MELBOURNE, 27 March 1947

TOP SECRET

APPRECIATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF
AUSTRALIA

[matter omitted]

Terms of Reference:

By minute dated 12 December 1946, the Joint Secretary, Joint
Planning Committee forwarded copy of Chiefs of Staff Committee
Minute No. 11/1946 and copy No. 32 of 'An Appreciation of the
Strategical Position of Australia' dated February 1946. [1] The
Joint Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee requested that this
matter receive the attention of the Joint Intelligence Committee,
and that they report on the Intelligence aspects thereof to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee. [2]

Having examined these documents, the Joint Intelligence Committee
submit the following appreciation for the consideration of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Division of this Appreciation into parts:

2. For convenience, this appreciation is divided into three parts-
Part 1- Review of the world situation as it affects Australia.

Part 2A- Possibility of war.

B- The likely courses of action the enemy would adopt, with
particular reference to theatres of operations.

Part 3- Short summary of conclusions of Joint Intelligence
Committee.

REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT AFFECTS AUSTRALIA

Threats from Adjacent Countries:

3. In the foreseeable future, which can be regarded as the period
which planning based on present knowledge must take into account,
Australia's physical security is not likely to be seriously
endangered as a result of any hostile or unfriendly action in her
own theatre. No country in the Pacific or South East Asia (India
is dealt with separately) possesses the capacity, either in point
of organisation or equipment, to conduct operations against her of
any significance. There is no danger at present discernible of any
of them developing a military potential which would enable them,
either together or singly, successfully to challenge the
Commonwealth.

4. Apart from questions of their military capacity, none of these
countries, perhaps with the exception of Siam, has yet evolved any
set policy to govern its future relations with Australia. In the
case of Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China and the Philippines,
a variety of factors, particularly the incomplete stage of their
political development, makes it extremely doubtful whether their
own leaders, as distinct from their foreign administrations,
Dutch, British, French or American as the case may be, which
exercise or until recently exercised jurisdiction over them, have
yet got down to thinking in terms of external policy. What is
quite clear is that a considerable time will elapse before any
grouping of these countries define their essential area interests.

Until they do so and have a clear appreciation of what they want,
they are unlikely to quarrel with Australian policy. The risk
remains that they can at any time be prompted by external
pressure, whether Russian, Chinese or Indian, to protest against
some aspect of Australian policy or to lend their support against
some Australian action. But the point at which their protests
become a military threat will be the point at which Australia, as
part of the British Commonwealth, faces a greater threat in Europe
or Asia or both. By themselves, whether they are regarded in
groupings or singly, the countries in this area do not endanger
our physical security except insofar as they are made part of a
hostile programme whose main impact is felt elsewhere.

Nature of the Problem:

5. Such threats to Australian security as here require
consideration will be in consequence of hostile or unfriendly
action in the Middle East or Far East. This does not disregard
Europe as a possible theatre of war, or the possibility that
initial moves by a future enemy will be made in Europe. What it
does say is that inevitably hostile action in any one of the three
major theatres, whether Europe, the Middle East or the Far East,
will quickly react in the other two, thus establishing in the case
of Australia a responsibility to concentrate, in her defence
planning, on the Middle East and the Far East as the regions in
proximity to her.

6. Each of these two areas, particularly the former, is capable of
producing a situation which threatens some vital British interest
resulting in Australia becoming involved either because of her
ties with the United Kingdom or because it is felt that Australian
participation is essential in order to protect her own ultimate
position.

7. The only Powers capable of waging war singly against the
British Commonwealth are the United States and the USSR It is
assumed for present purposes that no threat arises from the United
States. For so long as close relations are maintained between the
British Commonwealth and the United States, no combination of
powers which does not include Russia can safely challenge the
British Commonwealth.

8. In these circumstances, this paper limits itself to a survey of
the position in the Far East and the Middle East as the areas in
which any threat to Australia may become real, either because of
direct Russian action or because of support given by the Soviet to
other major countries in those areas.

9. It is not said that Russia is committed to aggression, or that
diplomacy is incapable of adjusting current or future differences.

The proposition is merely that, in estimating the military
contingencies that can arise in the future, attention must be
given first and foremost to the factor of Russia.

Russia in the Far East.

10. From the economic point of view, the Far East is important to
the Soviet because of the great potential resources of her own
eastern territories as well as of Manchuria, the potentialities of
the Chinese market, the mercantile outlet provided by the warm
water ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, and the access which these
ports give her to raw materials in the Pacific and South East
Asia.

