I am afraid I must inflict upon you a somewhat lengthy letter with
regard to the question of war aims or what might perhaps more
appropriately be described as 'peace aims'.

This matter was raised by the French communication of the 23rd
October which was transmitted to you in Dominions Office cable
D.52. [1] You will recollect that in that communication the French
Government suggested that an early exchange of views with His
Majesty's Government would be desirable on the problem of Allied
war aims.

On the 26th October I sent you a long cablegram on the matter and
suggested that you might take steps to initiate Dominion
consultation by direct communications to the other Dominion Prime
Ministers. [2] This you did in your cablegram of the 29th October
addressed to the Prime Minister here, and which you repeated to
the other Dominion Prime Ministers. [3]

Following upon your cablegram the Prime Minister of New Zealand
sent a long telegram on the 5th November setting out the views of
his Government. [4] On the 14th November you sent a further
cablegram amplifying your previous one [5] and on the 26th
November the Prime Minister of Canada [6] sent a very full
telegram analysing the position in very considerable detail.

On the 31st October, the Prime Minister of South Africa cabled
stressing the importance of this matter both in peace and war,
urging that fullest consultation should take place, and indicating
that he proposed to send the views of his Government later. [7]

These views he has not yet sent but on the 11th November he sent
you a cablegram which showed that he was in complete sympathy with
your cable and finished with the words 'Every care should also be
taken to prevent us going to another Versailles peace.' [8]

The opinions of the Prime Ministers of the Dominions contained in
the communications referred to above showed a remarkable
unanimity. In your cablegram you expressed the view that-
'The immediate object is to win the war and to win it in no
uncertain way since a patched up and premature peace would
inevitably expose us to a future of serious events similar to
those of the past few years.' [9]

This statement of yours broadly coincides with the views expressed
by all your fellow Prime Ministers. You go on, however, to ask the
pertinent question What comes after victory? and make it clear
that you do not believe future peace can be secured by suppressing
and dismembering Germany or imposing upon her an insupportable
burden. Here again you broadly express the views of the other
Dominions as disclosed by their respective cables.

As a result of the various communications from the Dominion Prime
Ministers, it was decided that before serious discussions were
opened with the French there should be full Empire consultation.

It was accordingly determined that an interim reply should be sent
to the French and one, which I personally consider might well have
been substantially shortened, was eventually agreed after
consultation with the Dominions, and has, I understand, been
despatched in the last few days.

This reply, as I have indicated above, is of an interim character
and contemplates oral and private discussions taking place at a
suitable opportunity.

Before these discussions can be undertaken Empire consultations
will have to take place and in such consultations the question of
the method of handling the French in the oral and private
discussions will have to be determined. In considering this point
it is necessary to have very clearly in mind the different views
which are held upon this all important matter. In my long telegram
to you of the 26th October, I set them out in some detail and it
might perhaps be useful if I summarised very briefly what I then
said.

There are two opposing schools of thought upon the question of
what form of peace settlement we should endeavour to achieve.

These two schools of thought might be described as:-

(a) Those who visualise a world after the war very similar to that
which existed before it, but with Germany disarmed and Europe
freed from the fear of future further German aggression, and
(b) Those who visualise a new world in which Germany would play an
appropriate part as a great nation resulting from a peace
settlement which had faced the vital problem of disarmament,
territorial adjustments, Colonies and the economic needs of all
nations.

It is felt in many quarters here that these two points of view are
so diametrically opposed that it would be most dangerous to
encourage discussion of the question because such discussion would
tend to create division in the united front that exists at
present. The United Kingdom Government is consequently very
fearful of tackling the question and they are particularly fearful
of doing so with the French who are regarded as super-exponents of
the defeat, disarm, and divide idea.

I feel, however, that this attitude is an extremely dangerous one,
as by avoiding any discussions in order to ensure unity for the
purpose of winning the war we may very well leave ourselves in a
position where when the question of peace comes to be discussed
divisions will appear that will result in our losing the peace. I
feel, also, that the idea that this question is an extremely
dangerous one is open to considerable doubt. There is agreement
between all schools of thought upon the two fundamental questions
that the war must be won and that the peace must ensure that the
fear of future aggression is removed from the world.

