Canberra, 10 January 1961

Secret

Chinese Representation in the U.N. and the Future of Formosa

(This working paper sets out:

(i) Australian objectives (paras 1–5)

(ii) Positions of major countries concerned (paras 6–18)

(iii) A suggested procedure (paras 19–34)

(iv) Other necessary action (para. 35))

Australia's Objectives

1. An essential objective of Australian policy is the preservation of an independent Formosa. This requires continued membership of the U.N. for Formosa but does not require the exclusion of Peking from the General Assembly and Security Council.

2. A further essential objective is the avoidance of a political and diplomatic defeat for the United States on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. Such a defeat would have widespread repercussions, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, on which the Communists are concentrating their efforts. It could also gravely affect the U.S. attitude to the United Nations as a whole, including membership of the organisation.

3. The international effects of a defeat on the Chinese question would be particularly serious if it came on the heels of a bad year for United States policies in, for instance, Cuba or Laos.

4. The Minister has made it clear that Australia will not break with the United States on this question. Although we would not wish to take any initiatives, it is in our interests to contribute ideas privately for consideration by the United States on means of achieving a joint objective.

5. The above considerations point up the need to bring home to the Chinese Nationalists a realisation that their interests would be adversely affected (as well as the interests of their major ally) if the United States suffered a major defeat on this issue and as a consequence the prestige and influence of international communism were markedly increased. The Chinese Nationalists must be persuaded that world opinion does not regard them as a Government of China. If they can be brought to face up to and accept this, there is some room for manoeuvre without necessarily risking immediately their position in the General Assembly and Security Council since Peking would presumably not agree to participate on the terms contemplated. (See paragraph 31 below).

The United States Position

6. The State Department�s directive from President Kennedy² and Mr. Rusk³ is to produce a device which will

(a) Keep Formosa in the United Nations,

(b) win some 55 votes, and

(c) be rejected by Peking.

7. Its early thinking, which appears confused and is admittedly tentative, envisages an Assembly resolution which would require an endorsement of Formosa�s continuing membership of the United Nations. Its present intention is to work to have Formosa also retain its Security Council seat. It plans to discuss ideas which may emerge with Australia and other countries concerned.

8. The United States is bedevilled by domestic political difficulties inherent in the China problem. For example, General Eisenhower has made it clear to President Kennedy that he would use his great personal prestige against the Democrats if his China policy were strongly criticised; a majority in both Houses of Congress has subscribed to a declaration by the Committee of One Million⁴ requiring the United States to oppose actively Peking�s entry into the United Nations; the Democrats are vulnerable to charges that it was their policy in 1949 which �lost� China to Communism; the Democrats could lose the next Presidential election or lose ground in the Congressional elections in 1962 on the issue of a disastrous China policy.

9. The United States Government has already spoken to the Chinese Nationalists suggesting tactical flexibility on their part.

The United Kingdom Position

10. The United Kingdom is still publicly bound by Lord Home�s⁵ early statement in Parliament that �the facts of international life� require that Peking should be in the United Nations. Following his talks with President Kennedy in early April, Mr. Macmillan wrote to Mr. Menzies saying that China �was not an easy subject both because of the historical differences between the United States and the United Kingdom attitude towards China and because of the position of Formosa. I got the impression that we could do no more for the moment than recognise the complications. You know what an explosive political issue this is in the United States. I made it clear that we were not attempting to put any pressure on the Americans but only wished them to know that if it came to a straight vote in the United Nations about the seating of Communist China we should have to vote in favour because we have recognised the Peking regime. The less we talk about this the better for the moment�. The United Kingdom appears to be waiting for the United States to define its objectives before taking firm decisions on future action. One cannot, however, avoid the suspicion, (based on past action and leakages) that the United Kingdom might still be tempted to �lead� the United States on this issue.

11. The United Kingdom will have to decide, after the United States line is firmly defined, whether it can give full support to it. It appears aware of the dangers to the West of disunity on the question. Moreover, the Foreign Office has told us that the United Kingdom would not agree to a solution of which a precondition was that the United States should withdraw from Formosa.

The Chinese Nationalists� Position

12. The Chinese Nationalists still claim as a matter of principle the right to be the sole representatives of China in the United Nations. (Apart from any other considerations, the Nationalists� claim to be the Government of China and not of Formosa alone greatly assists them in justifying the rule of eight million Formosans by two million mainland Chinese.)

