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89 Directive by Chifley [1]

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DEFENCE POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

DIRECTIVE FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT AND OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ON RELATED ASPECTS

PART I-BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Basis for Determining Defence Policy
Defence Policy has to be determined in the light of an up to date
strategical appreciation, and related to commitments under the
World Security Organisation, including regional arrangements in
the Pacific, Co-operation in Empire Defence, and the basic
organisation and resources that should be maintained by Australia.

2. Interim Post-War Strength of the Forces
An interim post-war strength is necessary to provide for:-

(i) The Force of Occupation in Japan.

(ii) The guard and garrison work in the Pacific Islands until the
Japanese prisoners are repatriated.

A report by the Defence Committee on the interim strength is at
present before the Government.

3. Ultimate Post-War Strength of the Forces
In regard to the ultimate post-war strength of the Forces, the
following Ministerial instructions have been issued for the
guidance of the Defence Committee:-

'A vital factor in post-war Defence Policy will be the system of
collective security which may be established and the strength of
the forces that will be required to be maintained:-

As a contribution towards the collective system, and to police the
observance of the Peace Treaties.

For Co-operation in Empire Defence.

For Local Defence.

'The Defence Committee, as the Government's Advisers, is to
examine the matter from the strategical aspect of a defence
problem, and to tender their advice of the strength and
Organisation of the Forces which, in their opinion, should be
provided. They have for their guidance, the elements of the
strategical situation as they see it now and in the future. They
are aware of the forces that were provided in the pre-war period
by a population of 7,000,000 people. They have knowledge of the
lessons and experience of the war.

'After the Defence Committee have formulated their proposals,
which should be coordinated as a joint system of defence, the
Government will consider them, together with the estimated cost,
and decide whether the proposals are approved, and whether the
prospective vote can be provided. If necessary, the Government
will give any further instructions that may be necessary for the
revision of the proposals and the allocation of the vote.'
A governing consideration which has to be resolved is the impact
of scientific development on the types of weapons and armament for
the various Services, their efficacy, and the effects on future
methods of warfare and organisation for it.

PART II-THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

4. A Regional Arrangement in the Pacific
The Australian Government has suggested, in connection with the
examination of the future status and use of bases established by
the United States during the war in territory of the British
Commonwealth, that there should be considered simultaneously the
future defence arrangements in the Pacific Zone affecting the
joint interest of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and
New Zealand, including the principle of reciprocity and joint use
of bases.

5. Relative Provisions of the United Nations Charter
Under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations:-

(i) Members undertake to make available for the maintenance of
peace, forces in accordance with agreements which are to be
negotiated by the Security Council as soon as possible. (Article
43)
(ii) Under the agreements, members shall hold immediately
available national air force contingents. (Article 45)
(iii) There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to
advise and assist the Security Council. The Committee will consist
of military representatives of the permanent members of the
Security Council. Representatives of nations not permanently
represented on the Council may be associated with the Committee
when its work requires such participation. The Military Staff
Committee may establish regional sub-committees. (Article 47)
(iv) Nothing in the Charter impairs the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a member, until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

(Article 51)
(v) Nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are
appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements
or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations. (Article 52)
(vi) The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its
authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of
the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any
enemy State. (Article 53)

6. Lines of Approach
The nature, strength and functions of the Australian Forces, and
the munitions and supply resources to be established for their
maintenance in peace and war, will be governed by the following
considerations which are blended and inter-related:-

(i) The forces to be provided in accordance with Articles 43 and
45 of the Charter, including regional arrangements under Article
52.

(ii) The forces to be maintained by Australia under arrangements
for Co-operation in Empire Defence in accordance with the inherent
right of collective self-defence under Article 51.

(iii) The forces to be maintained by Australia to provide for the
inherent right of individual self-defence under Article 51.

7. Machinery Required
It is essential that the Government should have appropriate
Departmental machinery to handle the three angles of approach on
which action will probably proceed simultaneously.

In Australia, the Defence and External Affairs Departments should
be adequately staffed to provide for the basic examination of
these problems and for advice to the Government thereon. The
closest co-operation and liaison should exist between both
Departments.

It is essential that the staff and organisation of these
Departments should provide for appropriate and sufficient staffs
in London and at the seat of the United Nations Organisation.

In London it will be necessary to provide, on the Defence aspect,
Joint-Service staff for continuous consultation between members of
the British Commonwealth regarding regional and international
arrangements for security, including all the ramifications of Co-
operation in Empire Defence. This staff will be the London
counterpart of the Australian Higher Defence Machinery, and will
work in an advisory capacity to the Resident Minister in London.

The channel of communication on matters of Defence Policy will be
between the Prime Minister and the Resident Minister, the close
relation between Defence Policy and External Affairs Policy being
constantly borne in mind. On other Defence matters, communication
will be on the official level, between the Defence Department and
the Head of the Joint-Service staff in London.

At the seat of the United Nations Organisation, it will be
necessary to provide Joint-Service staff for advice to the
Australian Representative on the Security Council. This staff will
have a close contact with the United Kingdom representatives on
the Military Staff Committee, and the Australian representatives
will be associated with this Committee when questions of security
in the Pacific are under consideration. This staff also, will be
the counterpart of the Australian Higher Defence Machinery. The
channel of communication on matters of External Affairs and
Defence Policy will be on the Ministerial level. On other Defence
matters, communication will be on the official level, between the
Defence Department and the Head of the Joint Service Staff.

