Following personal for Curtin from Evatt.

(1) The first meeting of the Pacific Council took place this
morning. The President [1] presided and Ministers were present
representing the United Kingdom [2], Australia, New Zealand [3],
Netherlands [4], China [5] and Canada. [6] Harry Hopkins [7] was
also present as the President's Deputy. The meeting was of a
preliminary and explanatory character. The President dealt with
the general strategic position and did not underestimate claims
and problems of the Pacific countries.

(2) He wants the Canadians to do more in the Pacific and he said
so. On this I have already been in touch with Mackenzie King [8]
and put it to him very strongly that he should help us in aircraft
and munitions supply. He has invited me to visit Canada to discuss
the matter and I leave here on April 7th, immediately after the
next meeting of the Council on that date. Will be away for a few
days only.

(3) The President is very anxious about vital lines of
communications to Australia and the proper reinforcement of Canton
[Island], Palmyra, Fiji and New Caledonia. A report on these bases
is being prepared for the next meeting when the United States
Chiefs of Staff will attend.

(4) Together with Hopkins and Nash I was appointed to prepare a
special report on the danger of attack or invasion of Australia,
New Zealand and on related matters such as supply. On this it
would be very helpful if a short analysis of the position could be
prepared by General MacArthur [9] in co-operation with our service
chiefs and telegraphed to reach here not later than Saturday. [10]
The document need not be a long one but it should emphasize the
probability of immediate attack, the inadequacy of our means, the
need of continuing air reinforcement by ferrying and all other
matters which seem to them to be pertinent. Of course they can
make an official report to General Marshall [11] if they prefer
but if they do I would like some statement from them in addition.

Please tell General Brett [12] that I am following his advice as
to the general line of action in Washington and that if at any
time he or MacArthur would like me to review any specific job I
shall do it gladly.

(5) There is a deal of talk here (and the President himself
mentioned it at the meeting) of an offensive from Northern France
to be commenced by the United Kingdom later in the year. Whether
this opinion is genuinely entertained or is merely propaganda it
is difficult to say at the moment. I am afraid I would regard the
proposed offensive with much doubt for it is a factor which
appears to be in the other direction as we fight our case for
further support to Australia and New Zealand.

(6) General Council discussion was on the whole satisfactory, and
the proceedings took much of the form of a War Council meeting in
Australia. I am certain that the machinery established is regarded
by the President as being his own rather than Churchill's and that
he is anxious to make a success of it.

(7) Nash is co-operating with me. I hear from him, however, that
with regard to the consequent departure from here of United States
divisions he may be pressing that the first should go to New
Zealand rather than to Australia. I have no doubt that General
MacArthur and General Marshall will decide points like this. In
every possible way I am endeavouring to help New Zealand in the
spirit of our agreement with New Zealand at the Melbourne
Conference. [13]

(8) Above all, the great essential is the delivery of munitions
and supplies and as far as I can judge from the procedure
substantial results in this direction will flow from the working
of the Council.

Discussions I have had with American Chiefs of Staff over the past
ten days are, I think, bearing fruit.