NAA: A5867 VOLUME 1

Canberra, 24 January 1968

7/1968. Secret

Implications for Australia of the British Defence Decisions: January 1968

Introduction

Before the visit by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations the essence of the Australian position in Malaysia/Singapore was that Australia should seek to prolong British involvement there to the greatest extent possible; and that Australia should maintain its forces in Malaysia at about the present level by association with a continuing Anglo/Malaysian defence agreement, as distinct from having a separate agreement with Malaysia. This position was to be seen as a significant element in the total context of Australian–U.S.A. relationships; not merely did it have the private approbation of the U.S.A., it was calculated to encourage a more active U.S.A. commitment in relation to the defence and security of South East Asia as a whole, including Australia.

2. At its meeting on 11th December Cabinet had:

(a) affirmed generally Australia's disposition to continue to maintain in Malaysia/ Singapore for the time being a military contribution at present operational force levels from all three Services;

(b) agreed that the Minister for External Affairs should visit Malaysia and Singapore in January–

1. to sound out those countries on the maintenance of Australia's present association with the Anglo/Malaysian Defence Agreement as the basis for a continuing Australian military presence; and
2. to explain the need for our Services to make an early reconnaissance of what was required for a continuing Australian presence in relation to the U.K. withdrawal then planned for completion by the mid 70s, and the order of costs;

(c) authorized the Services to undertake that reconnaissance;

(d) regarded the proposal for a 5 Power meeting as being in abeyance at that point.

The British Decisions

3. The main points made by the British Prime Minister are:

(a) Britain's security lies fundamentally in Europe and must be based on the North Atlantic Alliance;

(b) British forces will be withdrawn completely from Malaysia and Singapore and from the Persian Gulf by 31st December, 1971;

(c) Thereafter there will be a general military capability based in Europe 'which can be deployed overseas, as in our judgement circumstances demand, including support for U.N. operations', but no special capability for use in South East Asia;

(d) Britain wishes 'to reach a new understanding with (Malaysia) about AMDA so as to make it fit the changed conditions';

(e) 'Meanwhile, if our Commonwealth partners so desire and mutually satisfactory arrangements can be made we would be prepared to assist them in establishing a future joint air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore and in training personnel to operate it';

(f) Britain will discuss with Malaysia and Singapore the aid implications of its accelerated withdrawal;

(g) The force declarations to SEATO will be amended;

(h) The aircraft carrier force will be phased out as soon as the withdrawal is complete;

(i) Cancellation of the order for 50 F111 aircraft;

(j) Britain would be prepared to participate in a 5 Power Conference taking as its basis the foregoing British decisions.

The Problem

4. The questions that now face Australia fit conveniently into two periods–up to the end of 1971, and after 1971. In both cases there are problems having both political and military elements. Definitive answers to some questions calling for immediate action are needed. It is also necessary to identify and raise for preliminary discussion some long term matters which impinge on the short term. The two time periods cannot be considered in isolation because what may be decided in the first may very well determine or influence what may happen or be possible in the second and because well before the first expires, decisions governing actions for the second period must have been formulated. Two examples may be given. Whatever may be the value of AMDA (reinterpreted) during the British rundown, consideration will have to be given to the political arrangements to apply in the Region after the U.K. withdrawal. Second, the new Three Year Defence Programme which is scheduled to begin on 1st July, 1968 cannot be sensibly shaped without an understanding of the Government's attitude to what lies beyond 1971.

5. Depending on the answers given the Defence Committee can set about reappraisals urgently needed in Australia. For example, a careful review of the strategic basis of our policy will be needed. While, at this stage, there would seem no reason for departing from the premise of maintaining the present policy of the forward defence of Australia, the withdrawal of the British without the introduction of new factors, e.g. a greater U.S. involvement, requires a close examination of the manner of carrying out this policy and may call for changes in various ways in our precise military posture.