The provision of Joint Service Staffs in London and at the seat of
the United Nations Organisation does not presume that all security
discussions will be carried out at these centres or that all
Empire and U.N.O. Machinery will be established there. For
example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia have been located
in Melbourne to control the British Commonwealth Occupation Force
in Japan. Also, under Article 47 of the Charter, the Military
Staff Committee may, with the authority of the Security Council,
establish regional sub-committees.

8. Empire Co-operation in Relation to the Charter
Article 52 of the Charter provides that regional arrangements for
security may be made, provided that they are consistent with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.

In the Act of Chapultepec, the signatory American republics bound
themselves to a full and complete system of collective security
and mutual insurance against any act of aggression during the
recent war, either from within or without the Americas, and
undertook, as soon as the war was over, to carry this regional
collective system into the post-war period by means of appropriate
treaties.

In order to embrace the Chapultepec arrangements within the
framework of the World Organisation, it was provided in Article 52
of the Charter, that parties to regional arrangements should make
very effort to obtain the settlement of local disputes through
such agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

Secondly, a provision recognising the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence, if an armed attack occurs against a
member State, was inserted in Article 51.

It is apparent, therefore, that co-operation between the members
of the British Commonwealth in defence, in accordance with the
established principles outlined in the Memorandum of 14th December
1945 on Co-operation in Empire Defence (or such modifications as
may be necessary in the light of the experience of the war and
present circumstances), is consistent with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations (Article 52). Empire Co-operation
is also in conformity with the inherent right of individual or
collective defence (Article 51. Finally, it is only by co-operation
on a basis of standardisation of organisation, arms, equipment and
training, and exchange of technical and scientific information,
that the satisfactory development of Dominions Forces can be
provided for.

9. Local Defence in Relation to the Charter
Article 51 of the Charter provides that nothing in the Charter
impairs the inherent right of individual self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a member.

In addition to the forces to be provided in accordance with
Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter, including regional arrangements
under Article 52, it is imperative that Australia should maintain
such additional forces, together with a war production potential
of appropriate dimensions for expansion, as are requisite until
the security system is developed and firmly established. This
precaution is also necessary to provide against the contingency of
the general exercise of the right of veto by a permanent member of
the Council under Article 27 and, in particular, by the vetoing,
under Article 53, of enforcement action under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies.

10. Directive
It is recommended that the following directive be approved for the
guidance of the Defence Department and of the Department of
External Affairs on related aspects:-

(a) Basis of Approach to the Determination of Post-War Defence
Policy:

(i) The forces to be provided in accordance with Articles 43 and
45 of the Charter, including regional arrangements under Article
52.

(ii) The forces to be maintained by Australia under arrangements
for Co-operation in Empire Defence in accordance with the inherent
right of collective self-defence under Article 51.

(iii) The forces to be maintained by Australia to provide for the
inherent right of individual self-defence under Article 51.

(b) Procedure to be Followed:

(i) The Australian Government has suggested, in connection with
the examination of the future status and use of bases established
by the United States during the war in territory of the British
Commonwealth, that there should be considered simultaneously the
future defence arrangements in the Pacific Zone affecting the
joint interest of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and
New Zealand, including the principle of reciprocity and joint use
of bases.

(ii) For the purpose of (i), the Chiefs of Staff Committee is to
submit, from the aspect of Australian security, a strategical
appreciation of a regional arrangement in the Pacific. After
consideration by the Government, action will be taken on the
appropriate level for an exchange of views with the United Kingdom
and New Zealand Governments and their Advisers.

(iii) The development of Empire Co-operation should proceed
broadly in accordance with the principles outlined in the
Memorandum of 14th December 1945 on Co-operation in Empire
Defence, or such modifications as may be necessary in the light of
the experience of the war and present circumstances.

The detailed procedure should be the examination of specific
aspects of the problem as was done in the case of the proposals
relating to:-

Guided Projectiles.

Co-operation in Development, Research, Design, etc., of Munitions.

In particular, the closest co-operation should be maintained on
the impact of scientific development on the types of weapons and
armament for the various Services, their efficacy, and the effects
on future methods of warfare and organisation for it.

(c) Machinery to be Provided:

(i) In London it will be necessary to provide, on the Defence
aspect, Joint-Service staff for continuous consultation between
members of the British Commonwealth regarding regional and
international arrangements for security, including all the
ramifications of Co-operation in Empire Defence. This staff will
be the London counterpart of the Australian Higher Defence
Machinery and will work in an advisory capacity to the Resident
Minister in London. The channel of communication on matters of
Defence Policy will be between the Prime Minister and the Resident
Minister, the close relation between Defence Policy and External
Affairs Policy being constantly borne in mind. On other Defence
matters, communication will be on the official level, between the
Defence Department and the Head of the Joint Service Staff in
London.

(ii) At the seat of the United Nations Organisation, it will be
necessary to provide Joint Service Staff for advice to the
Australian Representative on the Security Council. This staff will
have a close contact with the United Kingdom representatives on
the Military Staff Committee, and the Australian representatives
will be associated with this Committee when questions of security
in the Pacific are under consideration. This staff also, will be
the counterpart of the Australian Higher Defence Machinery. The
channel of communication on matters of External Affairs and
Defence Policy will be on the Ministerial level. On other Defence
matters, communication will be on the official level between the
Defence Department and the Head of the Joint Service Staff.

J. B. CHIFLEY
Prime Minister

[AA:A1068 T4, DL47/5/3]

1 This directive was prepared by Shedden, in late January and
early February, following discussions with Chifley, Evatt and
Forde, and approved by Chifley on 15 February for the guidance of
the Defence Committee. The version here was printed without
alteration even though in parts (e.g. the first sentence of Item
10) it reads still as a submission to Chifley.


[CANBERRA], 15 February 1946
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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