13. They have maintained officially to the United States that they believe the moratorium⁶ can be maintained. They have been active in endeavouring to solicit African support for their cause. They have not responded to United States suggestions that they might show some tactical flexibility in view of Peking�s firm stand that it would not take a seat in the United Nations if Formosa were represented there in any form. They are reported to have said publicly that if efforts to keep Peking out fail, they would withdraw from the United Nations immediately. (The State Department, however, assesses this as a statement for the record rather than a statement of intention.)

14. The State Department is not hopeful that any package deal, even only ostensibly designed to bring about the seating of both Peking and Formosa, would be acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek. Despite initial setbacks, however, the State Department is �determined to find some mutually acceptable proposal� on tactics.

The Chinese Communist Position

15. Chou En-lai has emphasised in public statements that Peking will not take a seat in the United Nations while Formosa is represented there in any form or under any name. Moreover, in an interview published in Hungary in March, 1961, Chen Yi, the Communist Chinese Foreign Minister, is reported to have said that �our presence in the United Nations depends on one condition, namely that the United States ceases to occupy Formosa and withdraws the Seventh Fleet from the Formosa Straits�. Speaking in Djakarta in early April, Chen Yi also said that withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from the Formosa Straits would lead to an improvement in Sino-American relations. His omission of the point about ceasing to �occupy� Formosa may leave the way open to the suggested procedure outlined later in this paper (para. 27). However, it is expected that Peking will abide by the intransigent position described in the first sentence of this paragraph.

16. A recent Japanese visitor to China has told a United States official recently that �prominent Government officials� went out of their way to say to him that they expected a Sino-American rapprochement within six months, and that the difference of opinion over the question of representation in the United Nations arose because the United States insisted that China should be represented by Formosa alone. The Japanese source is suspect; the spreading of such stories, together with indications of interest in a �two Chinas� solution shown recently by a Communist bloc delegation in New York (the Ukrainian delegate told Mr. Plimsoll that a 'two Chinas' solution might not be impossible) may be designed to promote moves to seat both Peking and Formosa in the belief that these would in fact be blocked and the way cleared to seat Peking alone.

The U.S.S.R. Position

17. The U.S.S.R. (although generally quiet on this issue over the past few months) publicly gives full support to Peking's claims to its 'legitimate' seat in the United Nations and to its claim to sovereignty over Formosa. It would undoubtedly regard a United States defeat on the Chinese question as a major international victory. It would fully appreciate the opportunities created by the domestic difficulties which confront the Kennedy administration on this issue, particularly in respect of the United States' future dealings with the United Nations. It may be that the U.S.S.R. will regard this as the year for the showdown on China. (Peking's policies on Laos may be designed under U.S.S.R. guidance to build up its reputation as being peace loving.) If this is to be the year, heavy Soviet pressures can be expected including possibly a refusal to sit in the Security Council with the Nationalists (a device not employed since January–July, 1950).

18. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. has been embarrassed and its cause damaged by Peking's militant policies. It doubtless still desires (in its own interests) some measure of detente with the United States in certain fields. The Ukrainian view that a 'two Chinas' solution 'might not be impossible' (see para. 16 above) may represent genuine thinking in the Communist bloc (other than China.) The U.S.S.R. (if not the Chinese themselves) may not be willing to press for a showdown on this issue until it is completely certain of victory.

A Suggested Procedure

19. As the United States is unlikely to be able to acquiesce in seating Peking in the present circumstances, it is necessary to consider the possibilities of

(i) maintaining the moratorium, or

(ii) winning a substantive debate on representation on terms which will retain a seat for Formosa.

20. To ensure the success of whichever approach is attempted, it appears more than ever necessary to introduce a new element into the question which will

(i) convince the Afro-Asians that the West is genuinely seeking a solution,

(ii) be consonant with Article 4 of the Charter (on qualifications for membership), and

(iii) either be unacceptable to the Communists, or, if accepted, represent a sufficient improvement in the West's position to make it palatable to United States domestic opinion.

21. The relevant provision in Article 4 is that member states shall be 'peace loving' (Article 2⁷ is also applicable in the same context.) Peking's contention that as Formosa is an 'internal matter', she has the right to use force, is perhaps a less formidable obstacle now that the United Nations has adopted the habit of ignoring or over-riding Article 2 para.7.⁸ Peking's policies over Laos appear in part designed to convince the world that she is 'peace loving'.

