BY MR JOHN CAMPBELL
AUSTRALIA'S AMBASSADOR FOR DISARMAMENT
MR PRESIDENT,
AUSTRALIA ATTACHES GREAT VALUE TO THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION. WE REGARD IT AS ONE OF THE KEY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
WHICH UNDERPIN GLOBAL SECURITY. THE BWC STANDS ALONGSIDE THE NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IN
PROVIDING THE BASIS FOR THE GLOBAL LEGAL AND POLITICAL NORM AGAINST
THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THE HIGHLY DESTABILISING
POTENTIAL OF THESE INHUMANE WEAPONS IS UNIVERSALLY RECOGNISED. THESE
FACTS UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANT WORK OF THIS CONFERENCE IN REVIEWING
THE HEALTH OF THIS VITAL DISARMAMENT TREATY. WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED
BY THE VIGOUR AND COMMITMENT EVIDENT IN THE STATEMENTS OF OTHERS. IT
IS ALSO ENCOURAGING TO HAVE THE WEIGHT OF IMPORTANT NGO'S BEHIND US
AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO 1997 BEING A YEAR IN WHICH WE CAN MAKE REAL
HEADWAY.
ANY REVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE BWC REGIME SHOULD START
WITH ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE DISTANCE WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN TRAVERSED
IN EFFORTS TO BAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, BEFORE TURNING ATTENTION TO THE
CHALLENGES CURRENTLY FACING THE REGIME.
WHEN IT ENTERED INTO FORCE IN 1975, THE BWC WAS THE ONLY TREATY TO
BAN AN ENTIRE CLASS OF WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THE BWC WAS A
MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT - IT WAS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD FROM THE NARROW
AND INEFFECTIVE APPROACH TAKEN IN THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL. THE
EXTENSION OF THE PROHIBITIONS ON BW TO INCLUDE DEVELOPMENT,
PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING - AS WELL AS OTHER MEANS OF ACQUIRING OR
RETAINING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS - PROVIDED A MUCH BETTER BASIS ON WHICH
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD WORK FOR A TOTAL BAN THAN THE
LIMITED BAN IN 1925 RESTRICTED TO PROHIBITING THE USE OF SUCH
WEAPONS.
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE BWC WAS CONCLUDED IN 1972 HAVE, HOWEVER,
INCREASINGLY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF THE CONVENTION IN
PROVIDING A BARRIER TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS. LOOKING ONLY AT THE PERIOD SINCE THE LAST REVIEW CONFERENCE
IN 1991 THREE DEVELOPMENTS STAND OUT IN THIS CONTEXT:
FIRST, ADVANCES IN BIOSCIENCES AND BIOTECHNOLOGY CONTINUE TO MAKE
THE PURSUIT OF A BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM EVER MORE FEASIBLE FOR A
GROWING NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, IF THEY WERE TO DECIDE ON SUCH A COURSE.
THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IS NO LONGER THE
SOLE DOMAIN OF THOSE POSSESSING CUTTING EDGE TECHNOLOGY. AN
INCREASING NUMBER OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE NATURE OF A BW
PROGRAM WHICH WERE HELD AT THE TIME THE BWC WAS NEGOTIATED ARE NO
LONGER VALID.
SECOND, SINCE 1991 THERE HAS BEEN OPEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT AT
LEAST TWO COUNTRIES MAINTAINED ACTIVE BW PROGRAMS DESPITE THE BWC.
PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S STATEMENT IN 1992 THAT THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
HAD MAINTAINED AN OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, AND MORE
RECENTLY
THE CONFIRMATION IN 1995 BY IRAQ, FOLLOWING SUSTAINED
INVESTIGATIONS, THAT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE BW PROGRAM HAD BEEN MAINTAINED
BY THEM. JUST LAST YEAR THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION EXPOSED
THE FULL EXTENT OF THE IRAQI OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.