I am by no means unconscious of the difficulties that will
confront us when we come to the consideration of the question of
how we are to achieve the second of these objectives. I feel,
however, very strongly that if this difficult problem is
approached in an atmosphere that suggests that there are
fundamental and almost unbridgeable differences to be overcome
there would be every danger of serious friction arising and
division resulting. If, on the other hand, discussions are
undertaken in an atmosphere that no differences of opinion of a
fundamental character exist, and that our task is to consider the
most practical and effective means whereby our common objective
can be achieved, I have considerable confidence that agreement
could be arrived at.

If this view is correct it is obviously desirable that the
discussions with the French should take place at the earliest
practicable date. Before such discussions can be opened it is
necessary, however, that there should be agreement between the
Governments of the different parts of the Empire. In order to
bring this about further consultation will be necessary and as at
the present moment there is no indication that the United Kingdom
Government is intending to take the initiative in bringing such
consultation about, I suggest that it is desirable that you should
raise the question.

In the Empire discussions the practical problems which have to be
faced will emerge but as they will be identical with the problems
which will have to be discussed with the French, it would probably
be more useful if I dealt with them in visualising the line I
suggest we should take with the French.

In these conversations we should commence by making quite clear
that we regard the essential war aims as being to win the war and
after it is won to ensure that German aggression will be rendered
impossible in the future. This opening should go a long way to
calm the fears the French unquestionably entertain and to create
the right atmosphere. In the discussions the French should be
encouraged to develop their thesis as to how the second of these
two major objectives can be achieved. As the French develop their
views it seems to me inevitable that the impracticability of
permanently maintaining peace and preventing aggression by the
armed strength of the United Kingdom and France will emerge. As
the impracticability of this method is demonstrated, I think it
will be possible progressively to wean the French from what is
clearly their present attitude. My reasons for holding this view
are based on the points set out below, all of which would emerge
in the discussion.

One point upon which there will be complete agreement is that
Germany having been defeated she must be disarmed and having been
disarmed effective means must be provided of ensuring that she
does not rearm in defiance of her Peace Treaty undertakings.

Experience has shown the difficulty, in face of resolute and
unscrupulous leadership, of ensuring the continuance of a great
nation in a state of disarmament in an armed world.

It would, however, unquestionably be argued that this danger could
be met by the United Kingdom and France maintaining the forces
necessary to prevent German rearmament.

It would also possibly be suggested that as an additional
safeguard Germany should be broken up into several independent
areas, thus removing the danger inherent in the vast population of
a united Germany.

It is necessary to consider these two points separately. The
obligation involved in ensuring that Germany remained disarmed
would probably on first examination not be regarded as serious as
it would be suggested that once Germany has been defeated the
Forces necessary to ensure Allied predominance would not be large
and that the United Kingdom and France could easily undertake the
responsibility. Such an argument takes little account of Russia or
of Italy and Japan, nor does it make allowances for the probable
frictions in south-eastern Europe.

RUSSIA. The emergence of Russia from an absorption on [sic]
internal affairs into a markedly militaristic and even
Imperialistic country may prove to be a factor of the utmost
moment.

In the event of a German defeat or even of a prolonged military
stalemate there is considerable probability of a rapid spread of
Bolshevism in Germany. In addition, countries such as Hungary and
Rumania, with their numerical preponderance of poverty stricken
peasants, must be regarded as ripe for communism.

After an Allied victory, followed by a dictated peace, the
frontiers of Bolshevism might be greatly extended and might
include a great part of Central and south-eastern Europe. If this
vast area were under the control of an aggressive Russia, the
military responsibilities of the Allies, after the war, if peace
was to be maintained and aggression prevented, would be enormous.

ITALY AND JAPAN. Both these countries have great armed strength
and both have known ambitions which constitute them as potential
aggressors. In considering the Forces that France and the United
Kingdom would have to maintain, the dangers to world peace which
might come from these countries would have to be borne in mind.

