Cambodia

CONTENTS

• 1. INTRODUCTION
  • 1.1 Mission
• 2. THE PRE-ELECTION PROCESS
  • 2.1 Context of the Elections
  • 2.2 Election Registration
  • 2.3 The Campaign
• 3. POLLING AND COUNTING DAYS
  • 3.1 Preparation for and Conduct of Polling Day
  • 3.2 Conduct of Counting Day
  • 3.3 Assessment of International Observers of the Polling and Counting
    Procedures
• 4. POST-ELECTION PROCESS
  • 4.1 Consolidation of Results
  • 4.2 Post Election Complaints and Appeals Process
• 5. TRAINING,
  DEPLOYMENT AND CONTRIBUTION OF AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND OBSERVERS
  • 5.1 Preparation of Australian and New Zealand Observers
  • 5.2 Impact of the Australian and New Zealand Observer Mission
• 6. ELECTION RESULTS
  • 6.1 Preliminary Results
  • 6.2 Comparison with the 1993 Election Results
• 7. CONCLUSIONS
  • 7.1 Registration
  • 7.2 Campaign Period
  • 7.3 Polling Day and Counting Day
  • 7.4 Post-Election Process
  • 7.5 Role of the International Community
  • 7.6 Overview
• 8. SUMMARY OF
  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE MISSIONS
• 9. APPENDICES
  • Appendix A: ANZ Delegation
  • Appendix B: Election Timeline
  • Appendix C: Australia/New Zealand/Japan Deployment Plan

The Report

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Mission

1. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand were invited by the Royal
Government of Cambodia (RGC) to contribute observers to the Cambodian National
Assembly elections which were scheduled to be held on 26 July 1998.

2. The Australian and New Zealand Governments subsequently agreed to send a
joint observer mission to Cambodia for the election period as part of the
Joint International Observer Group to Cambodia.

3. The Joint International Observer Group (JIOG ) was established in order
to co-ordinate the activities of international observers from over thirty
countries. Membership of the Group comprised observers from the European Union
including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom , a delegation from the Association of
South East Asian Nations, comprising Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam and observers from other
countries including Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Japan, Republic
of Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and the United States.

4. In all there were almost five hundred members of international
delegations who operated under the JIOG, in addition to a significant number
of international observers who represented Non-Government Organisations
(NGO's).

5. Australian Long Term Observers (LTOs) were present in Cambodia from the
last week of May 1998 and were able to observe all phases of the election
process. A further twenty Australian and four New Zealand Short Term Observers
(STOs) were present in Cambodia from 14 July -1 August 1998 and observed the
later stages of the campaign, polling day and counting days in Phnom Penh,
Kandal, Kampong Speu, Takeo, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng Provinces. Australia
retained a Long Term Observer presence until 19 August 1998 after the National
Election Committee (NEC) completed the recounting and appeals process.

6. In addition to four joint Australia/New Zealand observation teams,
Australian observers formed eight international observation teams with Japan.
The ANZ Delegation wishes to express their great thanks to their Japanese
counterparts and the Japanese Government, in particular First Secretary
Kuzuhiro Nakai at the Japanese Embassy in Phnom Penh, for the high level of
co-operation and support provided in forming these joint teams.

7. The ANZ Delegation would like to pay tribute to the work of the
Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh, overseen by Ambassador Malcolm Leader, for
their great contribution to the observer mission. In particular, the
Delegation wishes to thank not only Ambassador and Mrs Leader, but also the
Deputy Head of Mission Stephanie Shwabsky and Third Secretary Shennia Spillane
for their political insights, the Defence Attache Colonel Dougal McMillan and
his staff for their advice on security matters, the Country representative for
AusAID Bill Costello and the Consul and Vice Consul Andrew Walls and Julie
Shiels for their logistical and administrative support.

2. THE PRE-ELECTION PROCESS

2.1 Context of the Elections

8. Election day is but one part of a five stage process which involves the
following elements that are critical to the conduct of a democratic election:

• Registration
• Campaigning
• The Balloting Process
• The Counting Process
• Post-Election Appeals Process and Respect for the Results

9. As such any assessment of the Cambodian elections must take into account
the full environment in which they occurred and the effect of that environment
on the election process.

10. The ANZ Delegation was at all times aware that the 1998 Cambodian
Elections took place against a historical background which had a continuing
effect on the climate of the election. Elements of relevant history included:

• The tragedies and the brutality inflicted upon the Cambodian people over
  the last quarter century;
• The Role of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
  (UNTAC) in helping to co-ordinate moves towards democracy through the
  conduct of the 1993 election;
• The setbacks to the democratic process and the will of the Cambodian
  people which occurred in July 1997 and its aftermath , including the
  egregious violations of human rights which accompanied those events; and
• The national and international initiatives for a restoration of
  parliamentary democracy during the first half of 1998, including the
  Japanese co-ordinated initiative for a peace process which would lead to
  parliamentary elections.

11. The technical aspects of the 1998 Cambodian elections are discussed in
chronological order incorporating registration, the campaign period, polling
and counting days and the provincial and national reconciliation of the ballot
counting.

2.2 Election Registration

12. Registration of voters for the Cambodian elections ran from 18 May - 15
June 1998. The National Election Committee recorded that approximately 95% or
5,395,024 of the total elegible voting population of over 5.6 million
registered to vote. The process was delayed in one province only, Siem Reap,
due to delays in registering Khmer Rouge defectors.

13. The ANZ Delegation found that in general, after early administrative
inefficiencies the registration process proceeded adequately and in a
representative manner. There were however concerns that the complaints and
appeals process was not adequately publicised or carried out with sufficient
transparency.

14. Australian Long Term Observers followed the registration process and
made the following observations on the critical elements of the process.

Training

15. The NEC employed a training system through which the NEC trained
Provincial Election Commission (PEC) officials who in turn trained Commune
Election Commission Officials (CEC). While this system worked relatively well
it was not sufficiently developed for the initial period of registration.

16. It was the clear conclusion of Australian Long Term Observers that the
training of Commune level officials should have occurred earlier and that the
quality of training could have been improved had the training process been
supplemented by teams of core NEC trainers.

Challenges to Registration.

17. There were relatively few reports of eligible voters being excluded
from registration. However after initial administrative delays during the
first week of registration some voters were of the mistaken belief that they
would not be allowed to register. This misconception was ultimately resolved
in most cases.

18. The main reasons why eligible voters chose not to register were that
some were unable to reach registration centres during the prescribed period
and that some were insufficiently informed about the registration process.

19. The conclusion of the ANZ Delegation is that in future the process of
registration could be improved by a more comprehensive public information
campaign detailing times, procedures and locations for registration prior to
commencement of the formal registration period. Consideration should also be
given as to how voters who on election day will be in a different area from
the one in which they registered may be allowed to vote.

20. The principal reasons for rejecting allegedly ineligible voters was
that they were under the age of eighteen or could not prove their Cambodian
citizenship through possession of an appropriate identity card or references.

21. In addition to the exclusion of some voters there was significant
controversy generated by allegations of multiple registration, improper
registration by underage persons and registration of large numbers of
allegedly ineligible Vietnamese citizens.

22. After considerable investigation by International Observers, it was the
conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that there was little substantive information
to support allegations of widespread enrolment of ineligible Vietnamese
citizens. The most disturbing feature of these allegations was that many of
those accused of improper registration were ultimately shown to have been
Khmer citizens of Vietnamese ethnicity who were disputed solely on the basis
of their ethnic background.

Complaints and Appeals Process.

23. It was the finding of Australian Long Term Observers that in the the
main the complaints and appeals process for the registration period was not
well conducted. Many Communes did not adhere to the Electoral Law stipulating
that the provisional electoral rolls be posted for three days at each
registration site from 15 June. Further, there was little awareness of the
process for making appeals and those who were refused registration were
frequently given neither adequate explanation for their rejection nor
sufficient information as to how to appeal. Although there were very few
rejections the appeals process was insufficiently transparent for those who
were rejected.