THREE, IN ADDITION TO THESE TWO ADMISSIONS, THERE HAVE BEEN
PERSISTENT REPORTS WHICH HAVE SUGGESTED THAT POSSIBLY AS MANY AS
ANOTHER DOZEN OR MORE COUNTRIES MIGHT HAVE SOME LEVEL OF INTEREST IN
ACQUIRING A BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. A NUMBER OF NON-STATES
PARTIES TO THE BWC ARE OFTEN MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT.
THESE DEVELOPMENTS REPRESENT GREAT CHALLENGES TO THE BWC. THEY
SUGGEST THAT THE VALUE OF THE TREATY IN PROVIDING A BARRIER TO SUCH
WEAPONS IS BEING UNDERMINED. THEY ALSO HIGHLIGHT THE NECESSITY OF
ESTABLISHING VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS AND OF FURTHER ACTION TO
PROMOTE UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DISARMAMENT REGIME.
THE NEED FOR VERIFICATION
AUSTRALIA'S BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT IN RESPONDING TO THE CONTINUED
CHALLENGES TO THE HEALTH OF THE BWC THE MOST IMPORTANT NEED IS THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS. WE
IDENTIFIED THE DEVELOPMENT OF VERIFICATION MACHINERY AS A KEY
OBJECTIVE FOR ADVANCING THE BWC IN OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE THIRD
REVIEW CONFERENCE. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AS JUST NOTED HAVE ONLY
REINFORCED OUR BELIEF THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL. OUR FAITH
IN THE CONTINUED VALUE OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, IS
LINKED CLOSELY TO OUR VIEW THAT EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO STRENGTHEN
THE BWC - ESPECIALLY IN THE VERIFICATION AREA - CAN BE DEVELOPED.
WE WERE ACCORDINGLY ENCOURAGED BY THE DECISION OF THE THIRD REVIEW
CONFERENCE TO INITIATE A PROCESS WHICH WOULD ENABLE STATES PARTIES TO
WORK TOWARDS THIS OBJECTIVE. THE SEQUENCE OF THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME
FROM THE VEREX PROCESS ESTABLISHING THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF
VERIFICATION, THE SUBSEQUENT 1994 SPECIAL CONFERENCE AND THE
INITIATION LAST YEAR OF THE AD HOC GROUP NEGOTIATIONS ARE FAMILIAR TO
ALL, AND DO NOT NEED DESCRIBING IN FURTHER DETAIL, BUT THEIR
IMPORTANCE CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED. THEY WERE MAJOR STEPS TOWARDS THE
VERIFICATION PROTOCOL WHICH WE ARE CONFIDENT WILL RESULT FROM THE AD
HOC GROUP'S EFFORTS IN - WE HOPE - THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE HEARTENED
BY THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PLANNED
PROTOCOL OF A LARGE NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY
THE SIGNIFICANT AND VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE TO THE PROCESS BY
MANY INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS FROM ALL REGIONAL GROUPS.
WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE
AGREED AND THAT THESE CAN BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER WHICH DOES NOT
THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY OR COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE MATERIAL.
WE BELIEVE THAT TO BE EFFECTIVE A VERIFICATION REGIME MUST INCLUDE
PROVISION FOR:
- MANDATORY DECLARATION OF RELEVANT FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES,
- ON-SITE ACTIVITIES TO REINFORCE THE DECLARATIONS REGIME,
INCLUDING ROUTINE INSPECTIONS,
- RAPID AND EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF A COMPLIANCE CONCERN BOTH
AT SPECIFIC FACILITIES AND ACROSS A LARGER GEOGRAPHIC AREA, SUCH
AS WOULD BE NEEDED TO INVESTIGATE AN ALLEGATION OF USE OF
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
CLEARLY, VERIFICATION MACHINERY OF THIS TYPE WILL REQUIRE
ORGANISATIONAL SUPPORT. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT AN EFFICIENT,
APPROPRIATELY SIZED STRUCTURE WOULD ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE SORT OF
VERIFICATION MACHINERY BEING PROPOSED.