DANUBE AND THE BALKANS. There are many difficult problems to be
solved in this part of the world. With Germany defeated, disarmed,
and possibly dismembered, it can be argued that the Anglo-French
Military combination would be strong enough to dictate peaceful
settlements of these problems. While with Russia indifferent or
quiescent this might be practicable, with Russia strong and
actively concerning herself in the problems of the Danube and
Balkans, it would be impossible.

The foregoing considerations indicate that if responsibility for
the maintenance of peace and the removal of the fear of aggression
from the world is to be undertaken by the Allies after they have
defeated and disarmed Germany, they would have to maintain Forces
at least substantially larger than those which existed at the
outbreak of the war. It is therefore necessary to consider the
probable reactions of the Allied countries to the maintenance of
Forces of such a magnitude.

FRANCE. While there is a large volume of opinion in France to-day
in favour of the idea of a repressive policy against Germany, it
is doubtful whether after the war is over the country as a whole
will be prepared to shoulder the burden involved in giving effect
to such a policy. The present unity of France is due to the
pressing danger with which she is confronted. Once this danger is
removed the Left Wing parties will reassert their demands for
greater social justice, for enlarged social services, and for the
curtailment of the powers of finance, industry and the high
command, with the probable result of the recreation in France of a
position similar to that which existed during the regime of the
Front Populaire.

UNITED KINGDOM. In the United Kingdom it will be quite impossible
to maintain a repressive policy towards Germany for more than the
shortest period, if at all. There is certain to be a strong body
of opinion demanding magnanimous treatment for the defeated enemy.

There will be an invincible reluctance to tolerate large scale
military expenditure and national memories being notoriously
short, any Government which attempted to do so would inevitably be
defeated.

DOMINIONS. In the Dominions the idea of the acceptance of
permanent military responsibility for policing Europe would
encounter overwhelming opposition. It is no exaggeration to say
that if the United Kingdom after the war adopted a policy of
repression against Germany and the maintenance of great armed
Forces, the Dominions would refuse to accept such a policy and the
first step would be taken towards the disintegration of the
Empire.

The other argument which has to be considered is that Germany
should be divided into several independent areas.

This suggestion, apart from its political significance, raises
economic considerations of the most important character.

The economic position after the war, with which I deal later, is
of vital concern to victors, vanquished and neutrals.

The experience of the past 20 years has demonstrated how
interdependent the world economic system has become and that
poverty and instability in one country undermines the economic
position of others.

The destruction of the German economic unit would have
particularly disastrous repercussions. Germany both as a market
and as a source of supplies is the third most important country in
the world.

Moreover she constitutes the principal market for the Agricultural
exports of south-eastern Europe and of a considerable portion of
those from the Baltic and Scandinavia.

The dislocation that would be caused by throwing the products of
south-eastern Europe on to the world's markets has been very
clearly shown during the present war, when the necessity of
replacing the German market has proved an almost insoluble problem
and has involved the Allies, and particularly the United Kingdom,
in the assumption of an intolerable financial burden.

In considering the possibility of dividing Germany into several
independent States it has to be borne in mind that the serious
economic depression which would result would inevitably drive the
Germans towards communism.

Apart from the menace of a communistic Germany to the rest of
Europe, the reinforcement of communism by German efficiency and
skill would have the effect of greatly strengthening its menace.

It therefore seems clear that if Germany were divided it would be
necessary to allow the new States so created to enter into an
economic and commercial union. With this close economic and
commercial link the possibility of co-operative action for
rearmament and revenge would still exist.

The result of the above examination shows the impracticability of
peace being maintained and aggression prevented by the armed
strength of the United Kingdom and France, even with Germany
disarmed, and possibly dismembered.

Summarised the reasons why a policy of repression is impracticable
are:-

1. It involves heavy and continuing military commitments for the
United Kingdom and France which neither nation will permanently
accept.

2. It makes no provision for dealing with the Russian, Italian or
Japanese problems. Neither does it provide any solution for the
Danube countries and the Balkans.

3. It would inevitably lead to a resurgence of extreme German
nationalism with the almost inevitable consequence of another war
within the next 25 years.