National Voter Registration Database

24. The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) funded the
National Election Computer Centre which was reponsible for compiling a
National Voter Registration Database. The Database was used for computer
generation of electoral rolls which were intended to be distributed to all
Provinces and to each polling station.

25. It was the conclusion of the observer mission that the creation of a
National Database which could be updated readily was an important development
and that the Australian Government should encourage and where appropriate
assist the Cambodian Government in establishing a mechanism for preserving and
updating the National Database.

2.3 The Campaign

26. The formal Cambodian election campaign ran from 25 June to 24 July
1998. It was a period which was characterised by unacceptable acts of violence
and significant attempts to intimidate sections of the population and
undermine belief in the secrecy of the ballot, while at the same time
observers witnessed a vigorous campaign including public rallies throughout
much of the country. These conflicting elements presented international
observers with the task of assessing what effect such negative developments
had upon the election process as a whole.

27. The key elements in making such an assessment were whether there was an
impact on the ability of political parties to campaign openly and whether
there was a significant erosion in the common perception of voter secrecy. In
particular, ANZ observers considered that the belief in voter secrecy was a
critical element in considering whether Cambodians had the capacity to cast
their votes withour fear of reprisal.

28. International observers and the ANZ Delegation had serious concerns
about a number of developments within the campaign period.

Intimidation and Unresolved Killings

29. The ANZ delegation concluded that there was widely corroborated
evidence of political intimidation of both party officials and in some cases
voters. There was strong evidence of threats against organisers from
opposition political parties. While this did not significantly deter
campaigning at the national level, there were consistent and credible reports
that some political party members felt threatened at commune level and limited
their campaigning as a consequence.

30. International observers also found credible evidence of a campaign of
intimidation against voters which was intended to raise fears of reprisal if
they were found to have voted against the wishes of local commune and village
officials.

31. The most serious manifestation of pre-election intimidation was the
widely reported phenomenon of killings of political party workers. The United
Nations Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia has recorded over thirty
allegations from political parties or other sources of political killings. In
its Report on the period 26 July to 18 August, the Office of the UN CHR
concluded: "The Offices's investigation into these deaths has found that
fewer than half a dozen of these case may be politically motivated and that in
a dozen other cases no political motives could be found. In the remaining
cases, both political and other factors are apparent making it even more
difficult to assess the motives." At the very least this leaves up to
eighteen killings which may have had some form of political motivation. Many
of these as yet unresolved cases were also reported directly to ANZ Observers
by the relevant political parties. The ANZ Delegation fully supported the
conclusions of the JIOG that these killings occurred in a climate of impunity
and that they have still not been adequately dealt with by the relevant
Cambodian authorities.

32. It is the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that a dedicated police
investigative unit be established in Cambodia with specific responsibility for
investigating any allegations of criminal intimidation relating to this or
future election processes. The international community should consider
offering direct professional assistance and training to such a unit were it to
be established.

Electronic Media Access

33. Electronic media access for opposition parties was limited during the
course of the campaign. In particular there was minimal coverage of opposition
activities on state run radio and television during the pre-election period.
In Phnom Penh, where the urban population is more literate, this was partly
offset by the presence of a highly plural print media. However, in rural
Cambodia the electronic media is critical to access the population. The
allocation of brief periods of free political broadcasting time to every
political party during the campaign did not offset the overwhelming advantage
that the CPP enjoyed in this area. The United Nations Centre for Human Rights
in Cambodia concluded in its report of 25 June 1998 that "since July 1997
only the CPP and its allies have had access to the electronic media". The
Centre for Human Rights found for example that for the month of May 1998,
"on a party basis, CPP had 448 appearances (in the electronic media),
Reastr Niyum had 91, FUNCINPEC had 9 and the Sam Rainsy Party had 5".

34. It was the finding therefore of the ANZ Delegation that there was not
equal access to the electronic media for the purposes of the election.

35. The first state aired political roundtable during the official thirty
day campaign period began on 26 June in two sections and featured five minute
slots from 26 political party representatives. Participants answered one
question during the two hour discussion. Under NEC rules each of the 39
parties was also allotted five minutes of time per day on national radio and
television. The political statements ran from 12.30pm to 3:00pm and from
4.30pm until 7:00 pm on odd numbered campaign days in a randomly determined
order.

36. Two independent information sources for the Cambodian population at
large were the broadcasts of Voice of Free Asia and Voice of America. Both
sources provided extended coverage of the election process in the Khmer
language. During the election campaign they provided equitable coverage of
opposition rallies and activities.

Secrecy of the Ballot

37. The ANZ delegation concluded that efforts were made to weaken voters'
belief in the secrecy of the ballot. These tactics ranged from the spreading
of crude rumours such as that there would be satellites capable of reading the
marks made by voters to more insidious practices. In particular there was a
campaign in which village officials gathered registration cards in order to
take down details without authorisation for so doing,. Further, there was a
related campaign in which officials also collected thumbprints of voters as a
form of pledge to vote . Although none of these tactics actually threatened
the secrecy of the vote they were intended to undermine popular belief in the
secrecy of the ballot.

38. In the end, it was the strong conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that due
to a number of factors attempts to undermine popular belief in the secrecy of
the vote, although deplorable, were largely unsuccessful and did not have a
significant impact on voters' understanding of or confidence in the secrecy of
the ballot.

39. The most important element in this process was the work of the three
internationally recognised Cambodian Non-Government Organisations COMFREL,
COFFEL and NICFEC, each of which conducted a major campaign of voter
awareness. COMFREL, for example, held over 10, 000 voter awareness sessions
throughout the country in which they acted out the voting process and
explained in simple terms the secrecy of individual ballots. These programs
consolidated the positive experience which many voters had during the 1993
UNTAC organised elections with regard to the secrecy of the ballot. Campaigns
to diminish public confidence in ballot secrecy in 1993 were similarly found
at the time not to have undermined the secrecy of the ballot. Finally,
throughout the campaign period international observers stressed to all groups
the fact and importance of the secrecy of the ballot and spent considerable
time explaining to community groups the mechanisms in place for safeguarding
ballot secrecy.

40. The election results provide an indication that there was widespread
secrecy of the ballot. Almost sixty per cent of the population voted against
the ruling party. Of the CPP's claimed 3.3 million members, many clearly could
not have voted for the Party. An interesting example is provided by the case
of two communes, Kien Svay and Krang You in Kandal Province, which had
directly received millions of dollars in development aid from second Prime
Minister Hun Sen and which voted overwhelmingly against the CPP. The widely
respected vice chairman of the NEC Kassie Nou has commented publicly that:
"If there was pressure from the CPP the voters largely resisted it. Most
people did not vote for the ruling party. The voting suggested that even in
CPP strongholds people voted as they wished. The CPP lost to Funcinpec in
Kandal Province, Hun Sen's home, a province under CPP control. The CPP lost
again to Funcinpec in Kampong Cham, Hun Sen's birthplace and a province run by
his brother." While this may not reflect the situation in some of the
more remote provinces, it provides important information about the largest and
third largest provinces.

Untrained National Observers

41. On 17 July the JIOG released a statement which it also conveyed
directly to the NEC, expressing its concern at the sudden accreditation of
large numbers of untrained national observers. The JIOG was presented with
credible evidence that such national observers were not sufficiently well
trained and were possibly partisan. The JIOG was concerned that they had the
potential to crowd out international observers and established national
observers from polling and counting stations. This development had the
potential to undermine the capacity to ensure the presence of independent
national observers in almost all polling stations throughout the country.

42. The JIOG made three unequivocal demands on the NEC and warned that
failure to respond could threaten the credibility of the entire observation
process. These were: first, that all international observers be guaranteed
access to all polling and counting centres at all times; second, that
accreditation for the established election observation bodies be given
priority; and third, that the three organisations, COMFREL, COFFEL and NICFEC
be guaranteed at least one place in each polling and counting station at all
times.