THE DUAL-USE NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH MEANS THAT MEASURES
DEMONSTRATING OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN RELATION TO BIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS MUST BE THE
BASIS FOR A VERIFICATION REGIME. AND WHILE AUSTRALIA, IN COMMON WITH
OTHER PARTIES, IS CONCERNED NOT TO HAMPER LEGITIMATE BIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE, WE ACCEPT A DEGREE OF
INTRUSION AS ONE OF THE NECESSARY COSTS OF SECURITY.
AS OUR WORK IN THE AD HOC GROUP OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS HAS SHOWN,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME FOR THE BWC IS
NOT AN EASY TASK. FOR THE MOST PART, IT IS UNCHARTED TERRITORY IN
WHICH WE ARE ALL FEELING OUR WAY.
EVEN RECOGNISING THE DIFFICULTIES, AUSTRALIA HAS TO REGISTER ITS
DISAPPOINTMENT THAT AFTER TWO YEARS WORK, THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY
THE GROUP COULD ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS MODEST.
THE MAJOR FACTOR RESTRICTING THE PROGRESS OF THE GROUP HAS BEEN
THE VERY LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS REGARD WE
WELCOME THE PROMISE OF AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
INHERENT IN THE AGREEMENT IN SEPTEMBER TO SET ASIDE NINE WEEKS FOR AD
HOC GROUP MEETINGS IN THE COMING 12 MONTHS. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE
ADDITIONAL TIME SET ASIDE AFTER THAT TO ENABLE THE AD HOC GROUP TO
INTENSIFY ITS WORK - THIS IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEVING A VERIFICATION
PROTOCOL WITHIN THE TIME-FRAME REQUIRED BY THE CHALLENGES FACING THE
TREATY.
WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT MOMENTUM TOWARDS A CONCLUSION WOULD BE
GREATLY ASSISTED IF A TARGET DATE FOR THE FINALISATION OF
NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO BE SET. WE WOULD NOT PROPOSE AN UNREALISTICALLY
EARLY DATE - AND FULLY APPRECIATE THE COMPLEXITIES INVOLVED IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, WE DO BELIEVE THAT SETTING A NOTIONAL TARGET
DATE WILL ASSIST GREATLY TO FOCUS OUR ATTENTION AND LEAD US TO A
TIMELY AND SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION.
WITH AN INTENSIFIED WORK PROGRAM IN 1997, WE BELIEVE THE TIME IS
ALSO RIGHT TO MOVE TO A NEW STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. TO DATE THE PAPERS
PRODUCED BY THE FRIENDS OF THE CHAIR HAVE SERVED US WELL IN
CONSOLIDATING AND DEVELOPING THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY DELEGATIONS.
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE USEFULNESS OF THIS FORM OF NEGOTIATIONS HAS
RUN ITS COURSE AND THAT WE SHOULD BE LOOKING TO MOVE TO SOME FORM OF
TEXT BASED NEGOTIATIONS AT THE MARCH SESSION.
CAREFUL ATTENTION WILL NEED TO BE PAID TO ALL ELEMENTS OF THE
MANDATE OF THE AD HOC GROUP.
PROMOTING UNIVERSALITY
AUSTRALIA ALSO RECOGNISES THE NEED FOR THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE BWC
REGIME TO EXPAND TO ENCOMPASS ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY. IT IS A MATTER OF PARTICULAR CONCERN THAT IN REGIONS OF
TENSION, LIKE THE MIDDLE EAST, PARTICIPATION IN THE BWC REGIME IS NOT
UNIVERSAL.
WE ACCORDINGLY URGE ALL COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NOT YET DONE SO TO
JOIN THE BWC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE BELIEVE THE ADDITION OF
VERIFICATION MACHINERY CAN ONLY ENHANCE CONFIDENCE IN THE BWC,
ENCOURAGING THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SO FAR HELD BACK TO ACCEDE OR
RATIFY THE CONVENTION.
