Evidence is accumulating that Van Mook has been sent to United
States to try out United States reaction to further military
moves, and that a final decision will be taken at The Hague before
Van Mook returns to Batavia. The Dutch, in making their choice
between withdrawal and advance, must be aware of the time factor
if the decision is to advance. Physically, movement will be
impossible as soon as the rainy season sets in, but, perhaps more
important, there is building up, as a result of Consular
observance of the 'cease fire' and the appointment of the
Committee of Three, a political situation in which it is even more
difficult to justify military action.

2. However, there is little doubt that, as previously, the Dutch
will cling to any expressions of views which are not positively
discouraging, and we fear that, encouraged by United States and
United Kingdom voting at the Security Council, they may he led to
think that further military action would not necessarily be
followed in the Security Council by the imposition of effective
sanctions on the Netherlands East Indies and on Holland itself.

3. We have done what we can in United Kingdom and the United
States to warn of this danger, but such a warning would best come
from the representatives of these and other countries at Batavia.

You might take opportunity, therefore, in discussions with
Consular group to emphasise the need for maintaining the 'cease
fire' position and, if possible, meanwhile arrange for troop
withdrawals at least until the Committee of Three meets and makes
some firm recommendations. You should drop the hint that this
considered view, if agreed upon by all, should be communicated
back to their Government and from their Governments to the Dutch,
so that there will be no doubt in their mind that, in the view of
the Consular group, there is no justification in the present
situation for further military action.

4. While your main duty is to observe the 'cease fire' order, you
are also acting as Consul-General and have, therefore, a duty to
report on these broader issues, and for this purpose you should
seek the co-operation as far as possible of your military
assistants who will agree with us that, whatever the merits of the
case, in Australian interests everything possible must be done to
avoid long term fighting in Indonesia.