43. The NEC ultimately met each of these demands in full, in addition to
withdrawing the accreditation of those organisations about which the JIOG had
raised concerns. ANZ Observers considered that the protection of the role of
independent national observer organisations was a key outcome in the course of
the election and one in which Australia played an important and significant
part. The NEC is to be commended on its timely and effective response to
JIOG's approach on this issue.

Gift Giving and Vote Buying

44. There was strong evidence that the major parties engaged in significant
gift giving of items such as rice, kramas and money in return for promises of
support. The evidence was particularly strong in the case of the ruling party.
Although this is a longstanding practice within Cambodia it had the potential
to be considered as a bribe, albeit against a general belief in the secrecy of
the ballot.

Promotion of Ethnic Prejudice

45. One feature of the election campaign which ANZ Observers found
objectionable was the promotion of ethnic prejudices as a political tactic by
some candidates. This campaign tactic was primarily directed against the
Vietnamese community in Cambodia. It was the strong conclusion of the ANZ
Delegation that all attempts to introduce ethnic prejudice into this or any
other election campaign should be deplored.

An Active Campaign

46. As outlined above the ANZ Delegation had serious concerns about many
elements of the campaign. The activities at the core of these concerns cannot
and should not be justified. The ANZ Delegation is of the clear view that
these activities were wrong and that strenuous efforts should be made by the
Cambodian authorities to ensure that they are not repeated and where
appropriate that they are thoroughly investigated and those responsible
prosecuted.

47. At the same time the ANZ Delegation witnessed an active political
campaign. It was a fact that throughout almost the entire country opposition
parties held well attended rallies. Opposition leaders spoke freely and
vigorously, being openly and aggressively critical of the Government. They
were not hindered in their movement. They informed the ANZ Delegation directly
of these facts. Opposition parties displayed signboards throughout the
country. International observers witnessed frequent and substantial popular
participation in Opposition rallies and vehicle convoys. Neither international
observers nor, significantly, the national observer groups received reports of
political rallies being either stopped or disrupted during the course of the
campaign.

48. The conclusion of the ANZ Delegation was that the Cambodian election
campaign was a highly active, highly contested political campaign conducted
against a deeply flawed background. It was the conclusion of the ANZ
Delegation that as a result of attempts to intimidate opposition political
activists there was some limitation on the capacity of commune and village
level party officials to campaign. At the same time it was the conclusion of
the ANZ Delegation that despite these attempts at intimidation there was also
a highly active and contested campaign which involved much of the community
and which reached the bulk of the population. It was the conclusion of the ANZ
Delegation that the credit for this outcome must in large part go to the
Cambodian people who displayed a fierce desire to seize control of their own
democratic process through popular participation. In assessing the election it
was the view of the ANZ Delegation that this fierce desire of the Cambodian
people to participate in and shape the election should not be underestimated.
Credit should also be given to those NEC officials who played a significant
role in organising the logistics and structures necessary for the election. In
particular, the ANZ Delegation would like to congratulate NEC members Kassie
Nou and Tip Jan Vibol for the role they played in promoting the best possible
climate for the election.

3. POLLING AND COUNTING DAYS

3.1 Preparation For and Conduct of Polling Day

Training

49. Three critical paths had to be administered in parallel for the
elections to proceed on 26 July. These were: the recruitment and training of
60,000 Polling Station officials nationwide; the distribution of polling and
counting kits; and the production and distribution of the computer generated
electoral lists . It was a significant achievement and a credit to the NEC
logistics operation that all three processes were competently managed. The
training observed by LTOs and STOs in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng was studiously
efficient, enthusiastically attended and completed ahead of schedule on 22
July.

Security

50. In general, throughout the country, the election was conducted in a
calm orderly environment. There was strong community spirit, efficient conduct
of polling staff, and high voter turnout, subsequently confirmed by the NEC to
have been 93.7% of registered voters. Both the ANZ Delegation in particular
and international and domestic observers more generally were struck by the
enthusiasm of Cambodian voters to participate in election day. International
observers did not directly encounter any serious incidents of violence nor
were there incidents of violence reported other than two involving the Khmer
Rouge . A number of ANZ Observers reported that respect for international
observers was clearly evident amongst both voters and electoral officials.

51. Despite the prevailing calm there were reports of two major security
incidents related to the Khmer Rouge. At Anlong Veng on the morning of 26 July
a group of about 30-40 Khmer Rouge attacked a village resulting in the death
of civilians and members of the security forces. The ANZ Delegation along with
the rest of the international community expressed their deep condemnation at
this attack and the unprovoked violence of Khmer Rouge forces. It was a sign
of the determination of the Cambodian people to vote that despite these
grotesque killings, voting later commenced and was completed in Anlong Veng.
In Stung Treng Province a group of Khmer Rouge defectors with weapons and
uniforms came to a polling station and demanded to vote. They were not
registered and electoral officials refused to allow them to vote. They left
the station but threatened to return. The ANZ Delegation would like to pay
tribute to the courage of the officials who stood their ground in the face of
considerable danger.

52. The only widespread security problem was early crowding of the polling
stations coupled with public impatience at the initial wait to vote. In Phnom
Penh one polling station official is reported to have been beaten by voters
after he gave his family priority access. This crowding was not reported to
have disrupted voting.

Conduct of Polling

53. International and domestic observers almost universally reported that
polling was conducted in an orderly and effective manner. Most significantly,
the ANZ Delegation concluded on the basis of its own observations, with
reference to the overall findings of International and Domestic Observers
stationed throughout the country, that on the day the conditions were such
that the secrecy of the ballot was protected and that just as importantly the
general perception of ballot secrecy was strong.

54. On the day it was the conclusion of both international and domestic
observers in general, in addition to the ANZ Delegation in particular that
there were no significant identifiable attempts to undermine the secrecy of
the vote, to commit fraud or to practice intimidation. Well after the
conclusion of polling day, reporting from throughout the country has so far
established no systematic picture of attempts to distort election day itself
through either intimidation or fraud.

55. There were however some reports of isolated actions which while not
constituting intimidation were not appropriate. It should be stressed that the
presence of international observers helped to overcome these problems where
they occurred. One ANZ Observer reported the presence of off duty police
outside of a particular polling station. The officers left after being
questioned as to the appropriateness of their presence. Further, one ANZ team
familiar with the local officials reported that a senior governing party
official was also part of the electoral team at a particular polling station.
There was a further report of activity by at least one CPP party agent who was
not confined to the area reserved for party agents.

56. A critical contribution to both the conduct and the effective
observation of polling day was the presence of representatives from the three
internationally respected Cambodian election monitoring bodies COMFREL, COFFEL
and NICFEC. Between them these groups covered almost every polling station in
the country and provided both a comprehensive presence and source of
assessment of the voting. ANZ Observers, in addition to other international
observers, maintained significant contact with domestic observers from COMFREL
and the related organisations throughout the day. Moreover, at an
organisational level, the ANZ Delegation had access to the comprehensive
findings of COMFREL and COFFEL which allowed for a rapid overview of
independent reports from almost every polling station in the country. It is
significant that these Cambodian observer groups, which have not hesitated to
criticise fearlessly and independently elements of both the pre and post
election process reported that their clear findings from throughout the
country were that there was no evidence of significant fraud or intimidation
during either of polling or counting days. Indeed, the national observer
groups were warm in their comments about the carriage of polling and counting
days.

57. A further important development was that both international and
national observers reported minimal presence of observers from those
organizations deregistered by the NEC on the eve of polling day.

58. Despite generally positive assessments of polling day there were
reports by ANZ Observers of various technical difficulties on election day.
The most significant of these was that there was widespread difficulty in
operating the double closure system for the ballot boxes so as both the blue
plastic serated edge seals which could not be undone, and the padlocks were
secured to the ballot box so as to form an unbreakable seal. This problem was
caused by a design feature of the ballot boxes which only allowed attachment
of the seals before rather than after the padlocks were in place. It was clear
that there was inadequate formal training of polling station officials on this
point and many ANZ Observers had to instruct the officials on the correct way
to seal the boxes. It is recommended that in future the design of the ballot
boxes be modified and that specific training be given to polling officials so
as to ensure understanding of this process.