4. It provides no solution for the economic difficulties which
confronted the world prior to the present war and which will be
intensified after its termination. In fact it would create an
economic position which would foster such a spread of communism as
would render all the efforts of the Allies in the war nugatory.

5. It would inevitably lead to friction with the Dominions, if not
the disruption of the Empire, and to estrangement from the United
States of America.

6. In addition to the considerations in (5) it would from a
Dominion standpoint lead to a further diminution of world's
markets with a consequent limitation of their economic
development.

When this picture emerges in the course of the discussion I think
it is certain that there would be agreement that a policy of
repression is impracticable and consideration would be given to an
alternative method of achieving the great objectives of
maintaining peace and freeing the world from the fear of
aggression after the war.

In the discussion as to an alternative method, the first point
that would emerge would be that some form of limitation or
reduction of armaments is essential. This point would be
reinforced by the fact that there would be general agreement that
the progressive race in armaments has unquestionably led to the
present war and that it has become increasingly clear that the
burden of armaments is destroying nations financially and
economically.

The consideration of the question of armaments would be on the
assumption that Germany having been conquered was disarmed. It
would then be necessary to consider how far a limitation or
reduction of armaments can be brought about between the other
nations. On first examination it would appear that Germany being
disarmed, Britain and France could reduce the burden of their
armaments. This, however, would immediately raise the question of
how far Russia, Japan, Italy and the Danube and Balkan countries
would be prepared to co-operate. An examination of the
probabilities in respect of these countries is not very promising.

The consideration of the position of Russia suggests that it is
extremely unlikely that the Soviet would be prepared to agree. The
case of Japan is more doubtful as considerable pressure could be
put upon her, possibly in association with the United States of
America, once Britain and France were freed from the obligations
which at present fetter their actions in the Far East. Japan's
agreement, however, could only be obtained if she were relieved
from the menace of Russia and the position in the Far East had
been sorted out in such a way as to afford to Japan a reasonable
opportunity to live and provide for her growing population.

With the overwhelming strength that France and the United Kingdom
would possess at the end of a victorious war, Italy could probably
be forced to agree but the measure of pressure that could with
decency be imposed on Italy would be dependent upon what it had
been possible to do with Russia. The Danube and Balkan countries
would present a considerable problem which it would obviously be
impossible to solve with a strong and aggressive Russia
intervening in these areas. In any event a disarmament agreement
in these countries could only follow upon the sorting out of many
difficult territorial and racial questions.

Assuming, however, that the many difficult political problems I
have indicated above could be resolved and agreement obtained
among the nations to another disarmament conference, it is
necessary to consider the problems that would have to be faced
when such a conference was held.

The experience of the Disarmament Conference forces the
realisation of how great are the difficulties in attempting to
find bases upon which a reduction or limitation of national
Armies, Navies and Air Forces can be brought about.

Even if a temporary basis for adjustment could be found how far
could we rely upon nations observing their undertakings and in the
event of their not doing so how would it be contemplated they
should be forced to honour their obligations. The idea of
sanctions, either economic or military, must be discarded in the
light of the experience with regard to the provisions of the
Covenant of the League of Nations.

In considering this question internal politics cannot be ignored.

Is it not inevitable that in individual countries political
parties would spring up maintaining that the rights of the country
had been sacrificed by the Government and demanding a
reconsideration of the Disarmament Agreement.

An even greater danger is that unless present indications are
wholly misleading, we shall encounter, after the war, in the more
advanced countries, as in 1922-1930, a strong pacifist movement.

Democratic Governments will probably be affected and will reduce
armaments below the safety level. In less advanced countries
pacifist pressure will be resisted and once again we shall find
the advanced Democracies in a position of relative weakness.

The discussion of the points I have indicated above would, I
think, inevitably lead to the conclusion that so many problems and
difficulties would have to be overcome in order to bring about
agreement for either the limitation or reduction of national
armaments that such a policy is impracticable. When faced with
this impasse, the discussion would inevitably tend towards the
consideration of the possibilities of the substitution of an
International Force for national armaments. This suggestion should
be sympathetically received by the French as both in 1919 and at
the Disarmament Conference they put forward proposals of this
character. The obvious starting point of any such discussion would
be the consideration of the possibility of the abolition of
national Air armaments and their replacement by an International
Air Force.

