Canberra, 31 March 1969

Some observations on my visit to P.N.G.–16th to 22nd March, 1969

So many decisions the Government has to take in respect of the Territory and Australia's relationships with it over a spectrum whose major elements include political, social, economic and military depend on a definitive assessment of the importance of the Territory to Australia. The Defence Department's prime concern is with strategy and defence and already the Joint Staff is directing itself to these matters.¹

2. If the conclusion is reached that the Territory is of critical importance to Australia, it becomes necessary that all elements of government in Australia should concert their efforts to encouraging a climate of opinion in the Territory which will lead to the Territorians being anxious to sustain a continuation of close relationships with Australia. The Defence Group of Departments has a powerful role to play on this.²

3. I found on this visit no more clarity among the Administration people, the expatriates or the indigenes with whom I spoke than on earlier visits as to what the relationship between Australia and the Territory should be or as to when the question of independence would reach a climacteric point. There was concern about the views expressed by expatriate teachers at the University and about the possible influence of vocal graduates and under-graduates from the University. No one saw in sight at the moment the demagogue who could set a fire to the movement for independence.

4. Nothing that I learned on this occasion led me to vary the assessment I made the best part of ten years ago that a political climax would face Australia before the end of the 1970s.

5. In all our thinking about the Territory, we must see it not as a part of Australia nor anything resembling an extension of Australia. For our purposes, the Territory is a country of South East Asia with ultimately, I suspect, closer affinities to the people of West Irian than we are inclined to admit, though not necessarily closer affinities to Indonesia in the political sense.

6. No less than I urged in earlier years in respect of institutions in the industrial relations field, we have to develop and organise a military establishment appropriate to the future needs and circumstances of the Territory. This must not be cast on the image and form of Australia's forces. If Australian forces are to be deployed to the Territory in post independence days, the ease of the task will depend on the political relationship then existing between the Territory and Australia: not on the shape and organisation of the Territory's forces. At the moment the forces in the Territory are more an extension of the Australian forces than a response to the circumstances of the Territory. This is more markedly so in the case of the naval force which is an unashamed integral part of the R.A.N. The Army at least makes gestures of being a Territory force.

7. I formed a high opinion of the job the Army is doing with the P.I.R.I was equally relieved to find that the Commander³ and his senior officers subscribed to the points just made and others to which I will refer and were anxious to make adjustments which would set the Army element in the Territory in its proper context as a Territory, not an Australian force.

8. Despite the comments made by indigene M.P.s and others, I see no reason to cavil at the standards of the Army accommodation at Goldie River, Taurama, Wewak and Lae, nor for being concerned about the standards of the married quarters accommodation we have provided for indigene personnel.

9. I view the establishment accommodation as being all that will be needed for many years–indeed I can see no need for any more–and the low maintenance cost structures should serve the Territory well for years.

10. By contrast the Drill Halls at Mount Hagen and Wewak are lavish and extravagant beyond belief. They must not be repeated. I mentioned to Brigadier Eldridge that with the Mount Hagen establishment on our hands we could get some slight ex post facto recompense for our expenditure by throwing it open to the maximum extent for community functions. I believe the same is called for at Wewak. At both places those concerned with the P.N.G.V.R. need to be far more active in searching out recruits: the contrast in attitudes at Rabaul of those concerned with the P.N.G.V.R. did not go unnoticed.

11. The contrast with the civilian accommodation provided by the Administration stems, I believe, less from considerations of floor space and provisions made than from the neatness and tidiness of the Army houses. This, of course, is the product of the discipline that causes gardens to be tended and houses to conform to specific hygiene requirements. The concrete wall slab type of house the Army has been building is a vast improvement on the less durable materials used in the Administration homes. Whatever may be the position as to houses, the time for any argument is passed because the Army building programme is complete.

