Agendum 61/1941 11 February 1941

MOST SECRET

SINGAPORE CONFERENCE REPORT-MODIFICATION OF AUSTRALIAN AND NEW
ZEALAND NAVAL DISPOSITIONS

Dispositions proposed in Report of Singapore Defence Conference
1. In the report of the Singapore Defence Conference, 1940, the
following observations were made in regard to the Naval Forces
required in Australian and New Zealand waters in the event of war
with Japan:-

'As regards Australian and New Zealand waters, assuming that air
reconnaissance will be available in the focal areas, and that it
is probable we shall be informed if Japanese forces pass through
the Netherlands East Indies to the westward, the following naval
forces are considered necessary:-

(i) South-East Australia Two 8" cruisers, one 6" cruiser.

(ii) South-West Australia Two 6" cruisers.

(iii) New Zealand Two 6" cruisers.

Note: Australian destroyers will be required for troop convoy A/S
[1] escorts in Australian and New Zealand waters.

This will leave only one old 6" cruiser and three A.M.Cs. [2]
available from Australian and New Zealand forces for convoy and
trade protection further afield. No naval forces can be provided
for Darwin.'
It was stated that-
'the minimum naval forces considered necessary to safeguard our
essential commitments in Australian and New Zealand waters can be
provided by the return of Australian and New Zealand naval forces
now serving overseas, but this is only on the assumption that
adequate air forces are maintained in the focal areas, which they
are not at present.'
2. No assessment was made by the Conference of the forces that
would be required in the Indian Ocean beyond the statement that
Capital ship escort for troop convoys would be essential, and that
the provision of aircraft was an urgent requirement. The
conclusion of the Conference in relation to the Indian Ocean was
expressed in the following terms:-

'The position in the Indian Ocean is dependent on the arrival of
naval reinforcements from elsewhere, as it will among other things
be necessary to replace the Australian and New Zealand ships now
on that Station.

The early provision of air forces in the Indian Ocean is
essential.'

Modification of dispositions
3. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs [3], in cablegram
No. 50 of 28th January (copy attached-Annex 'A') [4], states that
the United Kingdom Government's military advisers, after review of
the dispositions of naval forces proposed in the report of the
Singapore Defence Conference, have recommended that the
Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments be invited to consider
the possibility of modification of the proposed dispositions. The
main considerations emphasised by the United Kingdom Chiefs of
Staff are as follows:-

(a) They agree with the view of the conference that the
possibility of a major expedition against the Commonwealth and New
Zealand can be ruled out initially.

(b) They consider that the main defence of the whole British
Commonwealth in the Far East is the maintenance of the security of
Singapore and of sea communications through the Indian Ocean
between that base and the United Kingdom.

Security of sea communications through the Indian Ocean is also
vital to the Commonwealth and to New Zealand both as regards
maintenance of supplies between the Commonwealth and New Zealand
and United Kingdom and the maintenance of Commonwealth and New
Zealand forces now serving in the Middle East.

(c) They feel that adoption of a less 'local' allocation of
Commonwealth and New Zealand naval forces in the contingency
envisaged would facilitate protection of vital communications
referred to above.

4. The general views of the United Kingdom Government's military
advisers on the report of the Singapore Defence Conference 1940
are embodied in cablegram No. 49 of 28th January, 1941 (copy
attached-Annex 'B'). [5]

Recommendation of Chiefs of Staff
5. The Chiefs of Staff have considered the above proposals, and
their views are embodied in the attached draft reply which they
submit for transmission to the Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs (Annex 'C'). [6] 6. The Chiefs of Staff subscribe to the
principles set out in paragraph 3 (a) above, but they consider
that the implications of paragraphs 3 (b) and 3 (c) have not yet
been fully considered by all defence authorities in the Far East,
and propose that this should be done at the forthcoming Conference
at Singapore. Before the Conference takes place, however, they
consider that certain aspects of the Naval strategic plan should
be considered by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, and they put
forward important considerations relating, inter alia, to the
passage of United States naval forces to Singapore and the
necessity of maintaining control of the Tasman Sea area. These are
quoted in paragraph 5 of Annex 'C'.

7. The Chiefs of Staff are unable to dissent from the general
conclusion of the Singapore Conference on this matter, i.e. that
the minimum naval forces considered necessary in Australian and
New Zealand waters can be provided only by the return of all
Australian and New Zealand naval forces now serving overseas. They
consider that the main disposition of these forces should be in
the Tasman Sea area, with regular allocation of cruisers for
convoy escort, at any rate until U.S.A. has shown her hand.

Submission to War Cabinet
8. The proposals of the United Kingdom Government for modification
of naval dispositions envisaged in the report of the Singapore
Defence Conference, and the recommendations of the Chiefs of
Staff, are submitted for consideration by War Cabinet. [7]

A. W. FADDEN