Thank you for your letter of 5th March [1] which reached me when I
was on a trip to Chengtu. I hope you benefited by your trip [2]
and I should be glad to hear from you when you return. It is
profitless to discuss Australian politics from this distance. I
see that Fadden's 'no confidence' motion was lost in spite of the
fact that they got the Speaker to resign. [3] It is, of course,
useless to expect perfection in politics but, on the whole, I
fancy Curtin can secure the co-operation of the Labour masses
better than the others could. I am rather afraid, however, that
the effect of party factions will mean that the most constructive
figures on each side will suffer. I am told that the opposition
intend to go to the polls on the cry of 'No Socialism' which, in a
world drunk with the statistical Beveridge [4], is about as
promising as 'No Popery'.

We have of course been inundated with reports of Madame Chiang's
outstanding successes. [5] The only thing we can say is that there
are certain people who attract flattery as a magnet attracts iron
filings and who are clever enough to carry it off though they do
little to deserve it. Anyway, I wish she would come home and keep
her old man in order. He is in a queer mood-appears to be very
anti-foreign. They dare not translate his latest book for this
reason. There are several signs, and this may be one of them, that
the Chinese are getting desperate. Inflation is becoming
uncontrollable and there is a great deal of unrest in the country.

The new foreign legations who are trying to get house room are met
by demands for the most fantastic rents from the Banks and Trust
Companies to whom they belong, generally with a demand for two
years in advance. The result is that Canadians, Poles, Norwegians,
Mexicans are practically homeless, for the most part living in
filthy hotels. When Dill was here [6], he asked the Press Attache
[7] how long could China last. The Press Attache said twelve
months. Well that was as good or bad a guess as-next month-or next
week. The fact is that if you want to insure against the breakdown
of an important front, steps have to be taken at once. In May I
saw no signs of this being recognised, but I see signs of a
drastic change of policy in the last week or two.

I am not at all complacent about the Pacific situation mainly
because I am sure that the complexity of the strategic
requirements there [is] not recognised. The logistics of the Dills
and Marshalls are too simple. You may think it impertinent for me
to say this but I have some means of knowing what information is
going or is not going to Headquarters and I say most emphatically
that it is not adequate for them to make up their decisions. This
is the opinion of those who are collecting it. They seem to retain
the same psychology that entertained the view that Malaya and the
Philippines could be defended by a couple of divisions. Ergo it
can be retaken with somewhat similar forces. We treated the local
inhabitants and the local organisations as if they did not exist.

This view has been found to be a profound fallacy but have we
adjusted ourselves to it? Do we expect to be met by native princes
throwing flowers at our feet? Are we prepared for the political
and economic problems which will be involved in the reconquest?
I accept the Hitler first formula. We are condemned to it not by
the logic of strategy but by the fact that the many resources
which are needed come from peoples who are more interested in
Hitler than the Pacific but it does not do to conceal from
ourselves that this can mean loss of the war for Australia, which
can be avoided mainly by a much keener and more intelligent
interest in the specific problems of the Pacific War than has been
shown up to the present.

This is, of course, the case against complacency which I feel
bound to preach. I think we shall win. I have no doubt Japan has
her troubles but I see no sign of complacency on her part, only
the greatest assiduity in digging in and preparing for all
eventualities.

By the way did you see a statement by A.D. Rothman to the Sydney
Morning Herald about the 20th May, in which there is an elaborate
argument derived, he says, from sources of the most authoritative
kind, against the invasion of Burma, on account of the
difficulties of the terrain and the superb fighting qualities of
the Japanese. [8] This defeatist attitude, which came I am sure
from the Indian General Staff, is what frightens me. There is an
echo of this from London by Lieutenant-General Martin of the
London Daily Telegraph. Without the reconquest of Burma, the value
of China as a base is small and without the full use of China, I
do not see the technique of defeating Japan.

I am beginning to look forward to my furlough which I should get
in eight months time. The work one needs to do here is small.

Despatches are not obligatory but I like doing them. I have spent
a good deal of time lately lecturing to universities. But though
the work is light there is no possibility of any relief-a change
of scene or real holiday. There is only one thing to think about.