12. The current organisation of the Army in the Territory does not strike me as appropriate. Put broadly it is an extension of the Australian Army organisation. However justifiable that may be in Australia it has no place in the Territory remembering the point made in para 6, the critical need to cut costs and simplify procedures and the relatively small numbers the Territory's Defence Forces now have or are likely to have. So I see no justification for the Corps system with its inevitable functional duplication, I find myself wondering again whether the battalion concept is sound, and I see every reason why–

(a) the administrative overhead should be pruned;

(b) administrative procedures and practices should be simplified;

(c) the Territory Administration should be brought more positively into association with the administration of the P.I.R.;

(d) there should be a unified defence force in the Territory;

(e) pending this, everything should be done to eliminate duplication of activities between the P.I.R., R.A.N. and R.A.A.F.; and

(f) wherever practicable, provisioning and procurement, and repairs and maintenance services should serve not only the Defence Force, but the Police Force and other elements of the Administration.

13. Put in simple terms the problem that faces us is to devise a Force tailored to meet requirements of the Territory and its economic circumstances. If services of the type mentioned in para { 12} (f) can be provided more economically in a civilian organisation outside the defence forces and serving them and other elements of the Administration, this should not be rejected. To the maximum possible extent, the industries of the Territory should be used to support the Force: thus a contribution can be made to the Territory's economy and broader popular support for the Force secured. I would not rule out the possibilities that the best solution to the Territory's circumstances could be a force embracing police and military elements; there is nothing novel in this–c.f. Malaysia as an example. Indeed already the P.I.R. appears to be discharging outside the urban areas some of the roles that used to be and might normally be expected of a police force.

14. The case for one single Defence Force and one unified command and administration in the Territory seems clear. lt should mean amongst other things one philosophy as to the role and purpose of defence forces in the Territory and a common standard of relationships between expatriates and indigenes. I see no reason why indigenes should not be used in any air support element that is thought necessary–the Civil Airlines have, to my knowledge, been using indigene aircraft mechanics for ten years and more. There may be greater scope for the use of civil aircraft for air support roles but I would doubt myself the wisdom of vacating the whole field to civilian contractors. The fact that the air force element of the unified force and command may have roles to perform for the R.A.A.F. and the naval element roles to perform for the R.A.N. should present no problems. In the case of the naval element, if, as seems likely, the patrol boats are increasingly employed on fisheries surveillance, they will be performing a function for the Territory Administration, not for Australia: which is another reason for the naval forces being seen, as the Army tries to present the P.I.R., as a Territory defence force.

15. I am impressed by the desirability of involving the Territory Administration in the affairs of the Defence Force. Clearly too we must begin to educate the indigene parliamentarians in defence matters. Let me be clear–I am not suggesting that while the Territory stands in its present political relationship to Australia, Australia should abdicate responsibility for determining defence policy and plans for the forces in the Territory. While we retain such responsibility, if we are discreet in our approach, we can create a climate which will not compromise the long term association of the Territory's Forces and Australia's defence arrangements, if that proves possible under any political settlement between the two countries.

16. Increasingly it will be necessary for us to explain and to justify to the Territory's Parliament what we are doing. As I mentioned recently in correspondence with Mr. Warwick Smith, not merely should the Commander attend, as needs be, the Administrator's Executive Council; it would be desirable if from time to time the Minister for Defence, or Secretary to the Department of Defence or Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee attend a Council Meeting.⁴

17. But with policy and the programme for development of the forces in the Territory resting for the time being with the Defence machinery in Canberra, it seems to me that the sensible thing to do is to make available to the Territory Administration by way of lump sum the annual funds required for defence including the maintenance and any capital works funds, leaving it to the Administration to arrange payments for pay, allowances, works, services etc., to vouch the payments and so on. In short, the civilian side of the defence force in the Territory covering administration of the defence force should be part of the Territory's Administration, staffed by and part of the Territory's Public Service, and subject to progressive indigenisation. To the extent that civilian personnel from the Defence Complex in Canberra were required, they would be seconded, on a phasing out basis, to the Territory Administration.

