The following message which is of the highest degree of secrecy is
for the Prime Minister.

The Defence Committee of War Cabinet have now completed their
preliminary examination of the situation presented by the opening
phase of the Japanese attack on ourselves and on the United
States. Their appreciation of the situation and the immediate
steps that have been ordered are summarised in the following
paragraphs. [1] A copy of the full report has been sent to the
Prime Minister [2] at Washington. Summary begins.

(A) Future British naval strategy
(1) We must ensure sea communications in the Atlantic first, those
in the Indian Ocean second. Limited United States Naval support
can be expected in the Atlantic where our mutual interests
coincide and from the United States Asiatic Fleet-but not
elsewhere.

(Note: Calculations are based on the assumption that 'SCHARNHORST'
and 'GNEISENAU' at Brest are kept out of action. Unless concrete
evidence is forthcoming of the damage inflicted on those ships it
may be necessary to retain additional heavy ships in the North
Atlantic area thereby simultaneously with the formation of an
Eastern Fleet.)
(2) Simultaneous withdrawal of capital ships from both the Eastern
and Western Mediterranean is unsound.

(3) There is not one base which would be acceptable to both the
United States and ourselves as affording sufficient protection to
the interests of each at which our own and United States Forces
equal or superior to the Japanese can be assembled.

(4) Apart from the question of fighter protection we ourselves can
not provide a balanced fleet at Singapore at once. Therefore
unsound to send capital ships there at present.

(5) To produce the required fleet ourselves it will be necessary
to withdraw capital ships from the Eastern Mediterranean. This
withdrawal can only be offset by maintaining sufficient air
striking forces at Malta and in Cyrenaica to make, in conjunction
with our submarines, operation of Italian heavy ships against our
supply routes too hazardous.

(6) Pending assembly of a fleet in the Indian Ocean we must expect
Japanese raiding forces in that Sea. But until the Japanese secure
Borneo or an area to the South for the establishment of shore
bases for aircraft within range of Sunda Straits routes, escorted
convoys should be able to reach Singapore.

(7) When a fleet has been assembled in the Indian Ocean its action
will depend on the conditions prevailing. It may have to relieve
Singapore or repel a threat to Australia and New Zealand or
operate for a time from its Indian Ocean base.

(B) Wider implications of the war in the Far East
(8) In the Far East our object must be to retain such points as
will prevent the Japanese from using our vital interests in that
area and as will enable us later to attack and defeat Japan. In
both phases United States co-operation and assistance will be
essential. It will not be sufficient for them to maintain a
defensive attitude. We shall in addition require Chinese help for
the final defeat of Japan. Cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek [3]
must therefore remain a cardinal point in allied policy.

(9) To achieve our object we must hold:

(a) in the Indian Ocean.

(i) Burma (particularly Rangoon and the Irrawaddy Basin).

(ii) Ceylon and other naval and air bases.

We recognise the importance of providing adequately for land and
air defence of Burma both for immediately defensive and eventually
offensive needs. Burma also contains our only effective lines of
communication with China whose continued resistance is of such
great value. (Ceylon for naval reasons is equally important.)
(b) in the East Indies Area.

(i) Singapore Island and Southern Malaya to give depth to defence.

(ii) Java and Southern Sumatra.

(iii) Timor.

(10) United States authorities in a recent re-appreciation have
stated that their strategic requirements necessitated their
holding Wake Island, Hawaii, Samoa, Midway Island, Johnston Island
and Palmyra. In order to be able to assist us in offensive action
against Japan the United States are being urged to make every
effort to hold Manila.

(11) Our position in Malaya is very serious. We have no balanced
fleet in the Far Eastern waters; our air and land forces are
heavily outnumbered. It is of the greatest importance to hold
Singapore. The Japanese advance in Malaya must be disputed inch by
inch. The Commander-in-Chief of the Far East [4] has been told
that nothing compares in importance with Singapore which is to be
held at all costs. But should we in spite of our efforts be forced
out of Malaya we must make every effort to hold the other
essential points in the East Indies, retention of which provide a
barrier to the Indian Ocean and Australia.