11. Russia also has a definite political interest in the Far East.

Her frontiers with China are largely protected by a chain of
buffer states and provinces in which Soviet influence
predominates, but her Pacific seaboard provides a back door
through which Russian security can be seriously threatened. In the
face of the growing power of the United States, which now
confronts her in Asia as well as in Europe, it has become
essential that she establish for herself a strong position on the
Pacific coast. This objective is helped by the eastward movement
of Soviet industry, although considerations of Russian security in
Europe here play their part. The Soviet position is further
strengthened by her occupation of Northern Korea, by the
acquisition of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, and by the
activity of Chinese communists in Manchuria and elsewhere in
northern China.

Russian Policy towards Japan:

12. Russia is unlikely to regard her position in the Far East as
consolidated for so long as United States forces remain in Japan.

If and when those forces withdraw, the Soviet may aim to dominate
the country by a puppet Japanese government backed up by military
pressure from adjoining Soviet territory. Meanwhile, Soviet policy
is directed towards the communisation of Japanese prisoners of war
in Russian hands. In Japan itself its opportunities are at present
limited to preparing the ground. This can be done by supporting
the spread of communism among the Japanese, and by undermining
American influence.

The Factor of China:

13. Since the early withdrawal of American forces from Japan
cannot be forecast, the Soviet may be prompted to look for
alternative support in the Far East. The prospect of Japan under
what for all practical purposes is American control is one which
can be easily faced only if the Soviet is not at the same time
confronted by an unfriendly China, which could quickly become an
enemy base.

14. Threats which the Soviet may find in China would be removed if
that country were brought under Russian influence. This end might
be accomplished by the establishment, through penetration or by
civil war, of a passive Chinese government or, in the last resort,
by a political and military understanding with the Kuomintang.

15. The present temper of Chinese nationalist leaders does not
rule out the possibility of China and the Soviet reaching an
understanding which goes beyond the limited scope of their treaty
of 14th August 1945. There is already some evidence of Chinese
distrust of American policy in the Far East. There are potential
sources of friction, some of which can lead to serious
disagreement, between China and the United Kingdom and between
China and France. The reappearance of Japan as a strong economic
unit, especially if this results from the policy of the Western
Powers, may create grave disquiet. These factors, singly or in
combination, are capable of re-orientating Chinese sympathy
towards Russia.

16. There is, however, no immediate need for the Soviet to
entertain the idea of a military alliance with China. With the
American decision to discontinue efforts at mediation between the
Chinese Government and Chinese communists, the way is open for the
Soviet herself, if she so elects, to attempt to bring about the
establishment of a central Chinese government which in the initial
stages might be at least partly Communist and offer scope for
future infiltration of Russian influence. It is perhaps relevant
to mention that in some quarters the American failure at mediation
is traced to Russian efforts, exercised through Yenan, to prevent
the creation under American influence of a unified China which
might threaten Russian security.

Russia and South East Asia:

17. South East Asia cannot be without some importance in Soviet
strategy, but it is important in the restricted sense that South
East Asia plays a part in the economy as well as in the strategic
dispositions of the Western Powers, and unrest there can have a
prejudicial effect on their military capacity in Europe, in the
Middle East and in the Far East. Russia's broad objectives,
whether expansionist or merely aimed at her own conception of
security, could be achieved in this region by propaganda and
disruptive tactics which would curtail resources from the Western
Powers and hold down their forces.

18. Direct Russian intervention in South East Asia is most
improbable. Quite apart from the relative unimportance of the area
to her, the Soviet would hardly risk the danger of extending her
forces into South East Asia while the United States remains
unchallenged on her eastern flank. A Soviet challenge to the
United States in the Far East would seem to be a necessary pre-
condition to Russian military activity in South East Asia or, for
that matter, elsewhere in the Pacific.

Importance of China:

19. The real danger to South East Asia, and therefore to
Australia, will arise from the Far East if Russia should combine
with China. Under these circumstances China would be well placed,
and indeed might be prompted on her own account to embark on
operations in Indo-China, Burma, Siam, Malaya or elsewhere in the
region. In such an event she would derive substantial assistance
from the large groups of overseas Chinese who honeycomb these
countries. These Chinese nationals must be considered a potential
source of trouble in South East Asia, firstly because incidents
between them and indigenous peoples of the area are capable of
provoking demands or providing the excuse for intervention by
China in South East Asia; and secondly because, in the event of
such intervention, they can facilitate the entry of Chinese forces
and, in some regions, cause widespread paralysis of public
services.

