Canberra, 3 October 1963

No. 6/1963. Top Secret

Commonwealth Defence in South-East Asia in the Light of Indonesian Policy and Activity

[matter omitted]

Consideration

2. The Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East¹ outlined the latest British intelligence assessments of the threat to Malaysia in the Borneo territories, the present disposition of British forces in the area and plans for their reinforcement. He also outlined the expected Malaysian/British political/military machinery. (A separate record of this discussion has been circulated.)²

3. The British representative³ advised the Committee that statements last week by the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand⁴ have encouraged the British Chiefs of Staff to believe that the ANZAM Defence Committee would agree to co-ordinate planned operations by the forces of the three member countries for the defence of Malaysia against a threat from Indonesia. It was recognised that prior political approval from the Australian and New Zealand Governments would always be required for the use of national forces. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the threat to Malaysia was also a threat to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve military bases in Singapore and Malaya, which are established to deter aggression in the SEATO area.

4. Britain was currently developing two plans for the reinforcement of Borneo, Plan PEACH to counter an increase in infiltration by Indonesia, and Plan SALAAM to counter overt Indonesian attack on Borneo.⁵

[matter omitted]⁶

5. The British representatives again emphasised that Britain appreciated the need for political approval to be given by the Australian and New Zealand Governments for the use of their forces. It was hoped however that political approval could be given in advance for the inclusion in Plans PEACH or SALAAM of specified units so that the plans could be implemented in an emergency without further governmental approval or possible military veto.

6. The British representatives outlined the sort of plans with which the British Chiefs of Staff would like Australia and New Zealand to be associated:–

(a) Operations to meet the present situation, i.e. may Commander-in-Chief, Far East⁷ use Australian and New Zealand forces at present in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in rotation with British units?

(b) Operations in the event of a deterioration in the situation but with aggression remaining covert. In this case Plan PEACH would be implemented, and Britain might like to incorporate units of the Commonwealth Strategic reserve in this plan.

(c) Plans to deal with overt aggression confined to the Borneo area. In this case Plan SALAAM would be executed, and again it would be very helpful for Australian and New Zealand forces to be included.

(d) Plans to meet overt aggression on a wider scale involving all Indonesia and Malaysia (Plan COUGAR).

(e) Plans on an even wider scale to meet situations such as Indonesian attacks on shipping and aircraft on the routes between Malaysia and Australia or attacks on Australian New Guinea.

[matter omitted]

11. The Australian representatives⁸ agreed with the New Zealand view that an up-to-date
threat assessment covering both the short and the long term, and a precise statement of force requirements, were needed to enable planning to proceed. Australia would be agreeable to take part in counter-insurgency planning on the understanding that provision would be made for adequate political consultation. If Australian forces were to be used to provide periodic relief of other forces in Borneo it would be necessary to have prior Government approval to the programme of reliefs. The effect on SEATO commitments of deploying Australian Strategic Reserve elements to Borneo would have to be considered in the preparation of counter-insurgency plans.

12. The Australian representatives pointed out that the offer of assistance in the Government's statement of 25th September was explicitly to the Government of Malaysia. From the Australian viewpoint it is important that any assistance given should not be, or be seen to be, simply a part of British military effort or as bolstering so-called imperialism. Indonesia must not be allowed to derive a propaganda advantage from Australian participation in counter-insurgency. The Government's aim is to assist a newly-formed sister Commonwealth country and Australia should be able to demonstrate in every case of the use of her forces that such use was at the specific request of the Government of Malaysia. Malaysia should also take part in any planning for the use of Australian forces.

13. The Australian representatives stated that it was likely that possible Australian force contributions to operations in Sabah and Sarawak would be limited to those serving with the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve.

[matter omitted]

Conclusions

18. The ANZAM Defence Committee:�

[matter omitted]

(b) as regards the present anti-insurgency operations in Borneo

(i)invited the British authorities to make available their assessment of the current insurgent threat in Malaysian territory and of Indonesian capability to step up this threat in the immediate future;

(ii)agreed that Australia and New Zealand would require to study the assessment in (i) to provide the necessary background to the circumstances under which Australian and New Zealand forces might be committed to operations in the Malaysian Borneo area and to enable the Australian and New Zealand Governments to consider the effect on SEATO commitments of providing forces in Malaysian Borneo;

(iii)noted that possible Australian and New Zealand force contributions to operations in Sabah and Sarawak would be likely to be limited, as far as possible, to those serving with the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve;

(iv)agreed that, to enable the Australian and New Zealand authorities to consider how their forces might be used in the present insurgent situation in Malaysia, it would be necessary for Britain to provide full particulars of the force requirements, the tasks on which they would be employed and the need for such reinforcements in the light of the forces which Malaysia and the United Kingdom could provide;

(v)agreed that, after examination of the details in (iv) by Australia and New Zealand, consideration would be given by the ANZAM Defence Committee to the method by which Australia and New Zealand could be associated with Malaysia in the planning and control of anti-insurgency operations in Malaysia.

[matter omitted]

[NAA: A 1945, 245/3/4]

1 Major General Francis Wyldbore-Smith.

2 Not published.

3 Rear Admiral Anthony Davies, Head, British Defence Liaison Staff, Canberra.

4 Holyoake made a statement to the New Zealand Parliament, tabling documents connected with New Zealand's association with the Anglo-Malaysian defence arrangements, on 20 September.

5 Not published.

6 Matter omitted relates to SEATO planning, details of force requirements, directives for force commanders, threat assessments, and British-Malaysian defence arrangements.

7 Admiral Sir Varyl Begg.

8 Edwin Hicks, Secretary, DD; Air Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee; Air Marshal Sir Valston Hancock, Chief of the Air Staff; Lieutenant General John Wilton, Chief of the General Staff; and Rear Admiral Thomas Morrison, representing the Chief of the Naval Staff.