Canberra, 27 January 1965

Top Secret

Submission No. 599–Possible Use of Australian Forces in the Defence of Malaysia¹

The Committee noted–

(a) the Malaysian requests as outlined in messages from the Minister for Defence on his discussions with Razak in Kuala Lumpur;

(b) Razak's agreement that these should be regarded as informal requests to be translated later into formal requests to the extent that Australia indicated she was prepared to meet them;

(c) the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff as set out in paragraph 3 of the Submission.²

2. The Committee accepted that Australia should proceed on the basis that she would respond to Malaysia according to the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff mentioned above. This was subject to the condition that logistic support arrangements for any additional ground force contributions to Malaysian Borneo should be negotiated and agreed to before any final commitment is made to Malaysia and completed before the commitment of the forces is made public.

3. Given this acceptance, the immediate step was for Australia to discharge its obligations under ANZUS by informing the United States–and New Zealand–of the response which Australia would make to a formal Malaysian request and the reasons behind it, and concerting with them about this response. The Committee directed that messages to the United States and New Zealand should be prepared forthwith, indicating, inter alia, the position as regards forces and terms of engagement.

4. The Committee again registered its concern that the use of 3 RAR in Borneo for cross border operations could provide the Indonesians with material on which to develop charges of Australian aggression. It could also provoke them to indulge in demonstrations or hostile activities on the Papua New Guinea border which, on a strictly military view, would have the damaging result of dispersing Australian forces. The Committee considered the position of the SAS squadron. It was not similarly troubled by the deployment of these troops in Borneo, though it would be necessary to watch that their commitment was presented publicly as a defensive measure.

5. In considering the rotation of 3 RAR into Borneo, the Committee did not feel that Australia could seek to write in restrictions on the terms of engagement. This could not be sustained politically or militarily and would be detrimental to the morale of our troops. However, the Committee believed that there was scope for the Commander-in-Chief to manage the rotation of 3 RAR in such a way that in the months immediately ahead, and in the absence of a 'hotting up', the risks indicated at paragraph 4 above would be minimized. It was important therefore that the Commander-in-Chief should understand Australia's special position and vital interests in this regard. The Committee decided that the best course in the circumstances, and possibly a fruitful one, would be for the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff to have an informal talk with the C-in-C(FE) after the consultations with the United States and New Zealand had taken place and the decision on Australian forces for Borneo had been firmed. It directed that, in due course, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff arrange a quick trip to Malaysia for this purpose.³

6. On the request for 40,000.303 rifles, the Committee noted that the Department of Supply was at present checking the number available from a stock of 90,000 'repairable' rifles. An additional stock of 13,000 .303 rifles was being held against the needs of cadets.⁴ The Committee decided that Australia should inform the Malaysians that she held 'repairable' stocks of .303 rifles exceeding 40,000 which were being checked. It appeared as though 10,000 rifles would certainly be available and these would be shipped progressively in consultation with the Malaysian authorities.

7. In any announcement, Australia's action should be presented as a response to Malaysia, a near neighbour and fellow member of the Commonwealth, threatened by Indonesian aggression. A reference to the forces being drawn from the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve would, without naming them, show Britain and New Zealand were parties to the Australian response. A form of words should be found which would convey that Australia had also discussed her intentions with the United States.

[NAA: A4940, C1473]

1 Document 239.

2 See Documents 238 and 239.

3 Air Marshal Scherger had discussions with Admiral Begg in Singapore on 4 February.

4 That is, the Australian Cadet Corps, comprising students from high schools throughout Australia.