NAA: Al838, TS691/1 PART 13

Canberra, 22 August 1967

Top Secret

British Foreign Policy–Australian Assumptions

There has long been an ambivalence in British foreign policy. There have always been Europe-first and Empire-first schools of thought in both the major British political parties. British policies have fluctuated between them according to assessments of the threat posed by developments in Europe, and of economic advantage. The main elements which have come together this decade to effect what is probably a permanent and irreversible trend in British policy seem to be–

(i) The success of the E.E.C. concept as opposed to that of E.F.T.A.;

(ii) The failure of Britain to achieve an economic growth rate comparable to that of much of Western Europe, and to overcome the problem of recurrent balance of payment crises;

(iii) The growing cost of maintaining overseas military establishments set against–

1. doubts about the need to have them to preserve British economic interests;
2. the increasing capacity for rapid deployment overseas of home based forces;

(iv) The growth of political opposition to overseas military establishments because of–

1. ideological considerations (national self-determination, and 'white faces');
2. emotional considerations (casualties from conflicts in the Middle East and South East Asia);
3. the indefinite duration of 'colonial' wars;
4. Western failures in 'colonial' wars;
5. their international unpopularity, particularly given the changed array of forces in the United Nations;

(v) The democratisation of Britain and an increased pattern of contact with Europe leading in practice to–

1. some reversal of traditional British popular attitudes to Europeans;
2. a loss of interest in the world outside Europe (and the U.S.A.);

(vi) The growth of popular antipathy towards or impatience with 'colonials' because inter alia of racial intolerance, contrasting economic advances, colonial problems (e.g. Rhodesia) and 'colonial brashness';

(vii) The failure of the 'special relationship' with the U.S.A. and the to some degree consequent feeling that the U.S.A. should by itself bear the burden (and the ill-will) of policing the world;

(viii) The belief in the possibility of rapprochement with Russia and unwillingness to risk jeopardising this by action in areas remote from Britain;

(ix) The Sino-Soviet conflict.

2. These factors can be reduced to three broad propositions:

(i) It is hard for a Government closely subject to popular opinion, to pursue policies which are not obviously and immediately in the national interest. The British public is not interested in the Commonwealth and the British Government, since World War II, but particularly in the last ten years (Macmillan/Wilson periods), has become very much more influenced by instinctive public reactions than before.

(ii) For economic reasons, for self preservation, and through a growing sense of international community, there is a worldwide trend towards regionalism. Western Europe is only the most advanced instance of this, and Britain is part of Western Europe.

(iii) Whatever the Commonwealth meant in the past, in terms of multi-racial harmony, co-operative economic development, political co-ordination and security, it has been a failure.

3. Additional specific factors affecting British policies are as follows:

(i) British economic interests in Africa outweigh her economic interests in South East Asia and the South West Pacific. In Africa, however, she is not burdened by significant administrative and military charges.

(ii) There has never been in British history the same widespread emotional attachment to British possessions in South East Asia and the South West Pacific as there has been to British possessions in the Indian sub-continent and in Africa.

(iii) Although there is undoubtedly in Britain a strong sense of community with and moral obligation towards Australia and New Zealand, there is no real feeling that we are a part of South East Asia, or that we are in danger from either China or Indonesia. There is if anything a feeling that we are, on this subject, too inclined to cry wolf. There is also no doubt in some circles in Britain a feeling, that if we are exposed, we have merited it through our immigration and Viet Nam policies. There is too, the feeling that we have not in the past contributed our fair share to the cost of defending the Malaysian area.

(iv) There are many elements in British attitudes towards China (and harsh Chinese attitudes on Hong Kong could harden British opinion) but up till now–and even at the height of the Korean War–a major element has been that of sympathy toward Chinese national aspirations. There is, fundamentally, little sympathy in Britain towards the republic of China, and little support for the view that China has fundamentally expansionist aims towards South East Asia.

4. These considerations suggest that what is now becoming explicit in British policy against involvement in South East. Asia is unlikely to be reversed, whatever the result of the next round in Britain's overtures to the E.E.C., and whoever may be the victor in the British elections in 1969. The first British application to the E.E.C. and British sponsorship of the Malaysian concept were both indicators of this trend. The British response to confrontation, while prima facie a reversal of the trend at the time, in retrospect has surely had the effect of strengthening it. Whatever else was said in the February 1967 Defence White Paper, that fact comes out clearly as the lesson Britain learnt from confrontation.

5. In the light of the foregoing, the following statements may be made about what were Australian assumptions in the past in regard to British foreign policies, and what these assumptions should now be. It is noteworthy (and this is borne out particularly by the quotation in (a) I below), that Australian assumptions about future British policy have been realistic enough in the abstract but have not shown sufficient sense of urgency.

