Singapore, 23 July 1963

Personal Confidential

I feel obliged to report to you personally that Lee Kuan Yew is at present in an aggressive and angry mood about the role which he considers Australia has played behind the scenes in the Malaysia talks since last April.

The effect of our role, he says, became obvious to him during the talks in London preceding the initialling of the Malaysia agreement.

I spent about twenty-five minutes with Lee last night at a reception given by the Yang di-Pertuan Negara¹ to celebrate the return of the Prime Minister and his party from London and the conclusion of the Malaysia agreement. Much of what Lee said may be unpalatable, especially after the progress which has been made in the last two years in encouraging him to adopt a more accommodating and positive attitude towards Australia and the role it can play in South East Asia. Moreover, some of his remarks on the future of Singapore's relations with the Federation–and more particularly the implications behind them–are disturbing. In the circumstances, I shall report them verbatim, as far as I can.

Lee said he liked to be 'frank'. Sir Garfield Barwick had been 'bloody foolish' and had rendered Australia a disservice in urging the Tengku² in the Cameron Highlands to press for tight financial control over Singapore as the basis for a strong Central Government in Malaysia. (Although the reference to the Minister is offensive I felt that no real purpose would have been served by breaking off the conversation at the outset, especially as Lee tends to argue in definite, down-to-earth terms and would not, himself, have considered this language particularly abnormal. I have, for example, heard him describe Lord Selkirk with a four letter noun in the course of an animated discussion.)

Lee continued that this was one of the ideas that had stuck in the Tengku's mind in London. It had also been an important factor in the Tengku's agreement to Tan Siew Sin's demand for a Cabinet ultimatum to Singapore to accept the Federation's terms and in the threat to press for Malaysia without Singapore. Lee added that the idea of 'holding Singapore down through tight Federal financial control' had also been 'urged on the Federation Government by Tom Critchley'.

Lee went on to say that 'Australia should keep its nose out of Singapore–Federation politics' and that our intervention on this question had been 'dangerous and irresponsible'. If the London talks had collapsed, as they would have done if Singapore's position had not been largely met, he would have felt obliged to 'lam³ into Australia and Sir Garfield publicly'. He said 'I do not like the British but you have to give it to them. They have the experience and they know what they are doing. They are like a big computer into which a great deal of data is fed. It's processed and the answer usually comes out the right way'. 'Australia' he said, 'did not really know enough about the economic issues involved to interfere and did not appreciate Singapore's separate importance and special interests'. The Federal–State relationship in Australia was 'entirely different' to the situation between Singapore and Malaya and drawing parallels on the basis of 'incomplete data' was 'half-baked and dangerous'.

Lee went on with vigour and some anger to say that we were deceiving ourselves if we thought that 'the Tengku's court' aided by a group of 'reactionary, wealthy, corrupt, unrepresentative, out-of-touch Chinese in the N.C.A.⁴ in the Federation, could hold Singapore down'. 'Do not underestimate us. You cannot control Singapore from Kuala Lumpur' he said. 'We are the centre of Malaysia. Don't take us for granted. Don't think that Kuala Lumpur can run us without our co-operation or consent. Don't interfere in this because it can only cause trouble. The Tengku is really a bit of a myth. He will pass on and the charmed circle he presides over will disappear. The four million Chinese will stay. It's time Representatives in Kuala Lumpur stopped sitting at the Tengku's feet, hypnotised by his charm, saying yes sir, no sir, three bags full sir. The Tengku and his court are losing touch. We (the Chinese) are in touch. We are tough, dynamic and virile and there are four million of us and if we are forced by short-sighted policies in the Federation, supported by interference from outside countries, to get out the knuckle-dusters then watch out'. Lee said 'Malaysia itself would not solve anything and the 31st of August is simply a date on the calendar. Malaysia Day is part of a continuing process. Malaysia has to be a cooperative venture. The political and economic stresses and strains between Singapore and Malaya will have to be worked out sensibly and logically. Solutions cannot be dictated by Kuala Lumpur'.