20. China by herself does not now or in the foreseeable future
represent a threat to South East Asia or to Australia. She has
become impoverished by many years of war; politically she is
sharply divided although a growing nationalism may ultimately
blunt this division; her army is poorly equipped, there are no
Chinese naval or air forces of any consequence; and she has a
primitive economy.

Future of Japan:

21.Premature withdrawal by the United States and the British
Commonwealth of their occupation forces in Japan would leave the
way open for an immediate Russian influx, possibly resulting in
Japan being quickly brought for all practical purposes under
Soviet direction. If, on the other hand, the Western Powers remain
in control, the prospects are that Japan will establish a stable
government, which at any rate in form will be a democratic
government, and a reasonable economy. These characteristics may,
nevertheless, be insufficient, after the period of occupation, to
keep her out of the Russian camp. The essential danger is that
whatever the nature of their government, the Japanese may be
prompted by expediency to turn to any foreign quarter whose
support is calculated to facilitate the re-establishment of Japan
as a first class power. This urge may orientate Japan towards
Russia, despite the inconclusive factor of the traditional enmity
between these two countries and despite Russia's occupation of the
Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin. It is difficult to dogmatise at
this stage but, given a withdrawal from Japan of American
influence, an understanding between Japan and Russia is less
improbable than an understanding between Japan and China. Either
development, however, is beyond the period encompassed by this
paper.

Russia in the Middle East:

22. The Middle East area is of particular strategic concern to the
Soviet. As a potential source of trouble it outranks the Far East
in importance. Although, in consequence of the war, the Soviet has
achieved her old frontiers in the west and east, she has not done
so in the south where her frontier has no protective screen. In
her desire to deepen her defences she may attempt to dominate
countries such as Turkey and Persia which she considers necessary
to her security in this region. It is held in some quarters that
the Russian search for security is a constantly expanding process
without fixed limits. If this view is correct, the Soviet may seek
access to the Persian Gulf, and generally attempt to extend her
economic and political, and perhaps her ideological influence
throughout the Arab countries. In this region there are minorities
lending themselves to exploitation, and the unrest throughout the
area provides fertile ground for an active policy.

23. If Russia merely aims at self-protection, if there are in fact
clear limits to her search for security, some appreciable measure
of Soviet activity in the Middle East can still be expected. In
this region she must be conscious of great weakness in two
important respects. While the industrialisation of her eastern
areas, an essential feature of her planning, has reduced the
vulnerability of Soviet industry to attack from the West, that
industry has now become vulnerable to attack from the south. At
the same time, her Caucasian oilfields upon which she is so
dependent are an easy objective for any potential enemy operating
from adjacent areas to the south.

24. The importance of the Middle East in future strategy arises
partly from the fact that it contains one third of the oil
resources of the world. Russian oil supplies are not inexhaustible
for her long term requirements, and she must therefore at some
stage look beyond her southern borders to increase them.

Conversely, the Soviet's own position is strengthened, riot only
in the Middle East, but in every other theatre, if, by political
or other measures, she can deny oil to Britain, the only other
major power of any consequence in the Middle East. Since roughly
seventy Percent of British requirements are drawn from this
region, the implications of any serious curtailment of these
supplies are obvious.

Threats to South East Asia:

25. As in the case of Russian policy in the Far East, South East
Asia can be regarded as being of secondary importance to Soviet
strategy in the Middle East. It is difficult to imagine a direct
Soviet attack on any of the countries in South East Asia, for the
reason that, in the event of war elsewhere, disruptive tactics
without resort to force would achieve much the same result as a
direct assault, namely, the holding down of the forces of Western
Powers and limiting the flow of their supplies. If,
notwithstanding this factor, a Soviet attack were launched from
the north west, it would require to b@ based on India or on the
Persian Gulf. It could be based on the Persian Gulf only if Russia
first secured her eastern, that is to say, her Indian flank by an
understanding with India, or by some assurance that India would
remain neutral.

Importance of India:

26. It is reasonable to assume that, in keeping with a traditional
attitude, Russia will develop increasing interest in India from
this point onwards. The United Kingdom is no longer in a position
effectively to control the course of Indian events, and British
authority will be withdrawn not later than 30th June, 1948. This
decision, coupled with India's internal dissension, provides
Russia with an opportunity to pursue a more positive policy in
India than she has done in the past.