(12) The main considerations in connection with a return to the
offensive are:

(a) Assembly in the Indian Ocean of a Fleet of nine capital ships
and four aircraft carriers. This will necessarily mean increased
commitments for our land and air forces in the Middle East.

(b) The Far and Middle Easts are inter-dependent. We cannot afford
entirely to relax our grip on either unless in the last resort the
security of the United Kingdom or the Dominions demands it.

Provided that our offensive in Libya is completely successful and
Benghazi remains in our hands, some risk in the Eastern
Mediterranean will be justified particularly in view of Russia's
successes which have postponed, for some months at least, the
threat to the Caucasus and thence to our Northern flank.

(C) The main conclusions (and note of action already taken)
(13) Unified direction and closest co-ordination of all allied
forces should be secured as soon as possible. Offensive action
against Japan should be concerted forthwith between the United
States and our staffs.

These questions are being urgently pursued.

(14) It is very necessary that United States Forces should act
offensively on sea, land and in the air and at once. From the
point of view of the allies the retention of the Philippine
Islands is of first importance. We are asking that this should be
urgently pressed.

(15) We should assemble a capital ship fleet in the Indian Ocean
as soon as possible. In the meantime we must rely mainly on
aircraft carriers.

(16) We must contrive to fight the best possible delaying action
in Malaya, the Southern part of which is vital to the security of
Singapore Island.

(17) We must maintain Sunda Straits route to Singapore. The
Commander-in-Chief, Far East, has been instructed to co-ordinate
with the Dutch best possible arrangements for the maintenance of
this route.

(18) Immediate steps should be taken to provide adequate defences
and facilities in Burma and at ports and bases which will be
required in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific, for operation of
Naval, Military and Air Forces and reception of supplies and
reinforcements.

(19) Land Forces. Reinforcements must be rushed to Malaya and
Burma as soon as possible. The extent to which we can reinforce
Malaya will depend largely on our ability to convey forces to
Singapore and to maintain them there.

(20) The 18th Division, which was on its way to the Middle East
and has now passed the Cape, together with the 17th (Indian)
Division which was destined for Iraq have been placed at the
disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, India, for reinforcement of
Burma and Malaya. It has been decided that the leading brigade
group of the 18th Division is to go to Malaya either direct or
more probably via Bombay since very large United States ship in
which it is embarked is unsuitable to go to Singapore and it would
be without its guns and certain essential equipment. By
transhipping at Bombay into suitable ships, the Brigade group
should arrive complete with equipment at Singapore about 20th
January.

(21) The position as regards the 17th (Indian) Division is as
follows: - One Brigade Group was due to leave India for Malaya on
22nd December. A second brigade group with a squadron of light
tanks (17 Mark IV) will be ready to leave very early in January,
the tanks for Malaya and the group either for Malaya or for Burma
as most required, the balance of the Division will proceed to
Burma.

(22) One anti-tank regiment (48 guns), one heavy anti-aircraft
regiment (16 guns) and one light anti-aircraft regiment (32 guns)
in a convoy now at Durban are being diverted from Durban to
Malaya. 50 light tanks from the Middle East are being sent to
India as a general reinforcement for the Far East.

(23) It is proposed to increase the scale of defence at Indian
Ocean naval and air bases and at Australian naval bases. Details
are under examination. Meanwhile in addition to those mentioned
above very considerable reinforcements of anti-aircraft guns, both
heavy an light, are already en route or under orders for despatch
within a month to the Middle East, Iraq, India and the Far East. A
Royal Marine Anti-Aircraft Brigade (24 heavy and 16 light guns) is
being despatched from the Middle East to Ceylon.

(24) The United States are being asked to examine the possibility
of sending divisions to Northern Ireland with the object of
releasing British formations for service overseas.

(25) The Commander-in-Chief, India [5], is being directed to put
in hand administrative arrangements for the development of Rangoon
as a base for a force which may ultimately reach four divisions
and fifteen squadrons.

(26) General Chiang Kai-shek's offer of assistance in the defence
of Burma has been gratefully accepted. Our military representation
at Chungking has been strengthened and General Wavell himself is
shortly going there for consultation with Generalissimo.

