NAA: A1209, 1965/6595 PART I

Canberra, 13 October 1965

Top Secret

Defence Committee Discussion on the British Presence in Southeast Asia

Although you already have a useful note from Mr. Griffith on the Defence Committee agendum on the British presence in Southeast Asia, I feel it important to raise one central issue with you before any further discussion takes place in the Defence Committee.

2. It is the future of Singapore.

3. To my mind, we have not yet taken up with the British the really central assumption in their thesis, which is that Singapore will in the reasonably near future cease to be tenable as a base. The main ground for this assumption seems to be political. But why should Singapore have to be abandoned? Britain has held Gibraltar for a century; Berlin has remained an anomaly for two decades; Guantanamo has survived a 'communist' coup in Cuba; and Aden will only be surrendered because British defence policy so dictates.

4. Naturally enough, there will be political pressures on Britain to leave Singapore. But whence will their strength derive? Are the British frightened of Singapore? Do the .Malaysians really want their back door left open to Indonesia? Do the Singaporeans really want themselves left open to Malaysian economic blockade or even takeover? Is the Indonesian objection to the British base in Singapore really fundamental? These questions all seem to me to deserve very careful thought. It is certainly no foregone conclusion that the result of an examination of these 'political' questions would lead to the clear conclusion that the British should abandon Singapore.

5. Turning to the defence angle, there is the naval question discussed in the F.A.D. Committee meeting. Plimsoll added another as an aside in one of his recent cables from New York–the value of Singapore (in contrast to that of Aden) as an air staging post straddling Asia generally and the African, Indian and American continents. Then there are our own strategic requirements–Scherger's statement that no Australian base can be an alternative to the one in Singapore needs to be hammered hard home. Surely there are basic values, related to the maintenance of communications and stability in this troubled area which justify–indeed require–continuation of Singapore as a base. Here again, I think a much more thorough examination of the pros and cons seems to be required, preferably in full consultation with the Americans. (I do not like the suggestions of 'bipartite talks' that have emerged in recent cables.)

6. In some senses, I see discussion of the possible abandonment of Singapore as one of the most major events that has occurred in our defence history. We simply cannot afford to let things go by default. The next thing will be the 'Singapore Line' (reminiscent of the 'Brisbane Line'). ¹ I could not sit easy to this question unless the various experts had produced for the Defence Committee the most painstaking and exhaustive analysis of the implications in the political and defence fields. Before that has been done, I think we are years–hopefully decades–premature in discussing the possibility of alternative bases in Australia. This was, I feel, partly what lay behind the Prime Minister's comments at the F.A.D. meeting which heard from Scherger before the Quadripartite Talks commenced.

P.S. Since preparing this minute I have received a copy of the new agendum for the Defence Committee. It takes very much the line I have suggested. I agree that we should not wait for the British Defence Review; but I feel certain that the United States should be involved forthwith–they have not, for example, seen Wilson's message to the Prime Minister,² so far as I am aware. Further, I remain uncertain whether the central importance of Singapore has been fully brought out in the paper, and particularly whether sufficient attention has been given to the 'political' assumptions involved. I continue to be doubtful whether we should do anything yet to examine the extension of base facilities in Australia as alternatives to Singapore–though I would support examination based on supplementing Singapore (recommendation (e) of the paper).

1 The 'Brisbane Line' featured in the Australian Labor Party's 1943 federal election campaign as a supposed line of defence drawn by the previous conservative government across southeastern Australia in 1941 behind which Australian forces would have retreated ceding all of the north to the Japanese. A Royal Commission found that there was no basis for the allegation.

2 Dated 25 September 1965 and published as an attachment to Document 40.