6. As well detailed study of a number of matters, including these later referred to, must be undertaken. This is only one more reason why we should continue to keep open for as long as possible such options as are available to us. Despite the fact that many uncertainties face us, including the duration and aftermath of the Vietnam War, U.S. intentions thereafter, and perhaps meantime the possibility of interest by the U.S. in the Indian Ocean, certain decisions will have to be taken from time to time. Time is running against us for planning and programming. What we must try to ensure is that in taking decisions we do not prematurely close off options.

Policy Considerations Regarding an Australian Presence in Malaysia/Singapore

7. Most of the reasons previously canvassed in Cabinet for retaining Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore at least so long as the British are there remain valid. They include the need to secure stability in the South East Asian region and, in particular to prevent any crumbling of the situation behind the SEATO area whilst the Vietnam War continues, and to encourage continuing American support for this region. An Australian military presence contributes to stability in the region and gives support to the friendly Governments of Malaysia and Singapore; with the withdrawal of the British our presence could be the insurance against fresh insurgency in Malaysia. The Australian military presence also gives us influential standing in the handling of problems which could arise in the region and which could lead to tension among our neighbouring countries. It could be the means of bringing some closer accord between Malaysia and Singapore, at least in the defence field. Negatively, and the more so in the face of the clear expression of the United States view that Australia should stay, an Australian withdrawal could seriously compromise the U.S. attitude to Australia.

8. This report, accordingly, takes the position that:–

(a) notwithstanding the latest British decisions, Australia should continue to maintain in Malaysia and Singapore a military contribution from all three Services of the order of existing operational force levels; at least so long as the British are there (see also para 19 et seq).

(b) we are in no position to consider raising our present level of forces beyond what may be essential to provide that logistic and other necessary support for our own forces at present provided by the British (see also para 15 (a)).

(c) any reduction in the present level of force would incur the risk that the achievement of our political objectives could be rendered so much more difficult.

9. Maintenance of our forces should be contingent on a clear desire by Malaysia and Singapore that our forces are wanted. As well we should expect that satisfactory terms were accorded by those countries; and that they should be ready to undertake greater responsibilities in the building up of their own levels of preparedness and for support of our forces by way of provision of facilities and local personnel and resources.

10. In general, the Australian military contribution would cover the following limited tasks:–

(a) help Malaysia and Singapore to build up and make efficient and effective their own forces;

(b) promote defence co-operation between Malaysia and Singapore; the British reference to a joint air defence system is relevant here;

(c) do what we can to ensure the retention and maintenance of facilities which would enable quick and effective arrival and deployment of additional forces including U.S. forces if the need arises;

(d) maintain military communications;

(e) to be available to help the Malaysian/Singapore forces in counter insurgency activities in the event of a significant communist resurgence: the presence of Australian forces presents some insurgence [sic: insurance] against and deterrent to this;

(f) be available for deployment outside Malaysia/Singapore to meet a SEATO obligation, for example in the event of the spread of insurgency in Thailand.

11. Any commitment of our forces to operations would, as at present, be subject to the agreement of the Australian Government. This condition would extend to any involvement of our forces in internal civil disorder in Malaysia or Singapore and in relation to any external threat to the security of Malaysia/Singapore.

12. Our future relations with Indonesia must have a fundamental place in our thinking and actions. At all stages must we seek to have an understanding and sympathetic Indonesia. There can be no question in any discussions with Malaysia and Singapore of implying that we might be prepared to be automatically involved against Indonesia. Indeed we should be hoping that sooner or later Indonesia would be a participant in regional security arrangements that suit our ends.

13. Provided that AMDA continues in a form acceptable to us–which means that we cannot be indifferent to the British proposals for a 'reinterpretation' of that Agreement–we should aim to continue in our present association with that Agreement and avoid any question of bilateral arrangements at least over the next three years or so. What we do thereafter is discussed below.

