Agendum 195/1941 (extracts) 4 June 1941

MOST SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT ABROAD, 1941 REVIEW OF DEFENCE POSITION IN
THE PACIFIC

1. Paper No. C.O.S. (41) 230 [1] is the answer to a memorandum
(see Annex VII thereto [2]) reiterating certain points raised in
my brief and during discussions with the United Kingdom
Government.

2. This document gives us definite information on certain
considerations which have an important bearing on our Local
Defence preparations. Even though it may not be very encouraging
in certain respects, we certainly know where we stand, the degree
to which we must rely on our own efforts, and the necessity for
expanding them to the utmost extent.

3. The following is a summary
of the main impressions conveyed by the various sections:-

(i) LOCAL DEFENCE OF MALAYA
(a) Military Forces-
The deficiencies in Annex I are in vital artillery units.

(b) Military Equipment-
The main deficiencies, Annex II, are in vital requirements such as
anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, small arms ammunition and
artillery ammunition.

(c) Air Forces-
See Annex III.

Though the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff reduced the strength of
aircraft for Burma, Malaya and Borneo from 582 to 336 and stated
'this would give a very fair degree of security' the present
strength is 118 including the three Australian Squadrons and it is
unlikely the programme will be completed by the end of the year.

(Paragraph 6).

(d) General Remark on (a), (b) and (c)-
The remarks in paragraphs 4, 5 and 8 of Paper No. 230 rather
indicate a degree of complacency about the defence of the Pacific
region. It is now evident that, for too long, we readily accepted
the general assurances about the defence of this area. It was only
at the November Conference that the Australian representatives
discovered the weakness of the local defence position in Malaya.

It is only recently that the real situation in regard to a fleet
for the Far East has become apparent.

In regard to the following from paragraph 8:-

'We fully realise that our Air strength in the Far East is below
that necessary for reasonable security in the absence of a Fleet,
but we do not consider that in the present situation we are
running more serious risks there than elsewhere;'
other theatres are not devoid of both naval and air protection, as
would be the case in a war with Japan, should a re-disposition not
be made.

(ii) NAVAL DEFENCE IN THE FAR EAST
It will be noted from paragraph ii that the naval review is based
upon the assumption that the U.S.A. is neutral. It would be unwise
to overlook the worst situation which might arise.

The relief of Singapore under certain contingencies does not look
very reassuring from paragraph 9 of Annex IV.

In view of the following comment in paragraph 19 of the main
Paper, we must re-insure ourselves against the most unfavourable
likelihood by the maximum local defence effort:-

'All we can say is that we should send a battle cruiser and a
carrier to the Indian Ocean. Our ability to do more must be judged
entirely on the situation at the time.'
Though the estimated scale of attack in the Indian Ocean is
expected to include one or more capital ships, only capital ship
'cover' is to be provided for our reinforcement convoys. With only
one capital ship available in the Indian Ocean, escort by it will
result in reduced frequency of sailings. A dilemma may arise
between risking convoys or leaving the A.I.F. inadequately
supported. (Paragraph 22).

[matter omitted]

(iv) ATTITUDE OF U.S.A.

In regard to U.S.A. co-operation in deterring Japanese aggression,
the United States Secretary of State [3] intimated on 28th April
and 3rd May that the United States Government believed that, in
present circumstances, any more public declarations would do more
harm than good, though the possibility of a declaration at a later
stage was not ruled out. (Paragraph 28).

The attitude towards defining an act of war by Japan is stated to
be dependent on an assurance of American intervention. If this is
not forthcoming, no guarantee can be given that Japanese
aggression against the Netherlands East Indies, Portuguese Timor,
New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands will be treated
automatically as a casus belli. (Paragraph 31). Since the
preparation of C.O.S.230 the United Kingdom Government has
intimated in Dominions Office cablegram M.93 of 22nd May [4]:-

'We have an interest in any move likely to prejudice the security
of the line which runs from Malaya to New Zealand through the
Netherlands East Indies and we agree that any attack on any part
of that line equally concerns all affected parties, and must be
dealt with as an attack on the whole line.'
(v) DANGER OF JAPANESE SHORE-BASED AIRCRAFT ATTACK AGAINST
AUSTRALIA
Assuming the Japanese establish themselves in the Netherlands East
Indies, the Chiefs of Staff consider that 'the threat of direct
air attack on Australia would not be a serious one'. This view is
based on present Japanese air strength and aerodrome facilities.

(Paragraphs 33-35).

In a long war it is not known what changes may take place in these
directions, while ultimately the establishment of the Japanese so
close to Australia means a grave potential threat to Australia. It
is equivalent to the threat to Britain of a Great Power in the
Lowlands-'a pistol pointed at the heart of England.' [5]

R. G. MENZIES