Such a proposal does not create insuperable practical
difficulties. It has been ventilated from time to time and has
received a considerable measure of support even from quarters
which in respect to Land and Sea Forces will not listen to the
suggestion of their internationalisation. It therefore appears to
me possible that acceptance of the idea of an International Air
Force is not out of the question.

Even if nothing more could be achieved this would be a tremendous
step forward. It seems to me, however, that it would be a pity to
rest content with this achievement only. With Land and Sea Forces
continuing on a national basis all the difficulties I have
indicated above would still bar the way to agreement for the
limitation or reduction of these forms of armaments. If no
reduction or limitation of them can be brought about the nations
will still have to bear financial and economic burdens involved in
competing armaments. This burden would prevent the financial and
economic reconstruction to which I refer later and which is so
vital to the well-being of the whole of mankind.

It therefore seems to me essential that having obtained agreement
to the principle of an International Air Force an effort should be
made to break down the opposition of those who are opposed to the
extension of the principle to Land and Sea Forces. The argument of
those who are so opposed is that it is essential that Britain
should have a great Navy, and France a great Army, in order to
strengthen the voice of the two great Democracies in the councils
of the nations.

An examination of this argument, however, I suggest shows that
there is not a great deal in it. If Air Armaments have disappeared
on a national basis and an International Police Force has been
created, the effectiveness of the strongest Navy and the strongest
Army would be relatively small, particularly if developments in
the Air are to be of a character such as the experience of the
last few years would lead us to expect. It can therefore be very
well argued that for Britain to maintain a great Navy and France a
great Army is merely saddling those two nations with a great
unnecessary financial burden which would place them at a serious
economic disadvantage with the other nations of the world.

Even, however, if this is true the burden would have to be borne
unless in giving effect to the ambitious project of the
internationalisation of armaments the insuperable difficulties in
bringing about a limitation or reduction of national armaments
already referred to can be overcome. In order to determine this it
would probably be convenient to examine the principal countries
and areas in the same way as was done with regard to the
limitation or reduction of armaments, but to take them in a
somewhat different order.

ITALY. The acquiescence of Italy, save under the pressure of force
majeure, would be dependent upon whether or not her national
ambitions could be reasonably satisfied.

In a world from which national armaments had been banished there
would appear to be no insuperable difficulty in doing this.

Strategic considerations would no longer play a paramount part and
Italy's demands would probably not be so extensive or so
unreasonable as to be impossible of acceptance.

JAPAN. As in the case of Italy, Japan's national aspirations could
probably be met. By this I do not mean the realisation of her
dream of a predominance of an all powerful Japan in the Far East.

What I do mean is the satisfaction of her requirements for
adequate commercial outlets so as to enable her to maintain her
rapidly growing population. These requirements could be met by the
rehabilitation of an independent China with the financial
assistance of the nations of the world, particularly of the United
Kingdom and the United States of America, in which Japan would be
afforded specific rights in connection with the supply of
consumption goods and by granting to her equality of opportunity
for her commerce in the non-self-governing portions of the world.

DANUBE AND BALKANS. In these areas the main problems that have to
be resolved are territorial and racial. While national armaments
continue to exist and strategic frontiers are of paramount
importance these problems are well-nigh insuperable. With the
disappearance of national armaments these problems would be
tremendously simplified and the way would be opened for their
settlement on economic and ethnological grounds. If a basis could
be found for a fair settlement of these territorial and racial
problems it should be possible to obtain the acquiescence of the
Danubian and Balkan States although a certain amount of pressure
and compulsion might be required in the first instance.

RUSSIA. The Soviet presents much more formidable difficulties and
yet is of vital importance because of its repercussions upon
Italy, Japan and the Balkan and Danubian States.

