Canberra, c. 10 December 1963¹

Secret

British/Malaysian Request for the Use of Australian Forces

The Prime Minister's Pledge–25th September, 1963

'If ... there occurs in relation to Malaysia or any of its constituent States, armed invasion or subversive activity–supported or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia–we shall to the best of our powers and by such means as shall be agreed upon with the Government of Malaysia, add our military assistance to the efforts of Malaysia and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia's territorial integrity and political independence.'²

Sir Robert Menzies' statement has been widely interpreted, especially in Kuala Lumpur, as a more specific pledge than in fact it is. The language is actually vaguer than might at first appear and could literally be said to have already been fulfilled by the fact that the Sabre squadrons at Butterworth have been alerted and the 'Rules of engagement'³ agreed. However, the question cannot be dismissed in such a specious manner and this paper considers the possible answer to a Malaysian request for Australian forces against the background of the following headings:

(a) Australian reaction

(b) British reaction

(c) Malaysian reaction

(d) American reaction

(e) Indonesian reaction.

If Australia decided to make a substantial contribution to Malaysian defence, the following reactions seem probable:

(a) Australian Reaction

Public opinion seems to be divided between those such as the 'Sydney Morning Herald', who favour clobbering Sukarno now; the opposite view held by those who attach great importance to living on terms of friendship with Indonesia; and lastly those who will admit that a time may come when we may have to fight but question whether that time has yet arrived. A vigorous press campaign appears to have been sparked off in London suggesting that the time has come for Australia and New Zealand to do their bit.⁴ This campaign has not yet had time to gather momentum and it is difficult to say how it will influence public opinion. It could produce a demand for strong action or equally it could lead to the belief that we were being 'pooled' by the British. Public interest in the decision will probably be considerable, whatever course is followed.

(b) British Reaction

The United Kingdom clearly attaches great importance to the presence of even a small quantity of Australian troops in Eastern Malaysia and a favourable decision would, of course, please them. How deep their disappointment would be at an unfavourable decision would depend on the explanations made and the further assurances given. If they were convinced that our forces would be readily available if needed, this might go far towards satisfying them.

We have in the past drawn a distinction throughout in public and private between British and Australian obligations. We have not accepted that ties with Britain make Australian intervention automatic. The two main issues to be weighed are (a) whether Australian participation would deepen and consolidate British official and public commitment to the defence of Malaysia, and (b) whether our claim to call on Britain in circumstances of Australia's need would be affected by our decision in this case. Our feeling is that neither question is really at stake, if the matter is carefully handled. There is some evidence that the request has become toned down over a period of time and that some British authorities realise the great delicacy of the issue for Australian/Indonesian relations.

(c) Malaysian Reaction

The Malaysians would be disappointed by an adverse decision, but might not be seriously upset since the present request is clearly British inspired. They have the Prime Minister's pledge; the Butterworth Air Force units are participating in the air defence of Malaysia; and there is scope for material aid in building up the Malaysian Defence Forces. The terms of any reply could convey the seriousness of our intentions and the Government's willingness to keep the subject under constant review.

We do not think this reply would weaken our influence with the Malaysians. In fact, the contrary might hold good. Malaysian policy and diplomacy has its inadequate and even dangerous elements and it may be desirable for them to feel they do not have a blank cheque.

(d) American Reaction

A formal United States view has not yet emerged since we notified them of the request. It is now five days since Harriman was informed of the British note⁵ and there has been no reaction. Because of their desire not to increase tension in the area and add to Indonesia's difficulties, as well as caution engendered by the ANZUS commitment, they may prefer us not to send forces to Borneo.⁶ On the other hand, because of the British/Malaysian request, they may feel unable to express such a view.

(e) Indonesian Reaction

Some Indonesian reactions are reasonably predictable and others are not. Two earlier important decisions do not give much evidence of the likely reaction to a decision to send forces to Borneo. The Cabinet decision in February to reaffirm support for Malaysia⁷ was accepted calmly by the Indonesians. The Government's pledge to defend Malaysia did not excite much direct response, but there has been a clear deterioration in relations since that time and some suggestion of anti-Australian propaganda.

At best the Indonesian Government might play down the sending of Australian forces to Borneo as of minor military significance and as merely reflecting the known Australian position. They could say that there was no threat to Indonesia as Indonesia's regular forces are not involved. This would probably be accompanied by efforts to denigrate Australia in Asian eyes and to identify us with the British as a white, colonial power (not hitherto applied).

However, a sharper Indonesian reaction is likely and would probably take the form of an Indonesian denial of overflying rights for the RAAF Hercules. This would complicate the task of reinforcement and supply for our forces in Malaysia.

In addition they could take over the few Australian properties and investments in Indonesia, terminate the Qantas service into Djakarta and deny overflight rights for Qantas. This would involve major and costly re-routing of Qantas flights between Sydney and Europe. (See annex B.)⁸Indonesian interference with shipping routes could also gravely handicap Australian trade. This form of retaliatory action could be threatened even if it were not carried to the length of naval interference.