59. ANZ Observers also reported some cases where the handwritten voter
records were used because the computer generated version had never arrived. In
addition ANZ Observers witnessed stations in which the voting booths were
facing in other than the prescribed direction, but on no occasions did voters
or domestic observers indicate or imply, nor did international observers
conclude that it had an impact on the voting. These issues were always
corrrected at the request of international observers.

60. There is however an additional report which is still yet to have been
adequately investigated and explained which relates to allegations that in
some communes in eastern Kompong Cham a number of voters were given pre-marked
ballot papers. The ANZ Delegation is of the view that despite completion of
the NEC's processes this report should be further examined.

61. In summary the ANZ Delegation was able to draw upon not only their own
experiences covering over 200 polling stations, but also those of the general
corps of international observers who attended 17 % of polling stations and
domestic observers who covered almost 100 % of polling stations. On that basis
the ANZ Delegation concluded that there was no evidence of either significant
fraud or intimidation on polling day. In addition polling day was generally
well administered and was accompanied by high voter enthusiasm. There were
however a number of technical breaches which while unacceptable did not, in
the opinion of international observers, have a significant effect on the vote.

3.2 Conduct of Counting Day

62. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that the conduct of
counting day at the Commune level continued the general pattern of
transparency and calm which characterised polling day. However there were
concerns that the UN Deployment Plan did not make provision for observers to
follow the process through to the Provincial level. The counting process
involved two principal stages, each of which was followed by international
observers in general and ANZ Observers in particular:

• Transport and Storage of the Ballots; and
• Counting of the Ballots.

Transport and Storage of the Ballots

63. Prior to the election, the ANZ Delegation and other international
observers had been concerned that the process of transporting and storing the
ballots after the completion of polling day was a point of vulnerablity in the
electoral process. As such international observers spent a considerable amount
of time working with the NEC on ways to strengthen these processes.
International observers agreed with the proposal put forward by the NEC that
the secrecy of the ballot would be better protected if counting were conducted
at the commune rather than the village level. This enabled not only greater
consolidation of observation resources but also diluted the potential for
specific results to be attributed to specific villages.

64. International observers also supported the proposal put forward by the
NEC that counting be deferred to the morning of 27 July rather than commencing
late on the evening of polling day with the consequent risk of counting going
late into the night amidst the high possibility of power outages and a less
predictable security environment.

65. In order to safeguard these processes it was agreed that ballot boxes
should be transported in convoys to the counting centres and that they should
be accompanied by as many national, international and party observers as
possible. In most cases this meant large convoys followed the ballot boxes.
ANZ Delegations followed the ballot boxes from their final polling station to
the counting centres. In many cases because ballots were transported by NEC
vehicles moving from one station to another, and because there were often
multiple polling stations at the one site, ANZ Observers were able to
accompany most of the ballot boxes within their commune.

66. Given that almost all polling stations were able to complete voting on
time and that the weather on polling day was dry, the vast majority of ballot
boxes were safely transported to counting centres either before dark or very
early in the evening. Neither ANZ nor other international observers reported
any incidents during the transportation of ballots. In addition, domestic
observers expressed their satisfaction with the process of transporting the
ballots.

67. Ballot boxes were locked overnight in sealed rooms at counting centres.
The rooms in which ballots were stored were, in general, heavily secured with
tamper proof seals. Large numbers of national observers and party agents from
the different political parties slept outside of the counting centres. In
addition many internatioonal observers including well over half the ANZ
Delegation slept at the counting centres. Some ANZ Observers parked their
vehicles in front of the doorway to the counting centre and then slept in the
vehicle. Neither ANZ Observers nor other international observers reported any
incidents during the storage of ballots. Similarly there were no reports of
concern from national observers regarding storage of the ballots. One ANZ team
reported that the room with the ballot boxes was not properly locked
overnight, which lead them to sleep at the entrance to the room.

68. The ANZ Delegation concluded that there was no evidence of significant
problems with either the transport or the storage of the ballot boxes prior to
counting.

Counting of the Ballots

69. ANZ Observers witnessed counting in all areas to which they were
assigned. The conclusion of ANZ Observers and international observers, as
overwhelmingly reported in the consolidated assessment to the JIOG, and of
domestic observer groups was that at the commune level the counting process
itself generally proceeded in an orderly fashion and with no evidence of
significant distortions.

70. In general international observers gave a high grade to the conduct of
counting. It was the conclusion of ANZ Observers that the counting procedures
for reconciliation of the ballots, admission of national observers and party
agents and display of the ballots were generally carried out in accordance
with NEC procedures. Where multiple tables were used for counting it was the
experience of international observers that the safeguards established for the
process were acceptable.

71. ANZ Observers did however witness two events of significant concern.

72. In Prey Kabass District of Takeo Province the District Governor arrived
at a counting station to express strongly his dissatisfaction with the voting
result at that station, which had gone against the CPP and to demand a recount
of both CPP and FUNCINPEC ballots. There was a joint Australian and Japanese
International Observation team present which had not witnessed any cause for
concern with the counting process. Electoral officials supported by the
international observers resisted the demand for an unauthorised recount and
sought the guidance of the Provincial Election Commission (PEC). Ignoring the
advice of the PEC that the results should stand, the Governor continued to
insist that the ballots be recounted and approached the international
observers to participate in a recount. Ultimately, this demand was
successfully resisted and the Governor and his party withdrew without the
ballots or the counting process having been compromised. Just preceding the
Governor's intervention weapons had been displayed immediately outside the
counting centre by security forces allied to the Governor. Over the course of
and following this intervention, national observers and party agents steadily
left the counting centre, until only the commune electoral officials and the
team from Australia and Japan remained. The ANZ Delegation would like to offer
its highest praise to the Commune Electoral Officials and to the Australian
observer John Murray and his Japanese counterpart Shinrou Arase for their
courageous work in helping to protect the integrity of the counting process
and for their contribution in defusing a potentially violent situation.

73. A further incident occurred in Peam Ro District of Prey Veng Province
where a joint Australian and Japanese team witnessed an improper gathering of
armed personnel within the vicinity of the counting centre. The military
officers wanted to know the results of the counting but were refused entry by
the CEC chairman on three occasions. Eventually, at the sugggestion of
international observers, the PEC Chairman dispatched his operations officer
and assisted the CEC chairman in successfully dispersing the military group.
The incident represented a clear breach of NEC guidelines. It should be noted
that neither of these incidents in the opinion of ANZ Observers had any actual
impact on the conduct and ultimate outcome of counting.

74. In addition to the above international observers reported that party
agents and national observers left the ballot counting at lunch time with
apparently little regard for the security of the ballots. Although there were
no reports of ballot tampering it indicates that in future there could be
value in more comprehensive training for both party agents and national
observers.

75. A further and important point about the counting is that the
independent and widely respected Cambodian National Observer Group COMFREL
staged a parallel count throughout the country. COMFREL's figures tallied with
those reported to the NEC on a commune by commune basis with very few
exceptions throughout the country. This was seen as a significant indication
that not only was the basic integrity of the count preserved but that the
figures were also reported correctly through to the NEC. While the ANZ
Delegation again expresses its deepest concern at the extent of violence, both
grotesque and unacceptable, which pervaded the campaign period, the conclusion
was that this did not translate into fraud of either the polling or the
counting processes. The violence must however be thoroughly investigated as a
matter of highest priority.

76. Ultimately, it was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that the while
there was clear evidence of unacceptable intimidation, there was no evidence
of significant fraud and that the Cambodian people ran a vigorous election
campaign, were able to exercise their votes in secrecy and have them counted
without any significant distortion.

