Historical documents
Cablegram E38 [SAN FRANCISCO], 3 June 1945, 1.14 p.m.
IMMEDIATE SECRET
Delegation No. SFC33.
Voting procedure in the Security Council.
General discussion of the right of veto of permanent members of
the Security Council (Chapter VI Section C) [1] began in Committee
III/1 on 17th May. New Zealand pointed out that the meaning of the
Yalta formula was far from clear and invited the four sponsoring
Governments to explain precisely just what decisions were affected
by the veto. The United Kingdom was the only great power which
accepted this invitation and Cadogan expressed the personal
opinion that the veto did not apply to paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of
Section A of Chapter VIII. He said that inquiry into and
investigation of a dispute was not blocked by the veto though
recommendation or 'decision' could be blocked and Dr. Evatt then
expressed the opinion that on a strict legal interpretation of the
Yalta formula the veto applied to the whole of Chapter VIII
Section A.
The only exception was that under paragraph 3A party to a dispute
was disqualified from voting. He said that in the existing
circumstances it might be necessary to accept a great power right
of veto on imposition of sanctions under Chapter VIII Section B so
as to maintain unanimity amongst the great powers whenever the use
of force was in question. He could find no satisfactory argument
however in favour of veto upon action to settle disputes by
Pacific means under VIII A.
As the text now stood one great power not a party to a dispute
could prevent resort to means of Pacific settlement even though
this was desired by 10 members of the Council and by both or all
parties to the dispute. He appealed to the sponsoring Governments
to reconsider their position.
Dr. Evatt also referred to the present right of a great power, not
a party to a dispute to veto action by the Security Council
authorising enforcement action by a regional agency (VIII C2) and
drew special attention to the effective right of veto of the great
powers upon all future proposals to amend the Charter in any
respect. As the Charter now stood the great powers not only had a
right of veto over decisions to settle disputes by Pacific or
forceful means they also had a right of veto in perpetuity.
During the ensuing discussion strong support for the Australian
view that the veto should not be applicable to VIII A was given by
Canada, New Zealand, Belgium, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, the
Philippines, Greece, El Salvador, Brazil, Egypt, Cuba and
Argentine. The only opposition came from the four sponsoring
Governments supported by the Ukraine, White Russia,
Czechoslovakia, Norway and Yugoslavia. South Africa expressed the
intention of voting for the Yalta formula not because of the
merits of the formula but in order to maintain unanimity amongst
the great powers. France also indicated it would accept the
present formula on the same ground in spite of French amendments
which had been tabled distinguishing between 'recommendations' and
'decisions' of the Council and advocating application only to
'decisions'.
On 18th May the Committee decided to set up a Sub Committee
consisting of the four sponsoring powers, France, Australia, Cuba,
the Netherlands, Egypt and Greece to 'clarify the doubts' that had
arisen in decision as to the meaning of the Yalta formula. This
Sub Committee met on 19th May and at the suggestion of the Soviet
representative it was agreed that the members of the Sub Committee
other than those representing the four sponsoring powers should
draw up a questionnaire to be submitted to the latter
representatives designed to elucidate the meaning of the Yalta
formula. The Australian Delegation drew up 15 questions which
formed the basis of a questionnaire containing 22. questions
submitted through the Secretariat to the sponsoring powers. [2]
This questionnaire was submitted on 22nd May but so far no answers
have been received. According to press reports the four sponsoring
powers are unlikely to give a specific answer to each question but
will content themselves with a general reply. [3] The press also
suggest that while the Yalta formula will be maintained the reply
may place what has been euphemistically described as a 'liberal'
interpretation upon the formula. Pending receipt of this reply
Committee III/1 wished to turn its attention to the other portions
of the charter.
[AA : A1066, H45/771/1]