(a) British Policy East of Suez in General

I. Pre 1967 Assumptions

The 1964 Report by the Defence Committee on the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy included the following:¹

'In the past few years there have been indications that the U.K.'s policy was to reduce her military commitments in Asia. This has not occurred on a wide scale and the trend has been reversed by the need to provide assistance to Malaysia against Indonesian confrontation. The U.K. is likely to remain in Malaysia and South East Asia during the period but it is possible that circumstances might force her to withdraw from her Malaysian bases before the end of the period (ten years). This would almost inevitably lead to a very substantial reduction of U.K. military forces permanently deployed in the area unless she were to establish bases in Australia'.

Subsequent consideration of U.K. policy by the Defence Committee in 1965, 1966 and early 1967, led to amendment of the above to take into account British Defence White Papers and the ending of confrontation, but the amendments did not substantially alter the above forecast.

II. Post July 1967 Assumptions

In its Report on the same subject agreed on 6th July, 1967, the Defence Committee in a much longer passage endorsed the following main points:

(i) A significant reduction in U.K. military capability in the Malaysian area would increase the threat to the area, and Australia, might encourage Indonesian militancy, could impose an additional burden on Australia, could jeopardise Australian use of base facilities in the area and would require considerable revision of ANZAM arrangements in support of SEATO Plans.

(ii) The United States would probably not step in to fill the vacuum created by a British withdrawal. On the contrary such withdrawal might increase pressures on the United States to withdraw from military involvement in Asia.

(iii) Although the U.K. asserts its intention to defend its territories in the Pacific, if withdrawal in Asia should mean inability to continue these responsibilities, this would involve Australia and New Zealand (possibly in conjunction with the U.S. and France) in greater defence commitments in the Pacific.

(b) Britain and SEATO

I. Pre 1967 Assumptions

Australia has long been aware that Britain did not regard its membership of SEATO as of major importance. Vital British interests have not been concerned in SEATO. SEATO as an organisation is generally regarded with disfavour or scant respect by the British public, and consequently the British Government has not been anxious to become involved in military action under SEATO (e.g. Laos 1961/2 and Viet Nam). The British have, however, maintained an active commitment, centred on the 28 Commonwealth Brigade, to SEATO Military Plans. Australia has always assumed that Britain would honour its SEATO commitments and Australian planning for SEATO has been based on a joint British, Australian, New Zealand force worked out under ANZAM arrangements.

II. Post July 1967 Assumptions

With the withdrawal of ground forces from South East Asia, Britain's commitment to SEATO Plans is to be revised, present indications being that it will eventually consist of mobile forces capable of deployment to South East Asia from outside the region. The Defence White Paper stated that Britain would 'continue to honour our obligations under SEATO'.

Apart from the specific problem of the Commonwealth Brigade, Australia's assumptions regarding Britain's commitment to SEATO have been changed by the British withdrawal. Britain will be even more reluctant to become involved in military operations in South East Asia in future. Indeed, it is arguable that the British are seeking to shed their commitments not by negotiation, but simply by making themselves unable to carry them out. For reasons of solidarity with the Anglo-American alliance, Britain would probably feel obliged to make a token contribution to a SEATO Plan 4 situation (defence of the treaty area against attack by Communist China and North Viet Nam). But it is increasingly improbable that Britain would in future become significantly involved in any such conflict.

(c) Britain and Indonesia

I. Pre 1967 Assumptions

Assumptions about British policy towards Indonesian aggression are implicit in the passage quoted at (a) above. The following additional specific comments could be made:

1. We assumed Britain would continue to defend Malaysia against Indonesian aggression until confrontation came to an end;
2. We assumed that in the event of a renewal of confrontation, Britain would immediately resume this role with forces stationed in Malaysia/Singapore;
3. We have had since mid-1966 some hesitations about how Britain would react to renewed trouble in Brunei and East Malaysia (particularly Sarawak) unless this were clearly due to Indonesian intervention and clearly opposed by the local people;
4. We have always assumed that Britain would support Australia in the event of Indonesian aggression, though in the case of covert aggression in Papua-New Guinea, this support might be limited in scope;
5. We have assumed that Britain would have a continuing capacity in the area to deter Indonesia or, in the event of aggression, to resist it.

II. Post July 1967 Assumptions

1. We may assume that in the event of overt Indonesian aggression against either Malaysia or Australia, Britain will intervene;
2. We should assume that in the event of covert aggression against Malaysia, particularly in a situation where the attitude of the Malaysian people toward Indonesia and this aggression is uncertain, Britain will endeavour by diplomatic means to avoid physical involvement;
3. We should particularly assume that in the event of civil strife in East Malaysia and/ or Brunei in which Indonesia subsequently becomes embroiled, Britain will seek to avoid involvement;
4. We may make the same assumption in regard to Papua-New Guinea as in I (d) above;
5. We should assume that the reduced British military capacity in the area will have a lessening effect on Indonesia as time passes and be an increasing inducement to Britain to stand aside whatever happens;
6. We cannot, however, assume that the lessening deterrent will inevitably excite Indonesian aggression.

