Security 92.

1. Dr. Evatt presided at meetings of the Spanish Committee
yesterday and today. Yesterday's meeting was devoted to
continuation of the public questioning of the Spanish Republican
Prime Minister, Giral. Today's private meeting was devoted to an
examination of the stage reached in the committee's work and a
full and frank exchange of views regarding the preperation of
report for the Security Council. Members agreed that Thursday
should be declared the deadline, for receiving information
regarding the Spanish situation and that the Committee should not
ask for any extension of time but complete its report on May 31st.

The preparation of objective summaries of all evidence available
under each of the nine points of the commitee's studies has
reached an advanced stage and the Commitee has now turned towards
consideration of the conclusions.

2. The point to which the Committee is now moving is that while
there is evidence of international friction there is probably no
satisfactory evidence that peace is endangered to such an extent
as to justify action by the Security Council under Chapter 7.

Indeed it is realised if the Security Council were to take
measures under Article 39 as proposed in the Polish resolution [1]
before the Security Council, it must be prepared to recognise that
these measures are only the beginning of a series of steps to
remove the threat to peace, and that if the first step, namely,
breaking off of diplomatic relations did not bring the desired
result it would have to be followed by even more severe measures
under Articles 39 and 41. While the evidence regarding Franco's
association with the Axis powers and of his complicity in
conspiracies with Hitler and Mussolini to wage aggressive warfare
is exceptionally strong, it is clear that since the defeat of
Italy and Germany, Spain today does not at the present moment
threaten a breach of peace. At the same time members of the
Committee recognise that so long as the Franco regime remains in
Spain there is a potential threat to the peace and the United
Nations system of security will be incomplete. Evidence regarding
the closing of the Franco-Spanish frontier shows that it was in
fact a little more than a protest against the killing in Spain of
a Spanish national who had been prominent in the French resistance
movement, and that the closing of the frontier did not have
military significance.

3. While there is some doubt whether the Security Council could
lawfully take action of the kind called for by the Polish
resolution, the members of the Committee recognise that the
previous decision of the General Assembly that Spain cannot be
admitted to the United Nations so long as the Franco regime
remains in power, points to the necessity for some further action
by the United Nations. The Security Council has no specific
jurisdiction in a situation which is broader than a threat to the
peace requiring immediate enforcement action, and which is of
general concern to all members of the United Nations. It has been
suggested that the situation might be handled more appropriately
by the General Assembly under Article 14 [2] of the Charter, and
that such action by the General Assembly would be in logical
sequence from the General Assembly resolution of last January. [3]

4. It is therefore quite probable that the final conclusion
reached by the Committee will favour a special report by the
Security Council to the General Assembly (Articles 15 and 24 of
the Charter) drawing attention to the seriousness of the situation
in Spain and the strong evidence of conduct by the Franco regime
contrary to the principles of the United Nations and hindering the
attainment of the organisation's purposes, and recommending that
the General Assembly should itself take the responsibility for any
such measures as breaking diplomatic relations with Spain.

5. Dr. Evatt's provisional views have had an effect on the
Committee ...some of whom were at first inclined to take action in
conflict with the Charter. His special knowledge of the Charter
and its drafting and its legal implications may well save the
Council from action which in the long run would be detrimental to
the United Nations and would also be prejudicial to Australian
consistent position that the facts must always be ascertained and
proved before sanction can be applied.