18. There is already room for rationalisation within the P.l.R., R.A.N. and R.A.A.F. For example, I can see no reason why Navy should send to the Territory Psychologists to deal with recruits (and incidentally require the recruits to come to the psychologists) when the Army psychologists could do the task equally well. And there is every justification for the R.A.A.F. and R.A.N. using the P.I.R.'s medical, dental and hospital services, instead of sending people from Australia. The R.A.N. hospital at Manus is progressively becoming a hospital serving the civilian indigenous population: admirable if you like in one sense, but clearly a dubious role for the R.A.N. and borne by it for lack of appropriate civilian facilities.

19. Still for decision is whether a third battalion ofthe P.I.R. should be raised: the Joint Staff currently has this under consideration. Even if it may be justified on military grounds, economic factors cannot be discounted. Given the military justification, it should not be beyond the bounds of possibility that the raising of a third battalion could be managed within current financial limits–

(a) capital expenditure ahead should be far below recent levels;

(b) pruning of unnecessary overheads and simplification of procedures and action as suggested in para 12 should help;

(c) an even more determined effort should be made to train N.C.O.'s and specialist trades personnel to permit the reduction of the costly corresponding Australian element in the P.I.R.;

(d) substitution of indigene warrant officers for some Australian junior officers, e.g. by commissioning them for field purposes as was put to me at high level in the Territory would also cut costs. The Indian Army experience is a guide; and

(e) simplification of the trade structure was another suggestion.

20. Based on our latest intelligence assessments, it seems to me we can take some risks with the accelerated indigenisation of the P.I.R. With minimum Australian officering, the P.I.R. should be able to cope with the tasks that lie ahead. Unless the expensive Australian component and the overhead that goes with them, and the present over elaborate organisational arrangements,⁵ there is a real risk that we (let alone the Territory which ultimately must foot the bill) won't be able to afford the extra battalion–given that the conclusion is that it is required on military grounds.

21. Postings of Australian officers to the P.I.R. are too short: the Army brief handed to the Minister⁶ and me acknowledged this and the unfortunate consequences for the indigenes. As well the present posting periods add avoidable costs. I formed the impressions as I moved around that–

(a) some officers with the P.I.R. nearing their retiring ages would be content to remain on: there is surely no point in bringing them back to Australia to terminal postings or to postings with no further promotions ahead; and

(b) some officers would be willing to have their postings extended; the curse of the two year posting habit lies heavily.

22. Some random observations–

[matter omitted]

(c) I see virtue in extending the practice of sending companies of the P.I.R. on patrol beyond the mainland. One company was moving to Manus while we were in the Territory. Other patrols were planned for New Britain and Bougainville.

(d) I heard no criticism of the Army civic action programme and feel it is well conceived. It's not merely a nice illustration of adapting a costly military force to the circumstances of the Territory and ensuring developments which will serve both civil and military purposes, it's a means of developing a civilian friendliness to the Army[,] of intelligence and other value in an emergency;

(e) in counting the cost to the Territory of defence forces, there should be severed out items which directly relate to Australian needs, e.g. communications costs, costs of Manus refuelling etc.

23. It was gratifying to find that many of the impressions I have noted were widely shared in the P.I.R. by Brigadier Eldridge and senior officers I talked to around the Territory. They are already working out some of the ideas involved. They would like nothing better than a shining green light to press forward. But real progress can only be made if there is some stability in the senior posts and they are occupied by officers who see the P.I.R. as a Territory Force and if, in particular, a selected group is nominated, set aside and left in the Territory long enough to do the necessary planning. I was told that five years was needed: I should be surprised if it took that long.

24. The stability required could be met by–

(a) leaving in P.N.G. the officers needed who would be returning to Australia for terminal postings; or whose promotion in the Australian Army is unlikely;

(b) the Minister for Defence extending the terms of needed officers; and

(c) allowing volunteers to remain on for an extended posting, taking care to safeguard their ultimate promotional prospects in Australia.