77. In those circumstances the delegation accepts that the result of the
election should stand.

78. Two Observers, Steve Dargavel MP and the Honourable Ralph Willis MP,
wished to place the following statement on the record: "The extent of
unacceptable behaviour and violation of human rights in this election,
including political killings, violence, torture, threats, intimidation and
vote buying, lack of Opposition access to the electronic media, failure by the
authorities to properly investigate politically related crimes and alleged
election irregularities, and secret amendment of the seat allocation formula
to favour the CPP lead us to conclude that this election cannot be declared
free and fair, or indeed to credibly reflect the will of the Cambodian people.
We nevertheless accept that this election, having been conducted by the
Cambodians themselves, had many positive features and represents a significant
step towards the establishment of a system of truly representative
government."

3.3 Assessment of International Observers of the Polling and Counting
Procedures

79. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY 186 UN TEAMS ON CONDUCT OF POLLING

ASSESSMENT	PERCENTAGE
5.1 Very Good	33.3%
5.2 Good	59.3%
5.3 Average	4.8%
5.4 Poor	2.4%
5.5 Very Poor	0%

80. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY 192 UN TEAMS ON THE COUNTING PROCESS

ASSESSMENT	PERCENTAGE
5.1 Very Good	50.0%
5.2 Good	38.5%
5.3 Average	5.7%
5.4 Poor	2.6%
5.5 Very Poor	3.1%

4. POST-ELECTION PROCESS

4.1 Consolidation of Results

81. Consolidation of results at the provincial level occurred from 29 to 31
July. This process was witnessed by Long Term Observers who reported that the
process was generally disorganised and badly handled. There was insufficient
attention to detail, there was little scope for tracing the path of particular
commune bags or results from communes and the general experience was that the
organisation of the provincial consolidation was neither well planned nor well
executed.

82. At the same time international observers also reported that the
disorganisation at the Provincial level did not distort the transmission of
results from the Communes to the NEC and that there was no evidence of fraud,
only of poor management.

83. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that the provincial
consolidation of results was badly planned and poorly implemented. While the
disorganisation did not distort the outcome of the election, nor provide
evidence of fraudulent intent, the weaknesses did erode confidence in the
electoral process which is an important element in the building of public
trust.

84. The ANZ Delegation further concluded that in future operations
organised by the United Nations it would be preferable to continue the term of
deployment for Short Term Observers to include supervision of the
Consolidation of Results. This would allow those most familiar with the
outcomes in a particular Commune and District to track the process of those
results through the PEC to the NEC level.

4.2 Post Election Complaints and Appeals Process

85. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that the complaints and
appeals process was in general poorly managed by the NEC.

86. On 30 July the NEC issued a public statement committing itself to
respond to any complaints concerning the election results including random
checking, investigation or recounting of ballots. Advice from senior NEC staff
was that during the week 3-7 August, random checks of commune ballots would be
conducted in addition to recounts of those communes where party agents had
noted irregularities which could impact on the overall results. In the end the
NEC only completed recounts for eight communes and did not conduct the random
recounting initially promised.

87. The recounting process eventually commenced on 4 August after
considerable delays in the finalisation of procedures for recounting. The
commencement of this recounting process was not well organised. Party agents,
international and local observers, NEC staff and members of the press mingled
freely outside the ballot paper storage rooms while NEC staff struggled to
locate the commune bags in question. The storage of the bags was haphazard
while it was immediately apparent that some were missing seals and were
without all of the paperwork required by regulation. Despite these concerns
the recounts showed no significant variation from the results reported at
commune level and by the COMFREL parallel count.

88. Although many of the complaints lodged were minor, there was a general
atmosphere which the NEC allowed to emerge that such complaints were not given
the full airing that they deserved.

89. The most significant incident during the complaints and appeals process
occured when the Constitutional Council refused to accept a joint Sam Rainsy
and FUNCINPEC party complaint concerning the formula used to calculate the
allocation of seats. The opposition parties contest that the formula used to
translate the election results into seats in the legislature had not been
agreed upon according to NEC guidelines, and that opposition parties were
working on the basis of a different formula which would have provided the Sam
Rainsy Party and FUNCINPEC with a parliamentary majority. The final formula
allocates a majority of seats to the CPP. It was the conclusion of the ANZ
Delegation that the failure of the Constitutional Council to have addressed
complaints surrounding the formula for allocation of the seats was
regrettable.

90. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that while the complaints
and appeals process did not distort the outcome of the election, it was badly
organised and tarnished the reputation which the NEC had gained through its
work prior to and during polling and counting days. Most significantly, this
poor preparation for the post election period contributed to an erosion in
public confidence in the NEC which in turn weakens the important advances of
election and counting days.

91. One disturbing feature of the post-election period was the incidence of
intimidation and in at least one case of significant violence. Australian
LTO's interviewed a number of opposition party activists who had fled the
countryside because of alleged fears of reprisal and who presented credible
accounts of intimidation involving death threats or threats of rape as payback
for their involvement in the election. In addition to the above there was a
reprehensible grenade attack at the NEC during a visit by Sam Rainsy which
claimed one life. This attack is to be deplored in the strongest terms.

92. It is the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that these actions of
post-election violence and intimidation remain unresolved and should be
thoroughly and independently investigated and prosecuted as a matter of
priority.

5. TRAINING, DEPLOYMENT AND CONTRIBUTION OF AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND
OBSERVERS

5.1 Preparation of Australian and New Zealand Observers

Team Selection

93. The Australian team was selected as a result of a competitive process.
This was good for morale as observers felt they had earned the right to be
there, and it was good for the delegation's international image. The
Australian Delegation would recommend that for future missions consideration
be given to involvement by appropriately qualified members of the general
public from outside of the Public Service, as was the case with the New
Zealand Delegation.

Pre-Deployment Briefings and Training

94. Pre-deployment discussions with the Australian Electoral Commission
(AEC) ensured that ANZ Observers were able to commence observation of the
process shortly after arrival in Phnom Penh. Observers would like to pay
particular thanks to Michael Maley of the AEC who greatly assisted the
Delegation in its preparation. It is recommended that prior to participation
in future election observation missions all observers receive comprehensive
briefings from the AEC or its New Zealand counterpart.

95. The Short Term Observers received a two day training package from the
Department of Defence which provided practical advice and instruction on four
wheel driving, land mine awareness, basic medical assistance, map reading,
winches, satellite phones and Cambodia specific survival skills. A briefing by
Major David Barnes, formerly of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre, was valuable
in providing a first hand account of Cambodia as was an introduction on the
customs and social mores of Cambodia .

96. The two day training package had the additional benefit of bringing the
Australian and New Zealand delegations together prior to their deployment and
helped consolidate them as a team. There was a consensus within the group that
the training was appropriate and was excellent preparation for their
observation tasks in the field. The Department of Defence is to be commended
for its comprehensive assistance to the mission. It is recommended that the
Department of Defence be called upon to provide similar assistance to the
deployment of future observer missions.

Training and Briefings in Phnom Penh

97. On their arrival in Phnom Penh the ANZ Delegation were provided
briefings by the Australian Embassy staff and Long Term Observers on recent
Cambodian political history, security issues, the election process to date,
and logistics and communications issues.

98. The UN EAS provided further training on the duties and responsibilities
of election observers including briefings on the rules and procedures for the
conduct of the election. Each observer was issued with a comprehensive package
which provided: background information on the 39 political parties, complete
copies of the election law, rules and procedures, information on their
respective areas of deployment including route maps of their polling sites and
a medical kit.

99. While all three levels of briefings were well received by the observers
there is no substitute for field experience. The ANZ delegation was among few
which was able to deploy at least a week ahead of the election. No amount of
training can compensate for time on the ground meeting the political parties,
the election staff, national observer groups and the local people. To make
election observation meaningful at least seven days on the ground prior to the
elections is needed. It is recommended that future short term observers should
deploy in sufficient time to enable at least a week in the areas in which they
will observe the conduct of the election.

