NAA:A1838, T5691/1 PART 12

Canberra, 19 July 1967

Immediate

Britain's Defence Policy

I served as a departmental officer in Britain from February 1939 to November 1945. Previously ( 1928) and since (1948) I have lived there. The announcement of Britain's intended complete withdrawal of forces from East of Suez by mid-nineteen-seventies therefore is easier to understand because uppermost in the British Government and peoples' minds is the wish to regain their national greatness. They remember (especially men like Harold Wilson) who was a fellow-companion as Personal Assistant to Boyd-Orr¹ as a member of the British War Cabinet while I was P.A. to the Australian member (Bruce)² that the U.S.A. drove hard bargains in regard to the sale of British assets in the U.S.A. before the United States was eventually forced into the war by the Japanese. There is no fellow-feeling between the British and the Americans as exists between the Australians and the Americans.

2. This is not to say that the inherent British wish of outward thinking will not be squelched. I submit that Britain has no rival for the leadership of Europe and that appears to be the Wilson Government's immediate aim. The American President spoke in a critical vein of Britain's decision and alluded to the possible heavier strains it imposed on his country. But surely if the U.S.A. is to retain for itself the highest standard of living in the world (there has been an increase by 10% in the number of American millionaires since Mr. Johnson took office), the rest of the world must remain at what can be called peace.

3. So far as Australia is concerned our Prime Minister's disappointment has been expressed in temperate understanding terms and he has wisely spoken of the dangerous strategic situation in which we live. Moreover he has succinctly pointed to the need for the future generations of Australians not to look for an easier way of life. Might I be bold enough to suggest that he might have taken the opportunity to pay tribute to Britain for its assistance in our past protection and development and to have concluded his remarks in something of the strain of Churchill's speeches of 1940, 1941, and 1942 when he roused his countrymen by saying that the safety of not merely Britain but of the world depended on British exertion. (In our case the emphasis might be placed on the fact that Australia's future freedom depends almost wholly on our own efforts.)

4. Australians, under Curtin,³ responded to appeals in a similar vein. And it was Curtin that men like George Vl,⁴ Allanbrook [sic] (C.I.G.S-)⁵ and we three Australians at the London Office–Bruce, Stirling⁶ and myself doing our 6½ days a week–found to be the most popular of visiting Australian Prime Ministers.

5. The Prime Minister of Britain in his statement of defence policy has looked to the future while the President of the U.S.A. has rather looked to the past.

6. It is submitted that the facts since compulsory training for overseas service was introduced, have shown that almost the whole of the men affected have not shirked their responsibilities. It is surely hard but true thinking that the Australians of the future will shoulder their burdens provided the facts are squarely put to them and the burdens of protecting Australia are fairly distributed.

1 Lord Boyd Orr, British scientist and authority on nutrition, member of UK Cabinet's Scientific Committee on Food Policy during World War II, awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1949 in recognition of his work as Director-General of UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 1945–48.

2 Stanley Melbourne Bruce, Prime Minister of Australia, 1923–29; Australian High Commissioner, London, 1933–45.

3 John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, 1941–45.

4 King George VI, reigned 1936–52.

5 Field Marshal Alan Francis Brooke, 1st Viscount Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1941–46.

6 Alfred Stirling, Australian diplomat who served as Assistant External Affairs Officer, London, 1937–54.