22. The United States has for some time pressed Peking at the Warsaw talks to renounce force in the Formosa area. A further call for this [in the context of the Warsaw talks]⁹would make little fresh impact. However, Peking may have left one approach slightly open. When the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister was leaving Djakarta early this month he said that Sino-United States relations could be improved if the United States made the concession of withdrawing the Seventh Fleet from the Formosa Straits. (He did not mention, as he did in March, its ceasing to 'occupy' Formosa.)

The Need for Action by the Chinese Nationalists

23. A possible procedure within the limits of the criteria laid down by President Kennedy ((a) keep Formosa within the United Nations (b) win some 55 votes, and (c) be rejected by Peking) is outlined below. This procedure presupposes that the Chinese Nationalists could be persuaded to strengthen their prospects of retaining a seat in the United Nations by

(a) restating in some form their 1958 declaration that they would not use force against the mainland, and

(b) making the gesture, in case of absolute necessity, of expressing a willingness to relinquish their Security Council seat (in the knowledge that their offer would almost certainly not be acceptable to Peking).

24. It is essential that the Nationalists should take some such action at an appropriate time to win support for themselves and save the United States and its supporters from a major diplomatic defeat. Without such action, the prospects of their retaining a seat at all are poor. Moreover, in view of serious domestic difficulties in the United States, it would be necessary for the Nationalists, and not the United States, to take the lead if an offer to relinquish the Security Council seat had to be made. However, it must be accepted that the Nationalists would not move before it was unequivocally clear that the moratorium would fail and that their position was seriously in jeopardy.

The Importance of Timing

25. The timing of the proposed course of action would be of the utmost importance. It would be desirable to divide action into two distinct phases:

(a) the period before the opening of the 16th Session of the General Assembly (paragraphs 26–30 below), and

(b) the first few days of the Session (paragraphs 31–33 below).

The Pre-Assembly Phase

26. Action before the opening of the Assembly should be designed to assist the 'last resort' objective we have in mind (should it prove necessary) while not revealing that objective. Pre-Assembly action should be coherent and consistent in itself. All United Nations members are awaiting indications of United States thinking on China policy; they would be suspicious if a clear line did not emerge. To be convincing, early action should be in keeping with United States policy, as publicly known, and designed to build up support for a politically obvious and defensible aim.

27. Pre-Assembly activity might take the following form. The United States, together with a number of allies, might call on Peking to renounce the use of force over Formosa and the off-shore islands, stressing Charter requirements in this regard. The Nationalists might at the same time restate their 1958 repudiation of the use of force, preferably in unequivocal terms, and express their willingness to withdraw from the off-shore islands. The United States might also introduce a new element by going so far as to state that, if Peking renounced force, the United States would be willing to withdraw its Seventh Fleet from a defined area of the Formosa Straits (say withdrawal to the east of a line down the middle).¹⁰ The call would be made in firm language, citing, as reasons for calling on Peking
to renounce force, examples of Chinese belligerence elsewhere (e.g. in Korea and 'the Autonomous Region of Tibet').

28. This would be a constructive proposal. Peking would in all likelihood reject it; in the unlikely event of acceptance it could be interpreted as a genuine initiative on the part of the West to reduce tension, it could win support for U.S. internationally, and it could make it easier for� the U.S. Government to make a domestic case for acquiescing in the seating of Peking. It could also be a step towards an eventual 'two Chinas' solution.

29. However, assuming that this call was rejected, the United States might let it be known that, in these circumstances, it would work for a continuation of the moratorium or for a victory in a substantive debate on the grounds that Peking did not qualify for membership within the terms of the Charter.

30. The United States and friendly Governments would, in fact, work for these objectives in order, inter alia, to be able to assess exactly their prospects of success in respect of them by the time the 16th Session began.

Action at the Assembly

31. Assuming that, when the Session began, the prospects of success (in continuing the moratorium or in a substantive debate) remained dangerously in doubt, the Nationalists might, at the very beginning of the Session and before any Assembly vote was taken, take action in the Security Council in an ostensible endeavour to ensure that they would at least retain a seat in the Assembly.