Departmental Support

100. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade established a
Cambodia Task Force run successively by Dr Martin Sharp and Alick Longhurst
with assistance from Ruth Stone. The Task Force was critical in helping to
organise the training and logistics of the mission and its help was both
extremely valuable and highly appreciated by the Delegation. In addition, the
South and South East Asia Division provided considerable support and
particular thanks must go to the Division Head Nick Warner and his officers
Glenda Gauci, Annabel Anderson and Alexandra Borthwick.

101. DFAT in Australia also provided two indispensable members of the
mission, Kirk Conningham who was responsible for media and public affairs and
Amanda Beech who was responsible for logistics and administration. Both
performed magnificently and played a key role in ensuring the success and
safety of the mission.

5.2 Impact Of The Australian and New Zealand Observer Mission

Role of Observers.

102. The impact of ANZ Observers on the election process was significant in
three respects.

103. First, observers had an important confidence building role. Prior to
election day they visited a wide range of political parties, non-government
organisations, electoral officials and community groups. In almost all case
they were met with overwhelming enthusiasm and it was the widespread
experience of observers that there was consistent and deeply felt appreciation
for their presence. National observers frequently commented that they felt
emboldened by the presence of international observers, both through their
direct presence and through the more general knowledge that international
observers could be easily contacted where necessary. In this way their input
extended beyond merely those places in which they were present at any one
time.

104. On election day ANZ Observers visited over two hundred polling
stations as part of an international mission which observed more than 17% of
polling stations nation-wide. While international observers were not present
at all of those polling stations visited throughout polling day,
representatives from COMFREL, COFFEL and NICFEC as well as opposition party
representatives were present at polling stations and thoroughly briefed
international observers on the conduct of the poll and any irregularities.
Most significantly, voters were able to witness the presence of international
observers. Voters, local officials and non-government organisations frequently
expressed their gratitude for the presence of ANZ Observers. A similar pattern
was repeated on counting day during which time international observers were
present in over 13% of all counting centres.

105. The role played by Australia and New Zealand during the 1993 UNTAC
organised elections meant that there was a pre-existing high regard for the
work of ANZ Observers. The ANZ Delegation noted the particular respect with
which General Sanderson was held for his work as Head of UNTAC Forces and
believed that the level of trust established in 1993 assisted Australian and
New Zealand Observers develop close community links throughout their work in
1998.

106. Second, ANZ Observers had an important educative role in their areas
of deployment. Party agents, national observers and some local politicians
received advice on procedural aspects of the elections including last minute
changes in election regulations which were disseminated over the UN EAS
communications system.

107. Thirdly, by their presence, the ANZ Delegation helped consolidate
Australia and New Zealand's bilateral commitment to democratisation in
Cambodia and more generally to democratisation within South East Asia.

108. Cambodians from throughout the country and from across the political
spectrum repeatedly informed ANZ Observers that the presence of international
observers was critical to improving the climate of the elections. Real
breakthroughs were secured, such as the guaranteed involvement of genuinely
independent National Observers.

109. In that context, it was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that the
international community should actively continue to promote democracy in
Cambodia. The Delegation was of the view that further work needs to be done by
the international community, in particular Australia and New Zealand, to help
consolidate democratic transition in Cambodia. It should be noted that this
view was promoted by opposition parties, pro-democracy groups and was widely
encountered at village level.

Role in assisting the UN EAS

110. The UN Electoral Assistance Secretariat (UN EAS) was established in
early May with an initially undersubscribed budget and a small staff. In this
context the UN EAS faced many challenges in organizing the logistic, medical
evacuation, security and communications support for the international
observers. The parallel and more fully resourced EU headquarters was in open
competition for vehicles, drivers, interpreters, radios and field
accomodation. As such international observers were called upon to assist the
UN EAS in some of their preparations.

111. The Deputy Chief of the Australian Mission Major Peter Bartu assisted
the UN EAS in their overall coordination role by developing a medical
evacuation system for the entire international observer effort, assisting with
deployment plans, procurement of vehicles and in development of the
communications plan . His efforts were widely praised by both the United
Nations and other international missions. Recognition should also go to the
Head of the UN EAS, Jacques Carrio, and his team for producing the results
they did in an environment of significant resource shortage.

112. The ANZ Delegation recommends that in planning future observation
missions consideration be given to seconding trained Australian and New
Zealand Officers to assist with the UN's co-ordinating role.

Role in JIOG

113. The ANZ Delegation was an active participant in the work of the Joint
International Observer Group from the outset. The JIOG was drawn from over
thirty countries and included a Reference Group comprising Australia, Canada,
China, the European Union, Japan, the Philippines (representing ASEAN) and the
United States. Australia also acted as Drafting Secretary to the Chair of the
JIOG, European Chief Observer Ambassador Sven Linder.

114. The ANZ Delegation had three principal roles in the JIOG.

115. First, it acted as a strong advocate for recognition of the human
rights violations which occurred in the lead up to the election. To this end
the Delegation was active in ensuring that these factors were reflected in the
public statements of the JIOG.

116. Second, the ANZ Delegation played a significant role in ensuring that
the JIOG presented an unqualified position to the NEC that it needed to take
urgent action to overcome the threat to independent Cambodian national
observer groups created by the formation of apparently partisan election
observation groups. This was a major threat to the election observation
process and the ANZ contribution to the JIOG included putting forward a plan
of action which was ultimately met in full by the NEC. Credit must in
particular be given to the Chair of the JIOG, Ambassador Linder for the
successful outcome which ensured that polling day and counting day were
conducted in full scrutiny.

117. Third, the ANZ Delegation played an important role in the general
drafting process through Australia's role as Drafting Secretary. This role
gave the Delegation as strong an avenue as possible to ensure that all ANZ
concerns about the election process were considered as part of the JIOG's
deliberations.

118. It should be noted that some observers felt that the JIOG could have
delayed its post-election statement until more information was available from
the counting process. It was suggested that although there was a great deal of
early quantitative material available, there could have been greater
qualitative analysis before a conclusion was reached on the polling and
counting processes.

Role of Parliamentary Observers

119. The Australian Delegation included four parliamentary observers: Steve
Dargavel MP, the Honourable Bob Halverson MP OBE, Bill Taylor MP and the
Honourable Ralph Willis MP, with two representatives being drawn from the
Government and two from the Opposition.

120. Given their particular standing, the parliamentary observers
accompanied by the Chief of the New Zealand Delegation Tony Timms, a senior
political figure in his own right, were able to conduct a program of high
level meetings. These meetings, which included opposition leaders Prince
Norodom Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy, as well as senior figures in the NEC, the
international community and the diplomatic community assisted the ANZ mission
to not only gain high level insights, but also to have direct input into the
election process. The work of the parliamentary observers in helping to gain
greater access for Cambodian non-government organisations to polling stations
was an important contribution to the success of the election.

121. It is the recommendation of the ANZ Delegation that consideration be
given in future election observation missions to inclusion of a small
bipartisan contingent of parliamentary observers.

6. ELECTION RESULTS

122. The Cambodian elections were held on a provincial basis, in accordance
with a system of proportional representation and party lists. All Cambodians
aged eighteen were entitled to take part and to vote. Political parties could
be formed by any group of five thousand registered voters, but party platforms
had to be consistent with the prinicples and objectives of the 1991 Paris
Agreements. Voting was by secret ballot with provision made for the disabled
or elderly.

6.1 Final Results

123. The NEC announced the final results of the election on 1 September
1998. The results were:

CPP - 41.4 % or 64 seats

FUNCINPEC - 31.7% or 43 seats

Sam Rainsy Party - 14.3 % or 15 seats

124. The remaining 35 parties received slightly over 12 per cent of the
votes but no seats under the formula revised on 29 May. The Democratic Party
and the Cambodian National Sustaining Party finished fourth and fifth in the
popular vote. Approximately 5.05 million Cambodians voted out of the nearly
5.4 million registered. The total number of valid votes after discounting
informal ballots was 4.902 million votes.