(27) The Commander-in-Chief has been instructed:-

(i) to recommend after consultation with the Dutch what land
reinforcements are necessary in Java and Sumatra under the present
conditions and in the event of Japanese occupation of Singapore.

(ii) to evacuate all unnecessary civilian personnel from
Singapore.

(28) Air Force. Immediate preparations are being made to increase
the strength of our air forces in the Middle East by the despatch
of three torpedo bomber, half of one general purpose, three medium
bomber, two heavy bomber and one long range coastal fighter
squadrons in order to set off withdrawal of battle ships from the
Eastern Mediterranean. The proposed programme of reinforcements
cannot be fully completed for at least four months as our
reinforcement line to the Middle East is already working to full
capacity. Even with these additions our air forces in the Middle
East cannot effectively replace battle ships in defeating the
enemy sea borne operations so long as the western flank of our
Mediterranean position can be threatened.

(29) One medium bomber squadron is being despatched immediately
from the Middle East to Burma or the Far East and five more are to
follow as soon as our operations in Cyrenaica admit.

(30) Twelve Blenheims from the Middle East have already been
despatched to Singapore and some of these have already arrived.

Fifty Hudsons will leave the United Kingdom as soon as they have
been modified and fitted with long range tanks: the first should
arrive within three weeks.

(31) Fifty-one Hurricane aircraft, together with 18 Pilots and
ground personnel of one fighter squadron and various technical
equipment, now at sea in the vicinity of the Cape are being
diverted direct to Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies as the
situation demands. 32 Kittyhawk aircraft are being sent from Port
Sudan to India or Singapore as soon as prepared.

(32) The ground personnel and equipment of three fighter squadrons
now at sea in the vicinity of the Cape are being diverted from the
Middle East to India for subsequent reinforcement of Burma and the
Far East.

(33) We have instructed our Joint Staff Mission in Washington to
press the. United States authorities to agree to go aircraft,
together with appropriate personnel (which arrived on 19th
December at Brisbane) being sent to Malaya or to the Netherlands
East Indies should it not be possible for them to proceed to the
Philippines.

(34) The United States authorities are being asked to examine the
possibility of sending fighter and bomber squadrons to the United
Kingdom to take part in operations and to release more of our
squadrons for overseas.

(35) The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, has been asked to make
recommendations as to the most urgent requirements of the
Netherlands East Indies Air Force.

(36) We consider it essential to maintain the flow of air trainees
from the Commonwealth and from New Zealand and methods of ensuring
security of passage are being examined.

(37) The question of defence of Southern Pacific air route is
being raised with the United States authorities. The latter have
already taken steps to provide a light scale of defence at Canton
and Christmas Islands but we doubt whether these are adequate.

(D) Note on the enemy course of action
(38) Japan's object would appear to be to gain complete control
and freedom of movement in the Eastern area by eliminating all
allied power in that area. This necessitates capture of Singapore
and Manila. The control of Netherlands area which would follow
would provide Japan with certain vital economic resources,
particularly oil.

(39) To this end, Japan appears to be directing her main attacks
against Malaya, with a view to occupation of Singapore, and
against the Philippines. The capture by the Japanese of Hong Kong
would gain for them some strategic advantages but would not
materially alter the strategic situation of the China Sea as a
whole.

(40) The following operations might be carried out simultaneously
with or independently of:-

(a) An attack on Sourabaya to destroy the Submarine Base.

(b) The repetition of attacks on Hawaii to impede repair of United
States Naval Units and dockyards, so securing Japan from attack
from the East.

(c) The occupation of Islands to give stepping stones in our
Pacific air reinforcement route.

(d) Raids by cruisers, minelaying in ports and their approaches in
Pacific Islands, Australia, New Zealand and India, attacks on
shipping in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

(e) The acquisition of refuelling bases in Madagascar.

(41) The following operations may develop from the main operations
mentioned in paragraph (30):

(a) an attempt to occupy Sumatra and Java so as to close the
entrance from the West into the China Sea.

(b) an attempt to occupy air bases in the Celebes and Halmahera.

Summary ends.

I need not impress on you the vital secrecy of much of the
foregoing information. Please treat it with the utmost discretion.