14. Remembering the broad tasks mentioned in paragraph 10, taking account of the other considerations referred to above and depending on the outcome of the proposed 5 Power meeting and the facilities we take over from the British, it may become necessary to change in some degree the characteristics and locations of the Australian Forces now in Malaysia/ Singapore. In other words, we should not assume that the present composition and disposition of our forces will remain unchanged. However, at this stage and pending the military reconnaissance, we might assume that:

(a) the Australian Army forces would continue to occupy the Terendak Barracks. They could devote greater effort to specialized assistance and training for the local forces;

(b) the Air Force would continue to concentrate on Butterworth. The examination of the proposed joint air defence system may lead to some reappraisal of this;

(c) as the British rundown proceeds only a very small part of the Singapore Naval facilities would be needed to meet the Australian requirements, and apart from facilities including docks which might be converted to civilian requirements, the base would largely become redundant unless United States work is forthcoming as a result of the present U.S. technical reconnaissance. Apart from its effect on the docks, the withdrawal of the British fleet in 1971 will leave a stark vacuum in the peninsula's naval defence–and not least in relation to protection against piracy.

Proposed Military Reconnaissance

15. Not only should the military reconnaissance already authorized proceed (para 2(c)), it is indeed now more urgent. In the course of fact finding:

(a) a start should be made to influence the pattern of the British rundown in ways most advantageous from our point of view in that, for example, they minimise the problem of providing our own logistic support;

(b) those British assets of a moveable character which we should like left behind and also fixed assets which we should like left intact should be identified; our ultimate objective should be to get these wherever possible without payment;

(c) attention should be given to any particular areas in which we might desire to have the assistance of Malaysia/Singapore; again our objective should be to get any such assistance without payment;

(d) we should obtain as much information as possible relevant to the proposed Joint Air Defence System.

Five Power Talks

16. Five Power Talks have long been sought by the Malaysians, and Australia has indicated at the Prime Ministerial level its support of the proposed 5 Power Conference. The British Government has now indicated its willingness to take part on the basis of its new decisions. While we need take no initiative in pressing for the talks, from our point of view the sooner the talks are held the better. Time will be needed first for the reconnaissance mission to report and for its report to be considered and secondly for the ANZUS Council meeting early in April. This points in the latter part of April for the Five Power Talks. The talks should be at Ministerial level and should be held in Asia.

17. While, for tactical and presentational reasons, Australia should not take a lead in pressing for an early 5 Power meeting, we should use the meeting actively and positively for the promotion of Australian objectives. It should be the occasion for–

(a) clarifying British intentions and ensuring firm commitments by Britain up to December 1971;

(b) confirming, thereafter, some of the practical arrangements arising from the British rundown which will be of critical importance in relation to our forces during the British rundown;

(c) examining the proposed Joint Air Defence system;

(d) considering the future form of AMDA in terms of practical political and military effectiveness. We should wish to avoid a situation where the British attempt to reinterpret their obligations under AMDA by bilateral negotiations before the 5 Power meeting takes place: incidentally, technically AMDA does not extend to Singapore;

(e) applying the maximum pressure to keep the British involved for as long as possible in regional security in South East Asia–whatever view we may take about likely effectiveness of British military contributions;

(f) doing our utmost to encourage Malaysia and Singapore to build up their own preparedness;

(g) doing what we can to establish a rapport and co-operation between Malaysia and Singapore at least in the defence field;

(h) encouraging all five participating countries to think about co-operation in meeting the political and other problems of regional security.

18. As to this point just noted a series of factors will become increasingly important as the British rundown proceeds. Our loose association with AMDA has hitherto been favourable to us and as has been stated (para 13) we should aim, for the present, to continue this association. However, with the progressive British withdrawals, the Strategic Reserve will cease to exist and thus the present basis for our present association will disappear. New problems of administration and command arrangements will doubtless arise.

19. Earlier in this paper repeated reference has been made to the premise that Australian forces will remain in Malaysia and Singapore for the time being. Even before a 5 Power Conference, there will be feelers as to our intentions. We cannot afford to create a situation where it is thought that we are staying until 1971 but going automatically after that, or, at the other extreme that we are staying until 1971 and necessarily remaining thereafter, perhaps with additional commitments. We will want, on the contrary, to convey the impression that while we will have a continuing interest and involvement in the region, the form and shape of our contribution from time to time may change in accordance with practical requirements and new regional arrangements which may be developed. Most certainly there can be no illusions that we are taking over the role of the British or anything remotely resembling it. And always in our own minds will be our concern to discover what U.S. policy toward South East Asia will be after Vietnam. This known, we could face a major reassessment of our own position.