6.2 Comparison with the 1993 Election Results

125. On a national basis the preliminary 1998 results make an interesting
comparison with the 1993 election results. In 1993 the Sam Rainsy Party was
part of FUNCINPEC when it polled almost 45% of the vote. The combined national
vote for the Sam Rainsy Party and FUNCINPEC for 1998 was 46 %. The CPP
increased their vote by approximately 3.5 %. If FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy
Parties had run together it has been calculated that on the basis of the 1998
results they would have received over 70 seats.

PARTY	1993 ( % OF THE NATIONAL VOTE)	1998 ( % OF THE NATIONAL VOTE)
CPP	38%	41.4%
FUNCINPEC	44.7%	31.7%
SAM RAINSY PARTY	(Party formed after 1993 elections)	14.3%
REMAINDER	17.3%	12.6%

7. CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Registration

126. The ANZ Delegation found that in general, after early administrative
inefficiencies the registration process proceeded adequately and in a
representative manner. There were however concerns that the complaints and
appeals process was not adequately publicised or carried out with sufficient
transparency.

127. It was the clear conclusion of Australian Long Term Observers that the
training of commune level officials should have occurred earlier and that the
quality of training could have been improved had the training process been
supplemented by teams of core NEC trainers.

128. The conclusion of the ANZ Delegation is that in future the process of
registration could be improved by a more comprehensive public information
campaign detailing times, procedures and locations for registration prior to
commencement of the formal registration period. Consideration should also be
given as to how voters who on election day will be in a different area from
the one in which they registered may be allowed to vote.

129. After considerable investigation by international observers, it was
the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that there was little substantive
information to support allegations of widespread enrolment of ineligible
Vietnamese citizens. The most disturbing feature of these allegations was that
many of those accused of improper registration were ultimately shown to have
been Khmer citizens of Vietnamese ethnicity who were disputed solely on the
basis of their ethnic background.

130. It was the finding of Australian Long Term Observers that in the the
main the complaints and appeals process for the registration period was not
well conducted.

131. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Observer mission that the creation of
a National Database which could be updated readily was an important
development and that the Australian Government should encourage and where
appropriate assist the Cambodian Government in establishing a mechanism for
preserving and updating the Database.

7.2 Campaign Period

132. The ANZ delegation concluded that there was widely corroborated
evidence of political intimidation of both party officials and in some cases
voters. There was strong evidence of threats against organisers from
opposition political parties. While this did not significantly deter
campaigning at the national level, there were consistent and credible reports
that some political party members felt threatened at commune level and limited
their campaigning as a consequence.

133. The ANZ Delegation fully supported the conclusions of the United
Nations Centre for Human Rights and the JIOG that politically motivated
killings occurred in a climate of impunity and that they have still not been
adequately dealt with by the relevant Cambodian authorities.

134. In the end, it was the strong conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that
due to a number of factors attempts to undermine popular belief in the secrecy
of the vote, although deplorable, were largely unsuccessful and did not have a
significant impact on voters' understanding of, or confidence in, the secrecy
of the ballot.

135. It was the finding of the ANZ Delegation that there was not equal
access to the electronic media for the purposes of the election.

136. ANZ Observers considered that the protection of the role of
independent national observer organisations was a key outcome in the course of
the election and one in which Australia played an important and significant
part. The NEC is to be commended on its timely and effective reponse to the
JIOG's approach on this issue.

137. It was the strong conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that all attempts
to introduce ethnic prejudice into this or any other election campaign should
be deplored.

138. The ANZ Delegation had serious concerns about violence, intimidation
and other abuses of process during the campaign period. The activities at the
core of these concerns cannot and should not be justified. The ANZ Delegation
is of the clear view that these activities were wrong and that strenuous
efforts should be made by the Cambodian authorities to ensure that they are
not repeated and where appropriate that they are thoroughly investigated and
those responsible prosecuted.

139. It is the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that a dedicated police
investigative unit should be established in Cambodia with specific
responsibility for investigating any allegations of criminal intimidation
relating to this or future election processes. The international community
should consider offering direct professional assistance and training to such a
unit were it to be established.

140. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that as a result of
attempts to intimidate opposition political activists there was some
limitation on the capacity of commune and village level party officials to
campaign. At the same time it was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that
despite these attempts at intimidation there was also a highly active and
contested campaign which involved much of the community and which reached the
vast bulk of the population. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that
the credit for this outcome must in large part go to the Cambodian people who
displayed a fierce desire to seize control of their own democratic process
through popular participation.

7.3 Polling Day and Counting Day

141. In general, throughout the country, election day was conducted in a
calm orderly environment. There was strong community spirit, efficient conduct
of polling staff, and high voter turnout, subsequently confirmed by the NEC to
have been 93.7% of registered voters. Both the ANZ Delegation in particular
and international and domestic observers more generally were struck by the
enthusiasm of Cambodian voters to participate in election day.

142. The ANZ Delegation expressed their deep condemnation of the lethal
attack by Khmer Rouge forces on the village of Anlong Veng on the morning of
26 July.

143. The ANZ Delegation concluded on the basis of its own observations,
with reference to the overall findings of international and domestic observers
stationed throughout the country, that on election day the actual secrecy of
the ballot was protected and that the general perception of ballot secrecy was
strong.

144. Despite generally positive assessments of polling day there were
reports by ANZ Observers of various technical difficulties on election day.

145. It is recommended that in future the design of the ballot boxes be
modified and that specific training be given to polling officials so as to
ensure understanding of the process for securing the ballot boxes.

146. The ANZ Delegation was able to draw upon not only their own
experiences covering over 200 polling stations, but also those of the general
corps of international observers who attended 17 % of polling stations and
domestic observers who covered almost 100 % of polling stations. On that basis
the ANZ Delegation concluded that there was no evidence of either significant
fraud or intimidation on polling day. In addition polling day was generally
well administered and was accompanied by high voter enthusiasm. There were
however a number of technical breaches which while unacceptable did not, in
the opinion of international observers, have a significant effect on the vote.

147. The ANZ Delegation concluded that there was no evidence of significant
problems with either the transport or the storage of the ballot boxes prior to
counting.

148. The conclusion of ANZ Observers and international observers was that
at the commune level the counting process itself generally proceeded in an
orderly fashion and with no evidence of significant distortions.

149. The ANZ Delegation would like to offer its highest praise to commune
electoral officials and to the Australian observer John Murray and his
Japanese counterpart Shinrou Arase for their courageous work in helping to
protect the integrity of the counting process in Prey Kabass District and for
their contribution in defusing a potentially violent situation.

150. It was the conclusion of ANZ Observers that the counting procedures
for reconciliation of the ballots, admission of national observers and party
agents and display of the ballots were generally carried out in accordance
with NEC procedures.

7.4 Post-Election Process

151. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that the provincial
consolidation of results was badly planned and poorly implemented. While the
disorganisation did not distort the outcome of the election, nor provide
evidence of fraudulent intent, the weaknesses did erode confidence in the
electoral process which is an important element in the building of public
trust.

152. The ANZ Delegation further concluded that in future operations
organised by the United Nations it would be preferable to continue the term of
deployment for Short Term Observers to include supervision of the
consolidation of results.

153. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that the failure of the
Constitutional Council to have addressed complaints surrounding the formula
for allocation of the seats was regrettable.

154. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that while the complaints
and appeals process did not distort the outcome of the election, it was badly
organised and tarnished the reputation which the NEC had gained through its
work prior to and during polling and counting days. Most significantly, this
poor preparation for the post election period contributed to an erosion in
public confidence in the NEC which in turn weakened the important advances of
election and counting days.

155. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that credible cases of
post-election violence and intimidation remain unresolved and should be
thoroughly and independently investigated and prosecuted as a matter of
priority.

7.5 Role of the International Community

156. It was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that the international
community should actively continue to promote democracy in Cambodia. The
Delegation was of the view that further work needs to be done by the
international community, in particular Australia and New Zealand, to help
consolidate democratic transition in Cambodia.