Lastly, we should also expect our diplomatic influence to be reduced. The Indonesian Government would deny that we any longer had an independent role. The attitudes in Djakarta would steadily harden and the diplomatic bridges established over a period of time would not have much value. The loss of an independent and significant Commonwealth voice in Djakarta would be of some consequence, British influence there now being very slight.

Long Term Aspects of the Problem

The reactions already described are essentially short term and could be expected to manifest themselves within a few days or weeks of the announcement of a decision to send forces to Eastern Malaysia. Various long term aspects need to be considered.

(a) It seems certain that any Australian force commitment will be for many years. It is doubtful whether the 1955 decision to send troops to Malaya⁹ was taken with the knowledge that they would still be there in 1963. Similarly, the � Squadron of Sabres is still at Ubon.¹⁰ If we send more troops to Eastern Malaysia, we must be prepared for a long term commitment and not merely meeting a short emergency.

(b) Even if the Indonesian reaction is mild, it must contribute to a gradual deterioration of our relations. Other forms of established cooperation will suffer. Colombo Plan cooperation which has enabled us to retain a semblance of normality in our relations on which we might hope to rebuild our bridges in the future would probably have to go.

(c) Indonesia would be tempted to exploit our weakness in New Guinea. The Indonesians could calculate that some interference in border regions would create considerable public unrest in Australia and cause a diversion of troop dispositions. The Indonesians are well placed geographically to intrude; several former Dutch administrative towns are near the border and the Indonesian presence is well established in and around them; by contrast Australian border regions are more deserted , and our administrative centres further away. Minor forms of Indonesian meddling would be difficult to prevent and difficult to bring effectively to international notice.

(d) There are still other, more intangible aspects for consideration. Some regard must be paid to the capacity for self-deception and rationalisation of Indonesian leaders and political groupings. The notion that Malaysia is a 'plot' for 'Commonwealth encirclement' is a feature of the thinking of Indonesian radical nationalists, and the Communists. Within recent days Dr. Subandrio in a conversation with the Australian Ambassador reversed the normal processes of causes and effects when he declared that Indonesia would match the British 'man for man' in Borneo (until the Brunei revolt not a single British soldier was stationed in North Borneo). This emotionalism must be considered, the more so because in the coming months politics in Djakarta will probably become more hysterical and frenetic as the economic situation gets worse as the effects of the policy of diverting trade from Malaysia and–more fundamental–Western aid continues to be withheld. At some point in the future President Sukarno has to decide (in the face of contending internal factions and interest) whether he has to draw back from 'confrontation' or plunge in more heavily, with whatever outside backing he can muster. Given the fear of encirclement and the recurring suspicion of a Western effort to dismember Indonesia, is there not some risk that a new Australian politico-military decision might be taken as evidence of a Western return to the policies of 1958?¹¹

(e) Is there any reason to suppose that the reverse of this situation, namely that the arrival of regular Australian forces at the point of engagement between Indonesia and Malaysia will have any serious deterrent effect on Malaysia?¹²

Possible involvement in internal insurrection

We face extremely difficult questions over the prospect of internal insurrectionary movements. There are two main areas of disaffection, namely the Communist Clandestine Organisation (C.C.O.) in Sarawak and the rebels in Brunei. The C.C.O. is an organisation of left-wing Chinese who have infiltrated various open political groupings. They can be likened to the Communist Terrorists of Malaya¹³, being militant in outlook, rejecting the present constitutional framework, and drawing their inspiration and indoctrination from the Chinese Communist revolution. They number about 3,500 with the passive support of 20,000 or 15% of the Chinese population. In recent months upward of 700 have crossed into Indonesia for training in guerrilla fighting. If Indonesian pressure is sustained on the border and seems to be bringing about the weakening of morale in Sarawak it seems probable that the C.C.O. will mount direct action.

In the course of the Malayan Emergency the Government authorised the use of Australian forces against the Communist Terrorists. The authorisation related to a defined group–'Communist Terrorists'–who were not regarded as an indigenous political movement but an instrumentality of Communist China. The principle governing this action received little international criticism. Apart from Peking no other State had a strong interest in attacking it.

The Government has recognised the problems which we would have in Borneo by referring to subversive activity 'supported or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia'.¹⁴ We should have to base ourselves on that premise, but we would come under strong Indonesian criticism, full of racial and colonialist overtones, that foreign forces were suppressing movements for internal freedom. This would make some impact in Afro/Asian countries, especially if linked with the kind of general anti-Australian propaganda that might find some response among them.

The circumstances would be worse if the revolt flares up again in Brunei, as is quite possible due to the political failure of the Sultan.¹⁵ Once our forces are on the ground in Borneo (and we have to think of long periods ahead once that happens) it will become very difficult as a practical matter to make a series of careful distinctions between the insurrectionary movements we aid in quelling and those we do not�all of them will be significant for the stability of Malaysia and for Indonesian behaviour in the area.

