1. Reference your United Nations No.171 and Atomic No.6 [1], I am
furnishing my provisional personal observations on your cablegram.

It has only been possible to consult the Defence Committee so far,
and I shall submit your cablegram and my observations to Cabinet
at its meeting on Friday, 14th June, and advise you of the views
of Ministers. The following qualifications are made in regard to
my observations:-

(i) We have not received information of the results of the meeting
in London on Atomic Energy [2] which was held after I left. A copy
of the proceedings is in transit.

(ii) In view of the urgency of the matter owing to the early
meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, the observations have
been furnished without awaiting the receipt of the documents
referred to in your cablegram.

2. The following are my observations on your cablegram:-

(i) The first one relates to procedure. The United States is at
present in a monopoly position in regard to atomic energy and, if
the Lilienthal Report is being adopted by it, this would indicate
a broad and cooperative approach to the problem. It is assumed
that you have knowledge that this will be their attitude, and have
framed your observations on this understanding. I think it is
important that the United States should state their proposals
first on this matter to the Atomic Commission, in view of the
great responsibilities they carry in the shape of information on
the subject and a willingness or otherwise to share it.

(ii) The following observations are made on the recommendations
referred to in paragraph 4 of your cablegram:-

(a) It is noted that the vesting in the United Nations of all
rights in raw materials, processes, plants, and the products of
plants, for the exploitation of all forms of atomic energy, is in
accordance with the Lilienthal Report which, as stated, also
provides for a system of inspection. In view of the contention
that the primary objective of the discovery should be human
welfare, the Lilienthal Report places great emphasis on the non-
dangerous activities being left to nations or private agencies
under the general control and supervision of the United Nations
authority. It might be as well to refer to this aspect also.

In regard to 'prompt' action for vesting these matters in the
United Nations, this is linked with the disclosure of information
referred to later in (b).

(b) This recommendation provides for the disclosure of all
information without any reference to stages or the organisation of
international safeguards.

It will be noted that the statement of Mr. Attlee and President
Truman referred to the relation between disclosure of information
and the establishment of enforceable safeguards against its use
for destructive purposes. [3] The resolution of the General
Assembly also referred to the work proceeding by separate stages
with the development of the necessary confidence of the world. [4]

The Lilienthal Report indicates that the proposed plan will take
some time to put into operation:-

'The transfer of such facilities to international control; the
establishment under international control of similar facilities in
other nations; the creation of stockpiles; the gradual building up
of groups of men skilled in the various necessary artsthese are
changes which from their very nature will require time to bring
about, and which can, within not too wide limits, be scheduled and
controlled.'

A basic factor is the geographical location of plants so that a
strategic balance may be maintained among nations. In this way,
protection would be afforded against such eventualities as the
failure of the United Nations control, or the seizure by any one
State of material and plant in its territory.

In regard to the use of the knowledge for the production of atomic
weapons, the report states that, if such knowledge were available
to a rival undertaking, it would shorten the time needed for the
solution of the practical problems of making atomic weapons
Finally, the report states that:-

'In accepting the plan here recommended for international control,
the United States will be committed to making available this
information at the time, and in the full measure required by the
operating necessities. Once the sequence and timing of stages has
been fixed by negotiation and agreement between the nations, a
minimum rate of disclosure of information will have been fixed by
the agreement as well.'

It would appear, therefore, that the release of information has to
be based on a plan which will provide the safeguards of control
and be the basis of agreement among nations.

(c) This recommendation is concurred in.

(d) This recommendation is concurred in. It is related to the
observations on (a) relative to non-dangerous activities connected
with the use of atomic energy. [5]