views by the twenty–second when he has in mind to issue a more comprehensive analysis than has so far been put out upon the Australian attitude to the future of Formosa and the status of Chiang.

[NAA: A1838, TS519/3/1, iii]

1 The cablegram was repeated to Casey in Bangkok.

2 On 7 February, Casey stated that: 'For our part we do not agree that Formosa and the Pescadores are a part of the mainland of China or should be handed over to the Government at Peking. If it is decided that other off–shore islands close to the Chinese coast should be evacuated in the same way as the Tachen Islands are at present being evacuated, then it is clear that American aid in such evacuations is not only no threat to mainland China, but will reduce the danger which the Chinese Communists seem to fear of an invasion of the mainland from Formosa'. Later, on 9 February, Menzies announced in London: 'As regards the juridical status of Formosa, this is something which is yet to be determined and no doubt will some day be determined by the United Nations or under United Nations machinery. But these islands, so closely adjacent to the China coast, have to be considered separately'.

3 By the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed on 8 September 1951, the Japanese renounced 'all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores'.

4 Syngman Rhee, President, Republic of Korea.