It seems improbable that, if there were virtual world agreement
for the internationalisation of armaments and the creation of an
International Police Force to maintain security and prevent
aggression, Russia would stand aloof. If, however, she did so it
is unthinkable that the world should be debarred by her
intransigence from following a course which the nations were
agreed was essential for their security and well-being.

Such an attitude by Russia would have to be countered by the
organisation of the International Police Force upon such a basis
as to prevent aggression or interference by Russia either in
Europe or in the Far East.

GERMANY. Having been disarmed after having been conquered in the
war, Germany would presumably welcome the internationalisation of
armaments because it would immediately place her on an equality
with all the other nations of the world.

From the point of view of the other nations the creation of an
International Police Force would free them from the necessity of
ensuring, by their individual efforts, that she observed the terms
of the Peace Treaty.

While I do not minimise the difficulties of giving effect to so
daring and revolutionary a proposal as the abolition of national
armaments and the substitution for them of an International Police
Force, I believe those difficulties are not so far reaching and
insuperable as those which would be encountered in attempting to
bring about a limitation or reduction of national armaments.

However great they may be they have got to be faced and overcome
if the world is to be saved from chaos.

Unless some method can be found of affording security to the world
and at the same time of relieving the nations of the financial and
economic burden of competitive armaments, civilisation as we have
known it is doomed.

In the 25 years since the termination of the 1914-1918 war, the
world has several times been on the brink of financial and
economic disaster and looking back over those years it seems
little short of a miracle that it has survived. No thinking person
cm believe that with the innumerable additional complications and
difficulties which the present war will have added it will be
possible to avert the disaster which we have so narrowly escaped
in the past, save by bold constructive action.

In face of such a situation we cannot be fearful of even the most
revolutionary thinking.

Assuming the acceptance of the principle of the abolition of
national armaments and the creation of an International Police
Force, we have to consider how this Police Force would be
controlled and what form of International machinery for dealing
effectively with political problems between nations would have to
be created.

The first question to be considered is whether the necessary
organisation should be upon a world or a regional basis. The
League of Nations was conceived upon a world basis and has failed.

This failure, however, was not necessarily due to the fact that
the League was a world wide organisation, but was due to other
causes which there is little advantage in dealing with now. It is
possible that with the new conception of a limitation of the
sovereignty of individual States a world Political organisation
could be set up. Such a proposal would, however, encounter
opposition in the United States of America and it is doubtful
whether a world wide organisation would deal as effectively with
the problems of Europe, of the Pacific, or of Central America, as
a more limited organisation under which the nations most directly
concerned undertook responsibility for the maintenance of regional
security and the settlement of regional difficulties. Were the
regional idea adopted there might at the outset be four regions:-

1. Europe, including the Mediterranean,
2. The Americas,
3. The Pacific, including the Far East, and
4. The U.S.S.R.

This division would leave out Africa, apart from the territories
bordering on the Mediterranean, and India and the Middle East.

Consideration would be required as to how these areas should be
dealt with. The basis of regional co-operation would be complete
national disarmament save for clearly defined and lightly armed
Police Forces and the assumption by the whole region of
responsibility for security against external attack and the
maintenance of peace within the region. In each region a regional
council would be set up consisting of representatives of each
national State within the region. This Council would be
responsible for supervising national disarmament, the suppression
of national production of armaments and for the control of a
regional force consisting mainly of an Air Force and probably a
Navy and particularly in regard to Europe a highly mobilised
mechanised Land Force.

This Council would either itself or through the machinery it
created deal with all disputes arising within the region. The
International Force to be maintained by the individual regions
would probably not be very great, although in Europe substantial
armed forces would probably have to be maintained in order to
afford a sense of security to the nations which had accepted
national disarmament and possibly owing to the necessity of being
in a position to safeguard the European States against any action
by Russia. Certain countries would need to become members of, and
to accept the obligations of membership in, more than one region.

For example, the United Kingdom would obviously have to be a
member of both the European and Pacific Regions and the United
States of America of the American and Pacific Regions. It would
also be necessary that arrangements should exist between the
different regions for co-operation in the event of one region
being externally menaced.