United Nations

We should consider before despatching additional forces to Malaysia whether it would be to our advantage or disadvantage to seek a U.N. involvement in the threat to Malaysia. There is also the possibility that whatever we decide, the Indonesians may claim that British and Australian forces represent a threat to peace. Thirdly there is the question of the desirability of the despatch of Australian forces taking place only after the Malaysian Government has registered its complaint with the U.N. These matters are discussed in Annex A¹⁶ as is the desirability of prior discussion on U.N. tactics with our friends.

Conclusion

Our commitments to Britain and Malaysia are of such a nature that all these risks of varying degrees would have to be set aside if it were vitally necessary for Australia to put forces in Borneo, either to supplement otherwise inadequate forces or as a major deterrent. If it can be shown that our forces are vital to the defence of Malaysia, we should be obliged to accede to the request. Our view without having heard the Defence opinion is that this case has not been made out. If so, we might proceed as follows:

(a) Agree to begin consultation with Malaysia, as provided in the Prime Minister's pledge. This process could clearly take some weeks;

(b) Agree to supply such items from paragraph 39(a)¹⁷ as are least likely to involve us with Indonesia. For example the LAA batteries might be restricted to Singapore or Malaya;

(c) Hold back as long as possible on the provision of combat forces. This would however continue to be a factor in the overall politico-military situation. This is actually the position they occupy at the moment and it is something for the Indonesians to think about. The Indonesians know that Australia is pledged to the defence of Malaysia; they should not be in doubt that the pledge will be honoured; they know (thanks to Fleet Street) that Britain and Malaysia want us to commit forces; and that we have not hitherto done so. It seems that there would be merit in letting the Indonesians know precisely where we stand in the sense that we would not hesitate to commit forces if there is an escalation of their military effort in Borneo which we are watching very closely. It is because we would regard that as a serious and irretrievable step (possibly broadening the conflict, i.e., American commitments) that we have so far refrained from doing so. We still hope that calmer counsel will prevail in Indonesian policy. It seems to us that such a careful, limited but positive step would be in keeping with the Government's past handling of the crisis.

[NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1 part 18]

1 The original document is undated, and authors unidentified.

2 Ellipsis in original document.

3 'Rules of engagement' (ROE) are those directives by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. In this case, ROE had been prepared by the RAF, endorsed by Australian, Malaysian and British authorities on 20 September 1963, and implemented by the RAAF from early October.

4 Exemplified by an article by Clare Hollingworth in the Guardian, 10 December, 'Britain's role in Malaysia', in which she writes, in reference to the population of the Borneo territories: 'In Kuching, the capital of Sarawak, there is considerable bewilderment caused by the attitude of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, which have not even sent a token force to the Borneo territories from the Commonwealth Brigade which is well known to be in training on the Malay Peninsula. Australian missions, which have been established in Borneo for over half a century, are continually being pestered by their supporters to give reasons for this apparent military neglect and indifference.'

5 Beale informed Harriman of the note on 5 December.

6 Commencing with Harriman's attendance at the ANZUS meeting in Wellington, 5–6 June, and his subsequent visit to Canberra, Barwick had striven to gain a US assurance of the applicability of the treaty to Australian (and New Zealand) forces should they be deployed in Sabah and Sarawak. His efforts culminated in an 'understanding', reached with President Kennedy on 17 October, that the US 'would be prepared to commit air and sea forces and to provide logistic support' in support of Australian forces in Malaysia. In return Australia was to consult with the US before stationing armed forces in Sabah and Sarawak.

7 See Document 26.

8 Not published.

9 Cabinet decided on 31 March 1955 that Australia would join with the UK and New Zealand in contributing forces to a newly-created Far East Strategic Reserve in Malaya.

10 See footnote 3, Document 39.

11 A reference to Western support for rebellions in Indonesia's outer islands during 1957-58 (see footnote 7, Document 29).

12 Presumably, 'Indonesia'.

13 The British-trained Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army re-formed in 1948 as the communist-led Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Known as Communist Terrorists (CTs) they began a guerrilla insurgency to seize control of Malaya from the British. The resulting 12-year period of unrest became known as the Malayan Emergency.

14 Menzies' statement of 25 September (see paragraph 4, Document 120).

15 This view was based on a report by Woolcott following a two-day visit to Brunei in August. He had reported that the outlook for Brunei was 'depressing', with the state showing 'no sign of real progress despite shock of rebellion'. He assessed that this was due mainly to the continued 'autocratic but inefficient control of Government by Sultan', and saw 'little prospect of moderating inefficient, corrupt, nepotistic Government'. In his view, Brunei could become a 'centre of disaffection and political intrigue', a situation that could be exploited by Indonesia with the possibility of an Indonesian-backed 'further popular revolt for independence'.

16 Not published.

17 That is, items summarised in paragraph (a), Document 135.