The Prime Minister is an articulate and dynamic personality and when he is developing an argument it is difficult to interject, particularly if he is angry. I did, however, say that I was distressed to hear what he had said. I said that I was sure he had attached far too much importance to Australian influence on the course of the Malaysia negotiations. I said that the Minister and our High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur may have expressed, privately and personally, the view that if Communist subversion was to be controlled in Singapore a strong Central Government in Kuala Lumpur was desirable. This was, however, a different thing to suggesting that we had nearly wrecked the London talks and that we wanted to see Singapore's legitimate interests sacrificed.

Moreover, I added, one had to think in terms of the problems the Federation would face if Singapore's increasing prosperity were achieved at the expense of prosperity in Malaya.

Malay unemployment in the Federation could pose a threat to the Alliance Government and communal harmony.

I said to Lee that he himself had told me on a previous occasion that he regarded the unity of U.M.N.O. under the leadership of the Tengku as the sheet anchor of stability in Malaysia. If Singapore were to become obviously more prosperous than the Federation, and if it used its financial resources competitively to achieve clearly better education and housing facilities, then Malay envy and resentment could be expected to grow. This would have undesirable effects both on the stability of the Alliance Government and on the stability of Malaysia.

I said that I understood the Minister and Lee had got on well together when they flew down from the Cameron Highlands in April and I was sorry to hear his present views. At this, Lee interjected and said there was 'no room for personal sentiment in politics'. He did like the Minister and they had things in common. They were both lawyers by training. The Minister however had foolishly intervened in matters outside of his competence (Singapore–Federation relations) and this had encouraged the Federation to take a 'tough' line with Singapore. This could have had a damaging effect on Singapore, the Malaysia Agreement, and stability in the area.

I also said to Lee that Australia attached considerable importance to its relations with Singapore and was aware of Singapore's importance and vitality. I agreed that its relationship with Kuala Lumpur needed to be co-operative within the Federal structure. I added that Australia hoped it could continue to play a helpful, unobtrusive role in Singapore, particularly through technical and administrative assistance. Lee agreed and said he welcomed this. I also said that I was sure Australian Government appreciated the progress which Lee's Government appeared to be making in developing a non-Communist, prosperous and stable State in Singapore (at this stage Lee interjected 'no other Government can keep the Communists out and maintain prosperity so that is all the more reason why you people should not do irresponsible, dangerous things which could have resulted in real trouble here').

Other people who had been looking for Lee at the reception started to gather around where we had been speaking and so the discussion was broken off. I did, however, say to Lee that I would like the opportunity of discussing this matter with him in more detail once I had reported his attitude and had some reaction from Canberra. His parting comment was 'All right, I would like to talk to you again soon but, meanwhile, tell your Government what I have said'.

For what it is worth, Alex Josey⁵, who Gordon Jockel knows well, and who is a confidant of Lee's, telephoned me this morning to say Lee had told him he had given me a 'roasting' but had added that there was 'nothing personal' in this. In fact, he had said he enjoyed discussing questions with me but he wanted to make his annoyance at what he believed to be our activities in the Malaysia talks very clear to the Government.

I believe that our reaction to Lee's comments should be given careful thought in close consultation with Mr. Critchley. In my view, we have three courses open to us. We can attempt to mend our fences with Lee. We can argue that we were correct to use our influence in favour of vesting financial control in the Central Government in the interests of a strong, stable Malaysia which would also be in Singapore's interests. Thirdly, we could ignore Lee's outburst and ride out the storm, in the hope that time will heal the wound as it did after 1959 when Lee was particularly resentful of our close identification with Lim Yew Hock's Government.⁶

Our relations with the Federation Government are of course paramount. Our interests here, however, remain important and I do not think that we can afford to ignore Lee. Although he still lacks widespread popular support, he is a dynamic political figure in Singapore and is likely, in my opinion, to remain so. He is, in short, the 'best bet' for Singapore in Malaysia once it is assumed that the Singapore Alliance⁷ will not gain power here.