20. It is not possible at this time to forecast what new regional arrangements will finally emerge but if they are to take on a form most suited to Australia's requirements, Australia must take a positive role in shaping and influencing their development. So it is not too early to begin to shape our attitude. For as long as there are to be Australian and New Zealand Forces in Malaysia/Singapore, there will need to be practical arrangements between Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore to govern the stationing of our forces, training, interworking between the forces and so on. It will be our aim to maintain some form of British involvement. We will be seeking at all times to sustain the interest of the U.S.A. in the region and to allow of the potential, if not actual in the short term, involvement of the U.S.A. If we must think of a completely different relationship between the 4 Powers–Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and Australia–it ought not to be seen as providing for an exclusive arrangement–let alone a Commonwealth arrangement–directed to the security of the region. In particular, and at all times, we need to ensure that Australia's commitments are carefully defined, are neither automatic nor open-ended, and are related to our own capabilities, remembering always our overall national goals and aspirations.

21. In the long term there could be developments in the more formal Treaty groupings which already exist in the area and these possibilities need to be borne in mind. In all this it will be a continuing Australian objective to foster Indonesian friendship and to work towards closer understanding with her.

22. In light of Ministers' consideration of this whole question, those aspects of the matters briefly touched on above which are within the competence of the Defence Committee will be put to further study. They are referred to here as background to the immediate decisions required, because longer-term aims influence short term arrangements; because of the need to advance our thinking before the Five Power Conference; and because the little time before the British rundown renders British forces militarily ineffective leaves so short a span in which to begin to develop new arrangements.

Visit by Minister for External Affairs

23. The matters so shortly traversed above are very relevant to the proposed visit to Malaysia/ Singapore by the Minister for External Affairs. When the Minister's visit was first planned (para 2), the purpose was, inter alia, to ensure that the proposed reconnaissance did not lead to wrong assumptions about Australian policy. This purpose continues. But as well there are now new reasons for the visit. They are to be found in the matters discussed above. As well the Minister's talks should help Australian thinking on matters within the range discussed in paras 18 to 22 and allow of consideration of the tactics for future handling of the British.

24. No final view on the joint air defence system can be expressed until details are worked out and the Government has given more consideration to long term commitments. However the Minister might intimate that we are prepared to examine the suggestion with our other partners.

Recommendations

25. Noting that a governing consideration is that we should keep open for as long as possible such options as are available to us (para 6) and that in any event a reassessment of our own position may be required in the light of the Vietnam situation and developments in United States policy (para 19), it is recommended Cabinet approve that–

(a) Australia should continue to maintain in Malaysia and Singapore a military contribution from all three Services as indicated in para 8, it being understood that it may become necessary to change in some degree the composition and disposition of our forces (para 14);

(b) the maintenance of our forces there should be in the circumstances mentioned in para 9;

(c) the Australian military contribution should cover the tasks mentioned in para 10;

(d) any commitment of our forces to operations including involvement in internal civil disorder and external threats continue to be subject to the agreement of the Australian Government (para 11);

(e) the attitude to Indonesia be as mentioned in para 12;

(f) we are to continue in our present association with AMDA and should seek to avoid any question of bilateral arrangements at least over the next three years or so (para 13);

(g) the military reconnaissance already approved (para 2) proceed and military planning talks in Malaysia/Singapore be on the basis outlined in paragraph 15; this to be subject to any problems arising from the projected visit of the Minister for External Affairs;

(h) while we need take no initiative in pressing for Five Power talks, we should participate in them at Ministerial level (para 16);

(i) the Australian contribution to these Talks should be directed to the ends mentioned in para 17;

(j) the overall impression of the Australian attitude which we should convey is that set out in para 19.

27. In keeping with our past policy, we should continue to concert our actions closely with New Zealand at the political and military level. It would also be necessary to keep the United States informed of what we are doing in terms both of our vital interest in their support and co-operation, and of the recent exchange between the Australian and United States of America Governments.