(d) Britain and Malaysia

This has been covered in (a) and (c) above. Britain has given assurances of its continuing acceptance of its treaty responsibilities for Malaysia's (and in effect for Singapore's) defence. In making assumptions about the future we need perhaps to distinguish the following cases:

(a) Thai/Malay Border

After the mid 70s, Britain is unlikely to be in a position to contribute forces to anti-CTO operations, although a theoretical capability (through the marine commando) may persist. However, Malaysia is unlikely to need external assistance for operations against the CTO alone.

(b) Communist Aggression Through Thailand

This is an unlikely situation which would in any event presuppose a major prior conflict in the Thai area. Limited British assistance to Malaysia would be forthcoming.

(c) Conflict between the Federal Government and East Malaysia

Britain would seek to remain uninvolved.

(d) Rebellion in Brunei

Britain would seek to remain uninvolved (at least over the next few years) whether or not Malaysia and/or Indonesia should intervene.

(e) Malay and/or Indonesian Aggression against Singapore

Though temporarily sympathetic to Singapore, Britain would probably confine itself to activities of a diplomatic nature.

(e) British Unwillingness to put Land Forces into Asia

I. Pre 1967 Assumptions

We have for long been aware of Britain's reluctance to become involved in any major conflict in South East Asia. Britain would in particular avoid any kind of physical entanglement in Indo-China, in the Kashmir conflict, and would not seek to defend Hong Kong (other than in a temporary holding sense) against attack from China. We have, however, seen Britain intervene forcefully in Korea, Malaysia and the Persian Gulf and she has had until now a significant ground and other military capability deployed in Singapore/Malaysia.

II. Post July 1967 Assumptions

Bearing in mind the reservations set out above, we should assume that Britain will seek to avoid involvement in any form of conflict in South East Asia except in the event of overt Indonesian aggression against a united Malaysia, and except for a token contribution to a Plan 4 situation. In these exceptional cases, Britain would, at least initially, seek to confine her involvement to air and naval forces. She will, as far as possible, seek to ensure that the bulk of the land forces engaged in any defensive action, with which she might be associated, will be Asian.

(f) Britain and the Indian Ocean

I. Pre 1967 Assumptions

The British, in developing the concept of the B.I.O.T.,² saw it (and Gan³ and Masira)⁴ as part of a potential 'all red route' to East Africa, the Arabian area and Asia, and in the case of Aldabra as a jumping off point for peace-keeping operations in Africa, Mauritius and the Middle East.

The Defence Committee considered and endorsed a paper on Australian Strategic interests in Africa and the Indian Ocean in April, 1965. The principal passages relating to the B.I.O.T. were as follows:

'For the foreseeable future Britain must use air transit facilities in Africa or the Middle East en route to areas east of Suez. The alternative routes via North America involve longer flying times and are impracticable for certain types of aircraft which are included in current Far East plans. With the changing political scene in Africa suitable facilities have become scarcer and overflight by military aircraft has become more difficult. Future trends are difficult to predict and consequently it is essential for Britain to maintain as many options as possible. British interests in the Indian Ocean Islands stem from:

1. their use as staging points on British air reinforcement routes east of Suez;
2. the use of Mauritius and Gan for the next few years as alternative radio communications links between Britain and South East Asia, Australia and New Zealand.

Britain will have a vital interest in these Indian Ocean facilities as long as she retains a presence east of Suez.'

II. Post July 1967 Assumptions

British Indian Ocean territories (or quasi-territories) are at present Mauritius, the Seychelles, Socotra, Masira, the B.I.O.T. and Gan. It is unlikely that there will be any requirement in the foreseeable future to defend them against external attack. What is more likely is the development of a serious internal security situation through racial troubles (Mauritius), political differences (Socotra) or anti-British agitation (Gan). We cannot assume that Britain will wish to become seriously involved in any such situations. Masira may be an exception in that, after Britain leaves Aden, this will be an important staging point for the Persian Gulf. Masira is likely to retain its importance until the mid-seventies. Likewise Gan, which is of some significance for Singapore. Maldivian pressure on Britain to leave Gan before this time is unlikely but if it were to develop, might not meet with much resistance. The situation in the B.I.O.T. islands could be different, as their populations are very small and largely transient. In theory they are important for British mobile strategy, but in practice the West about route (via the U.S.A.) would probably be of greater importance in the event of major conflict in South East Asia, and in any case, if and when construction on Aldabra will commence, remains uncertain [sic].

