Canberra, 10 December 1963

Top Secret

External Affairs has produced a paper on political aspects of Australian assistance in Malaysia² which, I understand, takes a pretty cautious line.

2. We have no advice as yet of the United States attitude to the British requests.

3. The External Affairs paper will set out the political aspects in detail. Sir Arthur Tange will discuss with you the extent to which the political side of the question is canvassed at the Defence Committee meeting. Some of the aspects which occur to me are, on the one hand:–

(a) Militarily, the United Kingdom can meet the force requirements of the present situation and some enlargement of it.

(b) There is therefore no over-riding military requirement for Australian participation, although any help would be useful. The decision is essentially a political one for Cabinet.

(c) Australian forces would not materially influence the military situation.

(d) Commitment of Australian forces would be, in many ways, tantamount to a declaration of war against Indonesia–although in an unofficial and limited way. For the first time Australian and Indonesian forces would be ranged against each other with obvious long term consequences. This action would be on Australian initiative as Indonesia has not attacked Australian territory or forces or conducted activities specifically directed against Australian interests.

(e) We would be committing forces in support of objectives in which we cannot control or even influence adequately the political situation. See, for example, Woolcott's report to-day of the situation in Brunei in the heart of the Borneo area (12 months after the revolt, the same autocracy, inefficiency, corruption and nepotism).³ Also, we cannot influence adequately the Tunku in many of his statements and actions.

(f) There could be retaliation against Australian New Guinea.

(g) Unless the commitment were closely controlled, it could ultimately draw in a large part of our forces.

4. On the other hand:–

(a) The area is of great strategic importance to Australia.

(b)Whatever the background to the Prime Minister's declaration of 25th September, it could have raised expectations that Australia will commit forces despite the qualifications in the statement.

(c) The United Kingdom will be closely observing the Australian response. (You have no doubt noticed the pressure being applied on us through what appeared to be clearly inspired press leakages from the United Kingdom.)⁴ It is in our interest to keep the United Kingdom military presence in South-East Asia.

5. There has been no recent increase in Indonesian activities although an increase is threatened. Commitment of our forces would therefore be a deliberate decision not called for by any immediate military requirement. We would no doubt wish to obtain the maximum political result from such a decision or, in fact, from the possibility of such a decision–for example final warnings to the Indonesians to see if these would have any deterrent effect. If we did commit forces, this could be on a progressive basis beginning with logistic and support forces.

{We have not yet received a Malaysian request.}

[NAA: A1945, 245/3/6]

1 Gordon Blakers, now Deputy Secretary, DD.

2 Document 136.

3 Possibly, a reference to the report cited in footnote 15, Document 136. Although Woolcott's report had been received by DEA on 20 August, it may have just been passed to Defence.

4 See footnote 4, Document 136