Canberra, 9 August 1968

Confidential

Papua and New Guinea: strength of the Pacific Islands Regiment

In the light of past instances of disaffection in the PIR over pay and conditions of service and the implications of this for the reliability and stability of the Force, it was proposed to the Minister for Defence in March 1967 that the programme for expanding the PIR to three battalions plus supporting units, adopted by Cabinet in 1963, should be reviewed. ¹

2. Following an examination made within the defence machinery in consultation with the Department of External Territories, the Defence Committee considers that a review should be undertaken not later than 1970 to decide the overall position of the defence forces of Papua and New Guinea, including the PNG Naval Division, air transport and other support requirements, and that meanwhile the Army should work to a PIR strength of 3,500 odd (including 650 odd ARA) by June 1969, i.e. two battalions plus supporting units. It is understood that the proposed review could be brought forward to early 1969. ²

3. In 1961 indigenous soldiers rioted over conditions of service and further disturbances occurred among members of the PIR in relation to the Local Officers' Salaries issue in 1965 and 1966. In a submission to Cabinet in 1966 the Minister for the Army reported that the Commander in the Territory expected 'serious trouble' if an announcement on pay rates were not made in a matter of days. ³

4. Since Cabinet's 1963 decision the Force has increased from 660 Pacific Islanders and 72 ARA to 2,455 Pacific Islanders plus 632 ARA. The indigenous strength has increased by some 260 since last October when it was agreed between the Ministers concerned that the matter of further expansion should be submitted to Cabinet. The Defence Committee's present proposal would defer the raising of the third battalion but would still expand the present indigenous strength by about 15 per cent by June 1969.

5. During this rapid build-up the degree of reliance on Australian officers and skilled personnel has increased. Only six indigenous officers have so far graduated and competition from other fields for school-leavers of a calibre suitable for officer training will be strong for some years yet. The larger the force created the more difficult will it be to have it staffed by indigenous officers by the time of self-government and the greater will be the likelihood of instability resulting from the accelerated promotion of inexperienced officers.

6. While doubts about the future stability of the Force exist it would be desirable not only to limit further recruitment to officer trainees and replacements, but also to avoid large concentrations as far as possible, and in particular to restrict to a minimum the strength at Port Moresby, which is the main centre of political activity and potential unrest.

7. On the economic side even a force of the present strength would be beyond the capacity of the Territory's economy to sustain for many years to come. Australia might well be willing to continue to pay for its maintenance, but we have been trying to avoid creating institutions at a standard or at a level that a future PNG Government would not be able to maintain from its own resources. Moreover, a defence force which was dependent on outside maintenance would represent a serious limitation of sovereignty.

8. Because of the diversity of conditions comparisons with other countries do not offer a very helpful lead. Nevertheless for what it is worth a comparison on a population basis with some 35 developing countries suggests that a force of one battalion plus supporting units together with a small patrol boat force would be appropriate for Papua and New Guinea at its present stage of development. This would take about 2.6 per cent of the budget instead of 5.2 per cent for a wholly indigenous force of the present size.

9. Having regard to the basic problem of reliability a period of consolidation seems to be needed and there does not appear to be any external pressure to preclude this.

10. A reasonable course would be to hold the strength of the PIR at approximately the present level until the proposed review can be carried out, the target strength of the force to be determined when the results of that review are available to be taken into account, and in the light of the economic implications and any new facts or strategic considerations.

[NAA: A5868, 274]

1 See attachment B, Document 111.

2 See Document 190.

3 See Document 63.