25. The Navy side of the picture is far less satisfactory–

(a) if the P.I.R. belongs to the Territory, the Naval forces don't overtly appear to;

(b) the integration of Australian and indigenes to which the Army has devoted much care is not nearly so evident in the Navy; there was talk of tensions between Australians and indigenes on patrol boats; there was segregation of ratings ashore, even to the point of separate ablutions;

(c) while great praise is due for the self-help which the officers have practised and without which the Manus establishment would be a sorry mess, the set up as it stands is no credit to Australia as a military establishment. Not merely are many buildings unsightly and some fit only for the bulldozer, men should not be expected to endure some of the facilities and amenities as they stand and much of the area is unkempt and untidy;

(d) it would be very useful if the officers at Manus were to go to P.I.R. to study the P.I.R. practices relating to indigene management and expatriate–indigene relationships.

26. While the Joint Staff has yet to do its work and the Defence Committee to consider the question, the conclusions that stared me in the face were–

(a) there appears justification for having at Manus the minimum needed to provide:

(i) fuelling facilities–a very careful assessment of minimum needs must be made but before we commit ourselves to anything we should satisfy ourselves that the U.S. is not developing Truk as a fuelling station and if it is that we could not use it. As to this I gather the extra distance to Truk could present some problems;

(ii) for repairs for such patrol vessels that call there or could most economically operate from there: this does not appear to call for the extensive range of facilities currently at Manus which have as their ratio vivendi Manus as the base for all the Territory's patrol boats and, as it seemed to me, decidedly more. Indeed some of the workshops are directed to sustaining the Manus establishment to prevent its falling into worse state and to functions which should really be the affair of the Administration.

(b) a glance at the map highlights the inappropriateness of Manus as the base for all patrol craft in Territory waters: a study of the waste of steaming time using Manus as the base as at present might be revealing;

(c) maximum use should be made of private facilities for shipping, repairs and maintenance, provisioning and fuelling of patrol boats in Port Moresby, Rabaul and Madang; no possible justification is seen for the provision of naval controlled facilities for this purpose except perhaps at Port Moresby.

27. I have heard it said in favour of facilities at Manus that the locals are better disposed to the Navy than those on the mainland and that there could be fewer problems in retaining facilities at Manus than on the mainland. Yet Manus is part of the Territory and it will be subject to the same political outcome as the Territory.

28. Of Manus too it might be said that if we have the U.S. as an ally, Manus has no value except as a communications and fuelling facility, and that if we don't, Manus could be of doubtful value–another reason for keeping any expenditure there to a minimum.

29. It is a matter for consideration whether the indigenes training facility should be at Manus. I should have thought we should be training in one centre indigenes for all sea going craft, whether the Army's small ships or the Navy's patrol vessels. There would seem to be advantages in using the technical education facilities at Port Moresby. That may prove to be the best spot for all indigene training. I don't see why we should wait the development of one unified defence force for PNG before taking the proper decision.

30. It follows that, as at present advised, I see no need for the programme currently proposed for Manus. I can envisage a situation at Manus where we would have accommodation to burn–literally so–with the existing electric power generating capacity more than ample.

31. The facilities at Port Moresby suggest that it could be the main 'base' for the patrol and other sea going craft, with some limited 'base' facilities being retained at Manus to avoid the need always for patrol boats operating to the north of the Territory proceeding to Port Moresby.

32. Whatever subtraction from the present set up at Manus occurs would have to be compensated for to some extent by provisions at Port Moresby but it may be possible to provide accommodation for 'naval' personnel in the Port Moresby area in Army establishments. This will need study.

33. Whatever be the conclusions, I see no justification for any large expenditures on anything resembling a naval base, in the normally understood sense, in the Territory.

34. I was told at Wewak that D.C.A. is proposing to upgrade the Boram runways. We should find out without delay what is afoot to co-ordinate any thoughts we have for development of Boram for R.A.A.F. purposes.