7.6 Overview

157. Noting:

• The tragedies and the brutality inflicted upon the Cambodian people over
  the last quarter century;
• The Role of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
  (UNTAC) in helping to co-ordinate moves towards democracy through the
  conduct of the 1993 elections;
• The setbacks to the democratic process and the will of the Cambodian
  people which occurred in July 1997 and its aftermath , including the
  egregious violations of human rights which accompanied those events; and
• The national and international initiatives for a restoration of
  Parliamentary Democracy during the first half of 1998.

158. It was the strong conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that despite
reports of voter intimidation these do not appear to have influenced
significantly the climate and conduct of the poll itself and did not have a
significant impact on voters' understanding of or confidence in the secrecy of
theballot. This conclusion is a testament to the strong determination and
desire of the Cambodian people to register a secret vote for the party of
their choice.

159. In such circumstances the conduct of polling and counting days was
generally well handled and the election of 26 July 1998 was carried out in an
efficient and orderly manner.

160. Ultimately, it was the conclusion of the ANZ Delegation that while
there was clear evidence of unacceptable intimidation, there was no evidence
of significant fraud and that the Cambodian people ran a vigorous election
campaign, were able to exercise their votes in secrecy and have them counted
without any significant distortion.

161. In those circumstances the delegation accepts that the result of the
election should stand.

162. This conclusion on the acceptability of the election process cannot
and should not be used by any party to justify the politically motivated
killings, violence and intimidation which occured during the campaign and in
the post-election period.

163. The ANZ Delegation thus remains deeply concerned at these as yet
unresolved incidents of violence and calls on these actions to be investigated
thoroughly and prosecuted as a matter of the highest priority.

164. Subject to:

• acceptance of the poll by all parties;
• formation of a government which does not seek retribution for those
  that voted against it; and
• satisfactory and timely resolution of the unacceptable human rights
  violations that occurred during the campaign

the ANZ Delegation saw the election of 26 July as a step forward for
Cambodian democracy.

8. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE MISSIONS

165. It is recommended that prior to participation in future election
observation missions all observers receive comprehensive briefings from the
Australian Electoral Commission or its New Zealand counterpart.

166. It is recommended that the Department of Defence be called upon to
provide similar assistance to the deployment of future observation missions,
including training at DFSU Headquarters.

167. It is recommended that future election observation missions should be
deployed to polling sites no less than seven days prior to polling day.

168. It is recommended that the formation of a joint Australia and New
Zealand Delegation should be considered for future observation missions.

169. It is recommended that future missions should consider formation of
joint observer units with teams from other countries.

170. It is recommended that where joint international teams are to be
formed arrangements should be made to ensure deployment of national teams on
similar time frames and to ensure that national teams have a commensurate
knowledge base.

171. It is recommended that consideration be given in future election
observation missions to inclusion of a small bipartisan contingent of
parliamentary observers.

172. It is recommended that in future observation missions consideration be
given to seconding trained Australian and New Zealand Officers to assist with
the UN's co-ordinating role.

9. APPENDICES

• Appendix A: ANZ Delegation
• Appendix B: Election Timeline
• Appendix C: Australia/New Zealand/Japan Deployment Plan

APPENDIX A

MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION

LONG TERM OBSERVERS

Greg Hunt, Chief Observer

Major Peter Bartu, Deputy Chief Observer

PARLIAMENTARY OBSERVERS

Steve Dargavel MP

Hon Bob Halverson OBE MP

Bill Taylor MP

Hon Ralph Willis MP

SHORT TERM OBSERVERS

Ross Allen

Matt Anderson

Peta Arbuckle

Michelle Chan

Deborah Cook

Federal Agent Chris Eaton

Jane Errey

Federal Agent Bill Kirk

Doug Knight

Ian McConville

John Murray

Anthony Pearce

Borong Ros

Federal Agent Ian Standish

Felicity Volk

Federal Agent Peter White

NEW ZEALAND DELEGATION

Tony Timms, Chief Observer

Rex Bloomfield

Brian Cudby

Farib Sos

AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND DELEGATION SUPPORT

Kirk Coningham, Media and Information Management

Amanda Beech, Administration and Logistics

APPENDIX B

ELECTION TIMELINE

1997

19 December - Law on the Election of the National Assembly adopted.

1998

26 January - National Assembly approves composition of 11 member NEC.

5 February - NEC members officially sworn in.

28 March - Party and candidate registration commences (40 days).

6 May - NEC reviews draft Regulations.

8 May - Electoral Law amended to change vote count from polling station
level to commune level.

13 May - United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for
Human Rights releases Memorandum detailing forty two additional killings and
six disappearances of people presumed killed since the initial forty one
killings documented by the UN CHR in August 1997.

18 May - Electoral Registration commences.

21 May - Official Opening of National Election Computer Centre.

24 May - Chief, Australian Electoral Observer Mission arrives in Phnom
Penh.

29 May - NEC signs off on Election Regulations and Procedures. Parties
given ten days to review documents and report by 10 June.

2 June - Constitutional Council sworn in.

8 June - Co-Prime Ministers sign a sub-decree to set up a committee to
investigate human rights abuses.

12 June - Official list of political parties and candidates is
published.

15 June - Voter registration ends except in Anlong Veng where it was
extended.

25 June - Election campaign commences.

14 July - ANZ delegation arrives in Phnom Penh.

24 July - End of Campaign.

25 July - Posting of Computer Electoral Rolls at Polling sites.

26 July - Election Day

27 July - Counting Day

28 July - Commencement of Provincial Reconciliation

30 July - NEC forms Election Results Control Commission to investigate
complaints and to conduct random checks and recounts.

1-3 Aug - ANZ delegation departs Cambodia.

17 August - Constitutional Council commences hearing into complaints.

19 August - Last Australian Long Term Observer departs Cambodia

1 September - Announcement of official results and allocation of
National Assembly seats.

APPENDIX C

AUSTRALIAN/NEW ZEALAND/JAPANESE DEPLOYMENT PLAN

TEAM CALLSIGN	LOCATION	TEAM MEMBERS	VEHICLE PROVIDER
	PHNOM PENH
108	DANG KAO	Willis (MP) Taylor (MP)	AusAID
101	CHAMKAR MON	Hunt (LTO) McConville (DFAT)	UN EAS
	KANDAL
112	TAKHMAU	Halverson (MP) Timms (NZ)	AusAID
118	MUK KAMPOUL	Dargavel (MP) Volk (DFAT)	UN EAS
122	SEANG A	White (AFP) Rei Idemitsu	UN EAS
123	SEANG B	Allan (DEF) Chan (DFAT)	UN EAS
121	SEANG C	Errey (DEF) Jun Izumi	UN EAS
	KAMPONG SPEU
409	SAMRONG TONG	Arbuckle (DEF) Farib Sos (NZ)	UN EAS
	TAKEO
415	BATI	Pearce (DFAT) Kiroku Hanai	JAPAN
417	PREY KABASS	Murray (AusAID) Shinrou Arase	JAPAN
416	KIRIVONG	Borong Ros (DFAT) Naoto Sakaguchi	JAPAN
	PREY VENG
201	KAMPONG LEAV	Anderson (DFAT) Mari Katanyanagi	JAPAN
205	KAMPONG TRABEK	Eaton (AFP) Cudby (NZ)	UN EAS
212	PREY VENG (PT)	Bartu (LTO) Yuuiti Takada	UN EAS
208	PEAM RO	Cook (AusAID) Masaru Maruyama	JAPAN
	SVAY RIENG
301	SVAY CHRUM	Standish (AFP) Knight (DEF)	UN EAS
307	SVAY TEAP	Kirk (AFP) Bloomfield (NZ)	UN EAS
	TOTAL	17 Teams (5 AUS/AUS) (4 AUS/NZ) (8 AUS/Japan)	17 Vehicles (5 Japan) (2 AusAID) (10 UN EAS)