THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF IN AUSTRALIA

In your personal letter to me of 4th April [1], 1946, you asked me
for my personal views on the British Commonwealth Occupation Force
and Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia as a method of organizing
and controlling a Joint Empire Force, and my opinion as to how I
would go about the matter again in the light of my experience to
date.

Joint Empire Force
2. The British Commonwealth Occupation Force, as you are aware,
comprises basically a Brigade Group from each of the United
Kingdom, India, Australia and New Zealand plus an Air Force
component, elements of which are supplied from each of the above
countries. The Naval component of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force is small and almost entirely Royal Navy. The
whole is run by an integrated Headquarters and maintained by an
integrated Base comprising integrated units from each country.

I regard this size of force as being one of the most difficult to
run from an Army aspect for the reason that a Division is the
smallest formation possessing units for all Army functions.

Had each country provided a whole Division the problem would have
been somewhat simplified.

3. However, taking the size of the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force as it is, there is little alteration to the organization
that I would recommend, except with regard to the Base. I feel
that integrated Headquarters and Units should be avoided wherever
possible, and this should be a basic principle.

As Australia is responsible for the maintenance of the whole of
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, I consider that the
Base Headquarters and Base Units should all have been Australian,
with a few technical advisers from the other countries attached
thereto, as may be found necessary to deal with special items of
maintenance peculiar only to the nationals of one country.

However, this variation is minor and the present organization of
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force will no doubt be found
to work satisfactorily in practice.

Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia
4. For the control of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force
comprising basically 4 Infantry Brigade Groups, an Air component
and a tiny Naval component, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia
as at present constituted is totally unnecessary. Its
representatives are too numerous and too senior, and the
organization is too heavy and ponderous for the size of the force
controlled. One might style it 'a sledge hammer to crack a small
nut'.

5. Each main component part of the British Empire must learn to
treat other components as part of one family and not as foreign
countries. The world could be cut up into zones in each of which
one Dominion, United Kingdom or India should be recognised as the
dominant partner. In the case of the Western Pacific that dominant
partner should be Australia, and in my opinion the troops
comprising the British Commonwealth Occupation Force should have
been placed under the Australian Government and at the disposal of
the Australian Chiefs of Staff for the operation of the occupation
of Japan (under the general direction of General MacArthur).

6. When we sent the A.I.F. to the Middle East or 8th Australian
Division to Malaya, we did not have any equivalent to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Australia. In my opinion the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in Australia if organized to its logical conclusion with up
to three representatives (Army, Navy and Air Force) from each
country or Dominion contributing forces to a theatre, could not
possibly function for operations in war. It would be too clumsy,
cumbersome and slow in function.

7. I have seen reference in some documents to a similarity between
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia and the Combined Chiefs of
Staff in Washington. This is entirely erroneous, in my opinion;

the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington comprised
representatives of the United States of America and Great Britain
and no one else had a seat on the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

British Dominions and representatives of other countries, e.g.

Dutch, Poles, Chinese were occasionally called to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff meetings to advise on particular aspects, but they
had no vote in the decisions reached. Again the detailed strategy
and operations in the Pacific were the entire responsibility of
the American Chiefs of Staff based on a world wide strategy
decided upon at meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill. From my
own knowledge the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington knew
little or nothing of the details of what the United States Chiefs
of Staff proposed to do in the Pacific, and in fact, I was their
main informant of what was about to take place. This information I
acquired by personal contacts with the United States Chiefs of
Staff or their Directors of Operations.

8. The present difficulties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia are largely organizational and partly individual. The
senior representatives are far too senior for the small amount of
work involved and the status of that work. They consequently make
heavy weather out of what work they have. In my opinion, Generals
(or their equivalent) should initiate ideas, not words to describe
those ideas. However, as there is little scope for ideas in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia, the words come in for far too
much attention by the overseas representatives. The latter are
well provided with good and co-operative staffs but owing to the
small amount of work the seniors are disinclined to leave detail
to their staffs. At least two overseas representatives are
somewhat disgruntled at leaving active jobs in their own countries
to come out to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia, especially
when they discovered on arrival the limited scope of their work.

This certainly has not made for harmony at meetings. They are
capable officers but do not have scope for their energy or
capabilities.

9. In the light of experience, if I had to advise on the raising
and control of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force again, I
would recommend that-
(a) The control and maintenance of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force be placed entirely under the Australian Chiefs of
Staff assisted by staff representatives from each contributing
country integrated into the staffs of the Australian Services or
Joint Service Machinery.

(b) Australia should ask each country to provide a national
contingent which should be as self-contained as far as possible,
Australia to provide the whole maintenance set up. The force
Headquarters would need to be integrated on a scale to be decided
by Australia.

(c) On a Governmental level each contributing country or Dominion
to provide a representative to deal with broad policy affecting
their forces. High Commissioners or their nominees would appear
suitable for the purpose as it would be far from a full-time job.

10. Failing agreement to my proposals in paragraph 9, I consider
scaling down of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia is
essential. I feel that one senior representative from each country
is the maximum that should sit on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia for the running of the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force. He should represent the Army, Navy and Air components
supplied from his country or Dominion. The work connected with the
British Commonwealth Occupation Force does not really justify the
status of overseas representatives being more than that of
Brigadier (or equivalent). They should have on their personal
staffs representatives of the other Services but these latter
representatives should not have a seat on or appear at the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Australia meetings. My object is to reduce the
number of voices at the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia
meetings in order to expedite business.

11. Owing to lack of pure Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia work,
many of the overseas staffs have been co-opted into the Australian
Army Staffs to give a hand with the detailed work of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force maintenance. This is paying handsome
dividends in every direction, it lightens our load and enables the
overseas staffs to get to know our system, appreciate our
problems, whilst at the same time ensuring that proper measures
are being taken for the maintenance of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force as a whole as well as the particular portions
thereof in which they are primarily interested.

12. I feel that to continue with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia on its present set up is placing a heavy strain on
Empire Co-operation. We must learn to trust each other (as we did
in the Middle East and Singapore) and not treat each other as
foreign countries. When placing troops under United States
operational control during the war, the component parts of the
Empire seemed to have more faith in the ability of the United
States of America to run the organization fairly and efficiently.

It is probable that we still have to convince the United Kingdom
and India that Dominions Governments and their Fighting Services
are capable of controlling and maintaining Empire forces in
theatres where a particular Dominion has the predominant Empire
interest.

V.A.H. STURDEE
Lieut.-General
Chief of the General Staff