35. I have written to A.S.C.0.⁷ about its pricing practices in canteens in the Territory. I find it odd in the extreme that A.S.C.O. should be charging the same prices for Australians and indigines disregarding the patent differentials in pay.

36. Interestingly, only once was the question of the P.I.R. pension scheme raised with me. Which is not to say that this matter must not be vigorously pursued.

[NAA: A1838, 689/2 part 4]

1 Following the Cabinet decision of September 1968 that a review of the size of the PIR should be undertaken 'as soon as possible' (see Document 222), the Defence Committee had requested of the Joint Staff 'a review of the overall position of the defence forces of Papua/New Guinea be undertaken not later than 1970' (see Joint Staff Directive no. 29/1969, 6 March 1969, NAA: A1838, 689/2 part 4; for reference to the internal investigation already conducted by Defence, see footnote 2, Document 222). Warwick Smith was recorded in January as 'most anxious that [the question of the PIR's size] be handled on a broad basis i.e. he does not want the decision taken on purely defence grounds, it must have regard to economics and manpower' (minute, Besley to Legge, 20 January 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/911 ). He thereafter discussed the matter with Bland on 10 February: 'I said [to Bland] that we did not wish to be understood as belittling or decrying the need for adequate defence resources in the Territory. What we were aiming at at this stage was primarily procedural in that we wanted to ensure that at all stages of consideration of the various possibilities of structure, size etc. of defence forces in the Territory due weight was given to Territory civil considerations particularly the economic, social and political implications and requirements ... I said that on military questions we did not wish to try to tell the Defence people their own business but there may be some propositions which we would like to see carefully investigated and fully weighed e.g. a local militia, formations adapted to Papua and New Guinea terrain, people etc., and possibilities of the armed forces making substantial contributions to the civil economy after their military training requirements had been met ... Sir Henry indicated that in his own view the structure of the defence forces in Papua and New Guinea should be examined in the light of today's strategy as distinct from the strategy of 1963 and with full regard to local Papua and New Guinea considerations' (note for file by Warwick Smith, 11 February 1969, ibid.).

2 On 18 February, Fairhall had written to Barnes asking for advice on a speech he was to give at a PIR regimental dinner in Port Moresby. He suggested to Barnes that 'it could provide a useful opportunity for a comprehensive statement focusing on Territory problems such as the unique features of its strategic situation [and] its special defence characteristics' (NAA: A452, 1969/1246). Barnes agreed, and went on: 'Historically the Territory has been viewed as the first line of defence to the Australian continent and I have no doubt that with the advent of new weaponry and the probabilities of areas from which aggression might be expected, a reassessment must be made. With the risk of trespassing on your area of responsibility, I believe that a strong defence base equipped with modern weaponry and situated in North Australia would be a realistic answer to overall regional defence. Such a base should be powerful enough to deny to a major aggressor establishment of a base in the Territory. Given this set of circumstances the local military situation should be met by a small, efficient, highly mobile force trained in guerilla tactics. To support this latter suggestion we must view, some time in the future, the Territory running its own show either by self-government or independence, relying on a quite modest budget, suffering a delicate political situation owing to the very great differences among the people themselves. As I see it the prime requirements for such a force are firstly, a highly disciplined one supporting the central elected government and secondly, large enough to resist incursion from neighbouring West Irian' (letter, Barnes to Fairhall, 25 February 1969, ibid.). After his visit to PNG, Fairhall wrote to Barnes: 'I was greatly impressed by all that I saw and, in the twelve years since I last had an opportunity to visit, there has been much striking development. I also believe I now have a much more vivid and realistic appreciation of the problems confronting you, your Department and the Administration in advancing the Territory but, if solutions are the preserve of dedicated and competent men, I am confident they will not be lacking' (25 March 1969, ibid.).

3 Brigadier R.T. Eldridge had replaced Hunter as Commander, PNG Command.

4 See Document 212.

5 A word or phrase appears to be missing here.

6 Allen Fairhall.

7 Australian Services Canteen Organisation.