(g) British Attitude to Co-operation in the Region

I. Pre 1967 Assumptions

Australia assumed that Britain accepted there was a division of primary responsibility for Western assistance in the defence of South East Asia between the U.S.A. (which would cover the Pacific area, including any seaborne threat to Commonwealth territories in the Pacific, Indo-China and Thailand) and the ANZAM countries (which would cover the Malaysian area). We also assumed that, while Britain favoured the development of regional co-operation between the countries of the area and the progressive expansion of their capacity to defend themselves, she also accepted that for some considerable time to come, in view of the threat from China and instability within the region, there would be a need for extensive external assistance in defence. We assumed that Britain believed a significant Western military presence in the area was necessary to ensure stability and to act as a guarantee that assistance would be forthcoming in time of need.

II. Post July 1967 Assumptions

Britain is in effect now saying that primary responsibility for the defence of the area must rest with the countries in it. British assistance should be regarded as something supplementary. In particular, Britain should concentrate on the provision of sea and air support. The assumptions that follow from this are those outlined under the heading above.

(h) British Choice of Europe as Being More important Than Asia

Some general factors relating to this theme were outlined in the introduction of this paper.

I. Pre 1967 Assumptions

The 1966 British Defence Review included the following passages:

'It is in the Far East and Southern Asia that the greatest danger to peace may be in the next decade, and some of our partners in the Commonwealth may be directly threatened.' This was, however, preceded by an earlier passage headed 'Outside Europe' which began by saying 'a direct threat to our survival seems less likely outside Europe', and then in referring to specific British obligations and the general interest in the maintenance of peace throughout the world, made quite clear that there would be limitations on the role played by Britain outside Europe in the future.

We have always assumed that the major defence role played by Britain in Arabia, the Persian Gulf and South East Asia would in time diminish. We have assumed, however, in effect that significant forces would be maintained in at least the latter two areas until a satisfactory balance of indigenous forces had been obtained.

11. Post July 1967 Assumptions

Britain maintains in its latest Defence Statement that it will continue to play a role outside Europe and have forces to match its remaining commitments. We may assume that this will be so, and that Britain will honour these commitments. However, given the nature of present day aggression, there is wide scope for differences of interpreting the meaning of a particular commitment. Britain's developing ties with Europe and her strong concern with unproductive overseas expenditure suggest that where the commitment concerns a friend or ally, rather than a dependent territory, and the kind of threat to which it is exposed is obscure, then Britain will be reluctant to accept any prompt commitment of physical support.

(i) British Renunciation of Pretensions to be a World Power

It is difficult to make any comment on this additional to what has been said above, and particularly in the introduction. The July Defence Statement envisages a continuing world role for Britain but on a limited scale, commensurate with British resources.

(ii) The Future of the Commonwealth

The economic aspects of this question require a separate study. In terms of defence the Commonwealth has had real significance only in the ANZAM area, and to a lesser degree in India's conflict with China. It is not to be assumed that Britain's readiness to assist India, or Australia and New Zealand, in the event of attack, has in any way changed. However, the running down of British forces in the ANZAM area, combined with such new arrangements in the area as may eventuate, must affect and to some degree weaken ANZAM co–operation.

1 See Document 24, paragraph 36.

2 As a result of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the US became aware of a gap in its defence dispositions between the Mediterranean and the Philippines and wanted to establish military facilities on some of the small islands of the Indian Ocean. This was the main reason why, in November 1965, the British Indian Ocean Territory was established as a Crown Colony. With a population of 1,500, the territory consisted of the islands of the Chagos Archipelago (principally Diego Garcia), formerly administered through the Government of Mauritius, and the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and Descroches in the Western Indian Ocean, formerly administered by the Seychelles. Under the arrangement, the US paid for the facilities and allowed Britain to use them, and Britain made the islands available and compensated the governments of Mauritius and the Seychelles. Compensation included payment for resettling displaced local labour, since the US insisted, despite British representations, that it intended to use US personnel only. The US requested permission in 1968 to develop on Diego Garcia a communications facility, an airstrip and anchorage, and a fuel depot. An announcement was made in 1970 and agreement formalised by an Anglo-American exchange of notes in 1972. The facility began operating in 1973. The local inhabitants, known asllois, were resettled on Mauritius in a controversial manner which was taken to litigation. The population of Diego Garcia in 1968 was tiny, only 389. Some were contract labourers from Mauritius but 128 were of the second generation who were born on the island. This was not made public at the time. The British Government proposed to deal with any international protests by claiming the UN had no competence to concern itself with a territory where there was no indigenous population. Nor was it revealed that some of the llois had dual Mauritian-British nationality, and thus possessed, as an alternative to resettlement on Mauritius, the right to settle in Britain.

3 See Document 1, note 3.

4 Masira (now Masirah), an island off the east coast of Oman facing the Indian Ocean.