CBMS
AT THE LAST REVIEW CONFERENCE AUSTRALIA STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE
DEVELOPMENT OF STRENGTHENED CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. SINCE THAT
TIME THESE MEASURES HAVE PROVEN A USEFUL INTERIM TOOL TO INCREASE
TRANSPARENCY AND BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THE REGIME. HOWEVER, AS WE ARE
ALL AWARE, PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES HAS BEEN
FAR FROM UNIVERSAL, AND THE INFORMATION PROVIDED HAS NOT, IN ALL
CASES, DELIVERED THE HOPED FOR TRANSPARENCY. THE VARIOUS MEASURES
BEING CONSIDERED UNDER THE COMPLIANCE MEASURES ASPECT OF THE AD HOC
GROUP WORK OVERLAP WITH THE EXISTING CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.
FOR THIS REASON WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO CONSIDER ANY
AMENDMENT TO THE EXISTING CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AT THIS STAGE,
BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP CONSIDERATIONS.
ARTICLE X
AN ISSUE OF CLEAR RELEVANCE TO THE WORK OF THIS CONFERENCE, AND
ALSO TO THE AD HOC GROUP, IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE X OF THL
BWC. AUSTRALIA BELIEVES THIS ARTICLE OF THE BWC TO BE A KEY ELEMENT
OF THE TREATY AND IS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT
THEREIN. THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, OF ALL COUNTRIES WITHOUT
DISCRIMINATION IN THE FIELD OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ARE MATTERS OF VITAL
IMPORTANCE AFFECTING ALL STATES PARTIES. IT IS A KEY STRAND OF
CONSIDERATION IN THE AD HOC GROUP.
AUSTRALIA WELCOMES THE COOPERATIVE APPROACH BEING TAKEN BY STATES
PARTIES, AND THE INCREASING RECOGNITION OF THE WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITY
IN THE AREA OF BIOTECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE AND ASSISTANCE RELEVANT TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE X. MY DELEGATION WILL CIRCULATE DURING THIS
CONFERENCE A PAPER OUTLINING THE FULL RANGE OF COOPERATION IN WHICH
AUSTRALIA IS INVOLVED. WE ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO A POSITIVE AND
PRACTICALLY ORIENTED DISCUSSION ON WAYS OF ENHANCING COOPERATION IN
THE FIELD OF BIOTECHNOLOGY.
REGIONAL ASPECTS
BEFORE CONCLUDING, I WISH TO RECORD AUSTRALIA'S RECOGNITION OF THE
GROWING SUPPORT FOR THE BWC IN OUR REGION. AN INCREASING NUMBER OF
COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTH EAST ASIA/PACIFIC AREA HAVE RECOGNISED THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE BWC IN ENSURING THIS PART OF THE WORLD REMAINS FREE
FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF SUCH WEAPONS, AND THE DESIRABILITY OF AN
EFFECTIVE GLOBAL BAN ON BW.
FULL MEMBERSHIP OF THE BWC REGIME IS NOW ALMOST UNIVERSAL IN THE
SOUTH EAST ASIAN REGION. WE PARTICULARLY WELCOME THE RATIFICATION OF
THE BWC BY OUR CLOSE NEIGHBOUR, INDONESIA, SOON AFTER THE THIRD
REVIEW CONFERENCE - AND THE ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION IT
IS MAKING TO EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE BWC.
IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT LATE NEXT WEEK A SEMINAR ON
NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES WILL BE HELD IN INDONESIA UNDER THE
AUSPICES OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM WHICH WILL, AMONG OTHER THINGS,
CONSIDER THE VALUE OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AS AN ELEMENT
IN ASIA/PACIFIC SECURITY. AUSTRALIA IS PLEASED TO BE INVOLVED AS A
JOINT SPONSOR IN SUPPORTING THIS SEMINAR.
MR PRESIDENT
SO FAR OUR BRISK AND BUSINESSLIKE PACE HAS BEEN A PROMISING
APPROACH TO THE CHALLENGES AHEAD. ONE OF THE APPEALING FEATURES OF
THIS NEGOTIATION HAS BEEN ITS PRACTICAL AND FOCUSED STYLE AND IF WE
CAN MAINTAIN THAT WE WILL MANAGE WELL.
IN CONCLUDING, I WOULD LIKE TO REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENT OF MY
DELEGATION TO YOUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THIS CONFERENCE IS AS PRODUCTIVE
AS POSSIBLE.
THANK YOU.