32. The Nationalists might [then]¹¹ inform a special meeting of the Security Council that, believing that controversy over the Chinese seat could affect the working of the Council (on which so many small countries pinned their hopes), it was willing to vacate its seat if the Security Council recommended to the General Assembly that a seat in the Assembly should be guaranteed for the 'Chinese Nationalist Republic on Formosa'. The U.S.S.R. would presumably veto this proposal. In this event, the Nationalists would not necessarily be in a weaker position as–

(i) they would have indicated a willingness to accept present realities, but at the same time shown a desire to have United Nations guarantees for their independence through the continued representation of ten million people in the United Nations (some wavering members might accept this as reasonable),

(ii) Peking's earlier refusal to renounce force and the U.S.S.R.'s veto of the proposal would seem more unreasonable by contrast,

(iii) the Nationalists would continue to occupy the Security Council seat, and

(iv) the blocking third to prevent Peking's entry could still be mustered in the Assembly–and possibly more votes won.

33. In the very unlikely event that the U.S.S.R. did not veto this proposal, its failure to do so could be quoted as evidence of tacit Soviet approval of the scheme; it might then be more likely that a two-thirds majority could be mustered to guarantee Formosa a seat in the Assembly. In such a case it would be for Peking's supporters to devise means of getting her in as well.

Advantages of Proposed Course of Action

34. If action before the Assembly convened made it certain that a reasonably favourable vote on the moratorium or in the substantive debate would be secured, no further action would need to be taken. However, if the second stage of the operation had to be employed, it would have certain advantages. Those countries on whose votes Western success would depend would have to make their final decision quickly after a new element had be introduced, being under the strongest United States pressure in New York and in their capitals. There would be little time for the Communists and friends, who might be expecting the debate to be on the usual lines, to devise counters, or for waverers to sabotage the idea. The addition of a new element at that stage would be greatly preferable to relying solely on Afro-Asian commitments given beforehand, which might well be abrogated as a result of group meetings in New York.

Other Necessary Action

35. If this suggested procedure is followed, other necessary action would
include–

(a) continuing close assessment of likely voting on the moratorium and in a substantive debate (a study of the present position is attached as Annex A),¹²

(b) study of the question of whether the vote in a substantive debate in the Assembly can be treated as an important matter rather than one of credentials,

(c) study of the implications of the proposed Security Council recommendation with a view to seeing whether it could, if necessary, be effectively represented as approval for Formosa's admission as a new member,

(d) special efforts to put the leaders of important groups within the United Nations in the picture (i.e. in respect of only the first phase), with a view to winning their support or discouraging other initiatives. Such countries might include, in addition to the old Commonwealth,¹³ Malaya, India, Pakistan, Japan, Nigeria, Cameroun, Senegal, Italy, France, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.

[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, vii]

1 The paper was given to Tange for approval under cover of a minute of 10 January from Peter Heydon, Assistant Secretary, Division 4, Department of External Affairs. It had been authored by the DEA's Pacific and Americas Branch in consultation with the UN Branch.

2 John F. Kennedy, President-elect of the United States.

3 Kennedy had nominated Dean Rusk as his Secretary of State.

4 On 16 June 1960, the 'Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations' had called on the American public to support its campaigns against concessions to the PRC.

5 Sir Alexander Douglas-Home, UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

6 That is, the moratorium resolution that had been used by the United States and its allies to delay consideration by the UN General Assembly of Chinese representation (see editorial note–The Question of Chinese Representation in the United Nations). In 1960, the moratorium resolution had been adopted by the relatively narrow margin of 42 to 34 with 22 abstentions.

7 Article 2 of the UN Charter lists principles with which the UN Organization and its members shall act.

8 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter reads: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII'.

9 Text in parenthesis was handwritten in the original.

10 A footnote here noted: 'It would be necessary to examine whether, in the unlikely event of such an offer being accepted by Peking, it would leave the West at any serious strategic disadvantage. At first glance it appears unlikely that it would. The Seventh Fleet would remain within a few hours sailing from any likely trouble spot. It would still cover the West coast of Formosa. Bases in Okinawa and the Philippines would still be accessible. Protection for the off-shore islands would be reduced, but Peking would have to break its promise not to use force to attack them'.

11 Text in parenthesis was handwritten in the original.

12 Not published.

13 That is, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.