The suggested organisation on a regional basis is based upon the
idea that questions such as security, disarmament, the
organisation of the International Police Force and the settlement
of territorial and political problems can best be dealt with in
this way. If, however, a satisfactory peace settlement is to be
achieved it is necessary also to deal with economic and social
questions as well as the difficult problem of Colonies. The
settlement of the Colonial issue is a matter of vital concern to
nations in all quarters of the globe. Trade is essentially
international, and the repercussions of finance even more markedly
so. Social questions such as health and standards of living are of
concern to all nations and know no national boundaries. Moreover
the solution of world economic and social problems requires the
collaboration of all persons of good will in every country and in
particular the co-operation of the United States of America.

For these reasons it seems essential that economic and social
questions and the Colonial issue should be dealt with on a world
and not a regional basis. The necessary organisation might well be
provided by the Economic and Social Organisations of the League of
Nations and the International Labour Office. If under the peace
settlement political questions are dealt with on a regional basis,
the United States of America would almost certainly be prepared to
give its adherence and there would appear to be no insuperable
difficulty in Germany, Italy and Japan returning to such a
reconstituted League.

The Secretariat of the Health and Economic Organisations of the
League of Nations and of the International Labour Office possess
considerable accumulated experience and it would be a serious form
of international waste not to utilise this existing machinery.

The responsibilities for the World economic and social
organisations would include-
Non-self-governing territories.

The supervision of a progressive internationalisation of the
position of Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The process of internationalisation might take the following
form:-

The existing Colonial Powers to agree in the Peace settlement, in
the case of Colonies already far advanced towards self-government,
either to grant complete fiscal autonomy and thereafter to
expedite the progress towards self-government, or to agree-
1. Immediately to institute an 'open door' regime in their
Colonies for trade and for economic opportunities including
contracts.

2. That a Commission established by the World Organisation should
supervise the 'open-ness of the door'.

3. To treat their Colonies and Protectorates as Mandates and to
submit reports to the proposed Commission.

4. Progressively to internationalise the Administration and other
public services.

5. To accept the principle that the World Organisation should
through its Commission undertake a progressively increasing degree
of the responsibilities for the Government.

Under such a policy the possession of Colonies would cease to have
any importance from the standpoint of strategy, prestige, or
economics. It would also assure to all nations that the
responsibilities to be borne on behalf of, and benefits to be
derived from, the non-self-governing territories should become
within a reasonable period international.

A settlement of the Colonial question on this basis would go far
to remove the grievances of the so called 'have not' countries,
which have contributed to the rise of Totalitarian regimes and
explain, in part at least, the aggressions of Japan and Italy.

It is necessary, however, to deal with the grievances of
individuals as well as with those of nations. Before the series of
European political crises deflected men's minds from internal
affairs there was growing an insistent, and even menacing, demand
from the poorer classes for a more equitable share in national
wealth. For example, the Front Populaire in France and the 'New
Deal' in the United States of America. This demand will arise
again after the war in an even more insistent form.

The peace settlement should be made the starting point of an
internationally concerted attack upon the problems of poverty and
the methods whereby there can be a greater utilisation of the
discoveries of science. Problems of health will also have to be
faced. In addition the paramount questions of the readjustment
from war time to peace economic structures and the restoration of
the economic and social life of countries severely damaged as a
result of the war will have to be faced. All these matters are of
transcending importance and it is no exaggeration to say upon how
they are dealt with depends the future of the world and the well-
being of mankind.

As you know, ever since the World Monetary and Economic Conference
of 1933, these matters have progressively been my main
preoccupation. I have, however, inflicted so long a letter upon
you that I do not propose to add to it by dealing with them now in
the way that their importance demands.

I will, however, by a subsequent mail send you some thoughts of a
detailed character on the economic and social problems that I feel
have to be faced.

In any event the object of this letter is to raise with you the
desirability of early Empire consultation with a view to the oral
and personal discussions contemplated with the French which
obviously at the commencement will be concerned with political
problems rather than economic and social ones.

With kind regards and many apologies for the wearisome length of
this letter. [10]