Objectives

The PHYSICAL PROTECTION OBJECTIVES are to establish and to maintain
conditions to:

• protect against unauthorised
  removal of nuclear material in use and storage, and during transport;
  
• ensure the implementation of
  rapid and comprehensive measures by the State to locate and recover missing or
  stolen nuclear material;
  
• protect against sabotage of
  nuclear facilities and sabotage of nuclear material in use and storage and
  during transport; and
  
• mitigate or minimise the
  radiological consequences of sabotage.

Fundamental Principles Of Physical Protection Of
Nuclear Material And Nuclear Facilities

The following physical
protectionfundamental principles have to be considered
as the basis for achieving the Physical Protection Objectives:

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE A: Responsibility
of the State

The responsibility for the establishment,
implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State
rests entirely with that State.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE B: Responsibilities during International Transport

The responsibility of a State for ensuring that
nuclear material is adequately protected extends to international transport
thereof, until that responsibility is properly transferred to another State, as
appropriate.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE C: Legislative
and Regulatory Framework.

The State is responsible for establishing and
maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical
protection. This framework should provide for the establishment of applicable
physical protection requirements and include a system of evaluation and
licensing or other procedures to grant authorisation. This framework should
include a system of inspection of nuclear facilities and transport to verify
compliance with applicable requirements and conditions of the license or other
authorising document, and to establish a means to enforce applicable
requirements and conditions, including effective sanctions.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE D: Competent
Authority.

The State should establish or designate a
competent authority which is responsible for the implementation of the
legislative and regulatory framework, and is provided with adequate authority,
competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned
responsibilities. The State should take
steps to ensure an effective independence between the functions of the States
competent authority and those of any other body in charge of the promotion or
utilisation of nuclear energy.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE E: Responsibility of the License Holders

The responsibilities for implementing the various
elements of physical protection within a State should be clearly
identified. The State should ensure
that the prime responsibility for the implementation of physical protection of
nuclear material or of nuclear facilities rests with the holders of the
relevant licenses or of other authorising documents (eg., operators or
shippers).

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE F: Security Culture

All organisations involved in implementing
physical protection should give due priority to the security culture, to its
development and maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation in
the entire organisation.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE G: Threat

The State's physical protection should be based
on the State's current evaluation of the threat

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE H: Graded
Approach

Physical protection requirements should be based
on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of the threat,
the relative attractiveness, the nature of the material and potential consequences associated with the
unauthorised removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear
facilities or nuclear material.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE I: Defence
in Depth

The States requirements for physical protection should reflect a concept
of several layers and methods of protection (structural or other technical,
personnel and organisational) that have to be overcome or circumvented by an
adversary in order to achieve his objectives.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE J: Quality Assurance

A quality assurance policy and quality assurance
programs should be established and implemented with a view to providing
confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to physical
protection are satisfied.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE K: Contingency
Plans

Contingency (emergency) plans to respond to
unauthorised removal of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities or
nuclear material, or attempts thereof, should be prepared and appropriately
exercised by all license holders and authorities concerned.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE L: Confidentiality

The State should establish requirements for
protecting the confidentiality of information, the unauthorised disclosure of
which could compromise the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear
facilities.