I think, however, that our best course would be some combination of the first two approaches I have mentioned. A carefully drafted letter from the Minister might be helpful although I imagine that the Minister will be annoyed by Lee's intemperate attitude. A letter from the Minister outlining our legitimate interest in developments in this region, expressing the hope that Singapore's relations with Malaya within the larger Federation will evolve on a co-operative basis with each side taking account of the other's special problems, pointing out the general desirability of strong but responsive central Government, and stressing Australia's close and friendly interest in Singapore's future, might be helpful.

If the Minister were to agree to do this he could refer to Lee's conversation with me as Lee had requested me to report his views. Although he would be too busy to accept in the near future, an invitation to visit Australia, when he could spare the time would probably be a welcome gesture to Lee.

Alternatively, I could write to Lee. If you do not think the Minister would want to write in the circumstances and if you consider I should do so, I would welcome some guidance on the points, if any, you would like me to make. In any case, I am not going to be able to avoid talking to Lee again.⁸

Philip Moore, the Deputy Commissioner for the United Kingdom here, who attended the London talks and who is close to Lee, is in the Cameron Highlands. I have not therefore yet been to able to discuss Lee's views with him or to ascertain the extent to which Lee may have made these views known to the British. I understand from Mr. Smithies⁹ in Kuala Lumpur however that the First Secretary of the British High Commission there (Mills¹⁰) has also expressed criticism of our alleged influence on the course of the Singapore–Federation talks.

You will presumably want to consider how much of this is passed on to the Minister. My own inclination is that he should be frankly informed of the position. I also believe there is some urgency in this as Lee might yet attack us publicly. He is tactless, tough, mercurial and could do so if he felt inclined.

The only other comments I would like to make, apart from those concerning Australia, are that Lee's outburst illustrates his deep-seated jealousy of the Tengku–something which I have encountered before–and his believe¹¹ that Singapore (and its leader) is too important to fit into a Federation firmly controlled from Kuala Lumpur. In a sense this latter attitude is perhaps of more importance than the sense of resentment he appears at present to harbour towards Australia, as it has in it the seeds of conflict in Malaysia.

I have sent a copy of this letter personally to Mr. Critchley.

[NAA: A1838, 3006/10/4 part 3]

1 Singapore's Head of State: Inche Yusof bin Ishak.

2 Tunku.

3 Possibly, 'lay'.

4 Presumably, 'M.C.A.', the Malayan Chinese Association–the Chinese component of the Alliance (see footnote 9, Document 44).

5 Lee Kuan Yew's press assistant, who was also a correspondent for several international publications and broadcasting stations.

6 Lim Yew Hock was Chief Minister of Singapore from 1957 until the general election on 30 May 1959 when Lee Kuan Yew's PAP was elected.

7 Initially the Singapore Alliance (SA) was an informal alliance of Lim Yew Hock's Singapore People's Alliance (SPA) and the Singapore United Malays National Organization (SUMNO)–Singapore Malayan Chinese Association (SMCA) alliance. By mid-1961, SA also included the Singapore Malayan Indian Congress (SMIC). This SPA–SUMNO–SMCA–SMIC partnership was formalized as the Singapore Alliance on 24 June 1963. The SA belonged to the political right and was favourably disposed towards the formation of Malaysia.

8 It was decided that Woolcott should reassure Lee verbally that his conversation had been reported, and should convey the Minister's concern about the allegations expressed. In doing this Woolcott was to draw on the message to Critchley conveying the government's reluctance to become closely involved in the current federation debate (see Document 69). Before these instructions were dispatched, Woolcott advised DEA, on 30 July, that Critchley had seen Lee in the Cameron Highlands and that his attitude was more relaxed. Critchley doubted whether Lee would raise the issue again.

9 M.W. Bill Smithies, Second Secretary, Kuala Lumpur.

10 Frank Mills.

11 Presumably, 'belief'.