UKNA: PREM 13/1323

London, 16 June 1967

Secret

You said to me before I left Australia on this present journey that your Government would not proceed to decisions on defence matters as they relate to the region of Malaysia and Singapore until such time as I had had an opportunity to put to you personally the views of the Australian Government. I have now had this week with you and also with Mr. Healey and Mr. Bowden a series of valuable discussions and you will no doubt be proceeding in due course to further governmental consideration of your position, though I realise that prior to that you have it in mind to meet some of our other interested colleagues from other Commonwealth countries.

It seems to me that it would be useful if I were to leave with you this note in which I recapitulate briefly the views and considerations that I expressed to you with the agreement of my Cabinet colleagues.

As you know, I concluded our meeting on Tuesday² by asking if you could see your way to meeting two requests that I was sure would be unanimously supported by Australia and its Commonwealth neighbours and by the United States. The first was that, in the period up to 1970–71, the British Government should retain some flexibility on the question of the Commonwealth Brigade in Malaysia. The Brigade, whatever its deficiencies, has been an example of effective Commonwealth teamwork and we would wish your Government to leave enough forces to give it continued viability even if there had to be some reductions on the logistics side. Secondly, 1 expressed the earnest hope that no final British decisions about the period after 1970-71 should be announced or even so much as taken at this time. I fully accepted that this need not preclude contingency planning covering various possibilities including that of withdrawal of land based forces but we saw no need to ratify any planning assumptions at this stage and felt it important that these should stand unratified. We felt it had to be assumed that if a decision looking towards withdrawal from the mainland were taken, it would become widely known and there could be a highly damaging chain reaction which would not only bring forward the local effects of withdrawal but might also precipitate an earlier withdrawal than intended. I mention these two requests at this stage so that the remainder of my letter may be read in conjunction with them.

Before I move on to the general statement of the considerations which led up to my requests let me say how much I welcomed, on behalf of myself and my Government, your indication to me that you have decided to maintain a capability for use in the Far East after 1975. This decision recognises, as I believe to be the case, that Britain's continuing support in the region is needed to help ensure the consolidation of the security and stability which have resulted in the Malaysian region from the distinguished role which Britain has historically played.

However, what is important over and above this decision is the location and form in which it is given effect, and it is in this context that I again stress our view concerning the preservation of land forces within the region and the Commonwealth Brigade. We would wish to see the Brigade retained as close as possible to its present form and existing state of readiness at least until 1970–71, or at any rate to have forces retained with sufficient military effectiveness so that the Brigade presents a credible deterrent and also is able to act promptly for counter insurgency purposes.

I now move on to an account in a brief form of the views and considerations which I put to you in discussion.

We do of course appreciate the seriousness of the economic difficulties which have compelled you and your colleagues to contemplate a substantial reduction in the strength and composition of British forces stationed east of Suez. We recognise also that some running down of your large establishment in Malaysia and Singapore was to be expected with the ending of Indonesia's confrontation campaign. But we nevertheless expected that there would be a continuing British military presence within the region, a presence which would include a significant land force, subject to the continuing agreement of the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore. As you know, we have been in receipt of assurances from your Government that you would retain your important military facilities in Malaysia and Singapore for as long as the Governments of these two countries agreed that you should do so on acceptable conditions. Thus we had worked on and supported the assumption that British policies would continue to be as reflected in the Directive issued to the Commander-in-Chief Far East in April of this year. The main relevant points in this Directive are that it is the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief to prevent communist and particularly Chinese communist expansion throughout the SEATO area and to fulfil Britain's obligations under the Defence Agreement with Malaysia. In our view these obligations would require the retention of the Commonwealth Brigade at a satisfactory state of readiness.

It consequently caused us deep concern to learn that the British Government was not only contemplating making a very early decision to reduce its forces in the region by successive stages but to withdraw them all from the mainland by about 1975, and further to make the decision public now.

The basic reason for our concern is the continuing instability of the entire South-East Asian area and its vulnerability to pressure and subversion, both internal and external. We naturally hope that the countries in the area will in due course be able to establish a capability to protect themselves individually, and in combination with one another, against these pressures. It is one of the primary aims of Australian policy to help them to do so. But the achievement of this goal is still a long way off. Until then there is, in our view, a crucial need to maintain the existing framework of treaties and alliances, and to preserve the credibility of SEATO. As you know, the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve forms a vital component of the forces nominated for the various SEATO plans. We would therefore wish to see no closing of options at this time.

Further, we invite Britain to consider the consequences for her world position of a complete military withdrawal from Asia. It is our firm conviction that Britain's long experience and knowledge of the South-East Asian area, and particularly of Malaysia and Singapore, carries with it a degree of influence for international good that perhaps the British people themselves tend to underestimate. We believe that the presence of even a relatively modest British military establishment is in itself a psychological influence for stability and a deterrent against external threat, and a positive factor for Britain's own standing and welfare. It is my belief also that Britain's substantial economic interests in the region are likely to develop as the countries of the region become increasingly prosperous, which they can only do if they are allowed to develop in peace.

The Americans have a wide network of defence commitments around the arc of Asia, beginning as far north as Korea. But they have always made it clear that they look upon Malaysia and Singapore as a Commonwealth defence responsibility. The British military presence in those two countries, and its defence agreement with Malaysia, are each integral and complementary to the pattern of bilateral treaty arrangements which the United States has developed with other countries. These arrangements would suffer a loss of support in the United States itself if Britain were to wind down too far in Singapore and Malaysia. Further, we would all hope that there might be a settlement in Vietnam before 1975; but in the meantime, the United States' position there could be seriously embarrassed by a British declaration of intent to withdraw. The Administration in Washington would be likely to encounter mounting resistance in Congress and growing criticism from public opinion.

Again, and this is a vital aspect, withdrawal of British land forces from this part of Asia would give rise to difficulties for both New Zealand and ourselves in the maintenance of our present forward defence posture. There would also be consequences for our external position, and particularly for our relations with Asia. While it may be expected that our own capacity to make a contribution in the region will increase as our population and national strength grow, we could certainly not look to discharge Britain's historic role alone. This would be true even if, as we all very much hope, it is possible to bring about an early settlement in Vietnam.

It has been suggested that nowadays the presence of foreign, and particularly white military forces in Asian counties is scarcely tolerated. My colleagues and I do not accept this. So far as Malaysia and Singapore are concerned, we know that neither country is happy at the prospect of a complete withdrawal of all British land forces after 1975.

The submission I have made, of course, carries the risk of involvement to an extent that you have made clear you no longer wish to bear. However, any commitment involves risk. In the Australian view, the best guarantee that the risks, both from external attack and insurgency, will be contained is the continuing presence in the Malaysian region of a credible British presence, which must, in our view, include a significant land force. What we are faced with is not so much the likelihood of conventional attack, which sea and air forces could probably easily enough repel, as the likelihood of subversion and infiltration and growing guerrilla activity in an unstable political situation. The underpinning of political development in the hands of responsible, moderate leadership can only be secured at this stage by the familiar, accepted presence of British ground troops. This, we believe, is still essential to the maintenance of political confidence.

1 Holt had a further meeting with Wilson on 15 June and said he would leave with him before he left London a statement of the Australian position.

2 See Document 73.