Agendum 97/1940 2 May 1940

STRATEGICAL APPRECIATION BY AUSTRALIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Chiefs of Staff are not in a position to lay before the War
Cabinet an appreciation of the situation which the advent of Italy
in support of the Germans would create. The necessary data as to
strength and disposition of the forces concerned and the political
and other intelligence needful for the purpose are not available
to them.

2. The seriousness of the augmentation of enemy forces and the
extension of the flanks of the areas of operation, firstly to
Norway and secondly to north and east Africa, is self-evident and
needs no stressing, nor is it necessary to emphasize the danger of
dispersing our forces.

3. To the Empire the Suez Canal and the passage of the Red Sea
have always been of immense strategical importance. Their complete
safety is dependent upon our control of the Mediterranean and of
the Red Sea. We are not in a position to make any estimate of the
length of time which would be involved in regaining control of the
Mediterranean. Nor are we able to speak with any certainty of an
early clearance of the Red Sea. Doubtless, effort would early be
concentrated on this latter task, as it is of first importance
that the Empire should be able to support the forces about Egypt
and Palestine and so to isolate Abyssinia and be able to thwart
any Italian action from Libya.

4. The advent of Italy into the war is unlikely seriously to
affect the Naval situation in areas outside those discussed in
paragraph 3 above. The main Italian Naval forces are contained in
the Mediterranean, and the only small units disposed elsewhere are
in the Red Sea. Apart from this area, there are no Italian forces
in the Indian or Pacific Oceans. The Italians have made little
preparation for arming their merchant vessels, and the menace from
this source is very small.

5. Taking these factors into consideration and the other most
important factor, that Germany's Naval strength has been
drastically reduced in the Norwegian venture, it is considered
that the prospective threat to Allied sea communications in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans is very small.

6. The Cape route to the United Kingdom (which is only 10% longer
than the Suez route) becomes of greater importance, and there
should be no difficulty in adequately safeguarding it. Convoys
proceeding via Capetown could be routed from that port through the
Red Sea if and when this route was reopened.

7. Until the Red Sea route is opened, there may be difficulty in
getting supplies to our forces in the Suez Canal area, but this
problem is one which the United Kingdom Government must have under
review. It is clear, however, that the clearance of the Red Sea
route is one of the urgent and major necessities.

8. From the air point of view there can be no question that
British shipping in the Red Sea would be open to air attack in
considerable force.

9. From latest reports, which admittedly are not up to date, the
Italians have in Italian East Africa (Eritrea and Abyssinia) some
230 bombers and some 45 fighters, including reserves. The majority
of these aircraft could be transferred from one area to another
without much difficulty if petrol facilities allowed. Shipping
could come under Italian air attack from the entrance to the Gulf
of Aden to as far north as Port Sudan. Our air forces at Aden
consist of some 24 bombers and 6 fighters with reserves. We have
one squadron of bombers at Nairobi, one squadron of 18 bombers at
Khartoum. In the Middle East there are some five squadrons of
bombers and three squadrons of fighters. The French have at
Djibouti one squadron of bombers and one flight of fighters.

10. Air reinforcements could be sent from Iraq, India, Singapore
and South Africa provided the situation allows.

11. Finally, we consider that if the intervention of Italy occurs,
the need is emphasized of Australian assistance in the main
theatre as fully and promptly as possible.