27. As distinct from this, Russia must calculate the strategic
importance of India in relation to any moves which she may
contemplate in the Middle East. A hostile India, providing a base
for operations against the Russian flank created by any Soviet
thrust into Persia, is a potential threat which Soviet policy
cannot afford to ignore. A neutral India, on the other hand, would
greatly facilitate Russian strategy in the Middle East since it
safeguards that flank. Indian neutrality is, in fact, of more
essential use to the Soviet than an India brought into an
alliance, because an alliance would open the country not only to
enemy attack but also to enemy occupation.

28. In India itself, the situation is fluid, and some considerable
time is likely to elapse before Indian leaders make up their minds
regarding which course the country should follow. There appear,
however, to be at least three ways in which the situation may
develop-
(a) There are a number of indications, including the resolution of
the Constituent Assembly for the proclamation of India as an
independent sovereign republic, that India will decide not to
remain in the British Commonwealth. Despite her withdrawal,
however, India may continue to go along with countries of the
British Commonwealth because she already has firm economic and
political relations with many of them, because of her long
connection with the United Kingdom, and because she may consider
that she would gain strength from maintaining a close connection
with British countries, especially if, as is and will be the case,
those countries maintain close relations with the United States.

(b) India may join the Russian camp. On security grounds her
leaders may argue that China is bound ultimately to come under
Russian control, thereby increasing the threat to India from
Russia in the north east. On ideological grounds, it may be argued
that Russia is an Asiatic power; insofar as the Moslems are
concerned, cultural ties may be found in the fact that there are
25,000,000 Muslims in adjacent Soviet Republics. On purely
political grounds, those Indian leaders who desire to cast India
as the principal power in South East Asia may be tempted to
conclude that this role might be more quickly accomplished if
given Russian backing. Finally, it is not without point that
Russia, unlike the United Kingdom, France and Holland has no
colonial possessions in the area, the administration of which may
provide a source of friction, or at least evoke adverse Indian
comment.

(c) India may adopt a completely independent role, reasoning that
in view of her huge size, population and resources she can
maintain herself as a single unit. It is impossible at this stage
to predict with any confidence the course which India may take.

The most that can be suggested is that Soviet policy will aim to
ensure Indian neutrality in the event of hostilities in the Middle
East. It is open to serious doubt whether Russia, having an eye on
her own particular strategy which demands that she focus attention
on the Middle East, would be prepared to support by military
strength any foreign aspirations which India may develop.

Conclusion:

29. Just as China is the key to hostile strategy in eastern Asia,
so India must be regarded as the key to hostile strategy in the
area to the north west of Australia. Australia's physical security
is not directly threatened by Russia without China, nor by Russia
without India. In the foreseeable future neither China nor India
constitutes a military danger to Australia unless it receives
Russian military support. Given such support, these countries
could represent a threat.

PART 2

POSSIBILITY OF WAR AND LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION AN ENEMY WOULD
ADOPT

A THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR

30. In discussing the possibilities of war it should be borne in
mind that service intelligence is bound to consider the worst
case, in order that:-

(a) The intentions of a potential enemy can be assessed as long as
is possible before actual hostilities are declared.

(b) The necessary data can be accumulated to wage a successful
war.

31. While there is no evidence to show that war between the
British Commonwealth of Nations and the USSR is inevitable, the
possibility that such a conflict may occur exists, and will
continue to exist. Therefore, in laying plans for the future,
consideration must be given not only to the possibility of a clash
with the USSR, but also to the future time at which such a clash
is most likely to occur.

32. The main possibility of war between the British Commonwealth
of Nations and the USSR lies in the expansionist policy which the
Soviet Government has followed to date. While at present there is
a halt in the Soviet long range plan of expansion, it is likely
that, after consolidation, further stages of the plan will be put
into effect.

33. Though at present it appears unlikely that the USSR will
deliberately seek war with the UK and the USA-since war with the
former would most probably mean war with the latter also-the
possibility continually exists that, through a miscalculation of
the exact point at which she will be opposed by force, the USSR
may make a move which will provoke armed counter measures.

34. While, therefore, the possibility of an armed clash between
the UK and the USA on the one hand and the USSR on the other, does
exist, the probability of such a clash and the future time at
which it is likely to occur, will be governed primarily by the
following factors:-

(a) The future foreign policy adopted by the USSR.

(b) The ability of the economy of the USSR to back up an
aggressive foreign policy.

(c) The possession by the USSR of atomic and biological weapons.

35. The foreign policy of the USSR has so far provided her with a
ring of buffer states except in the Middle East and on her Pacific
seaboard and it is most probable that her future aim is to achieve
similar protection for what she considers her present weak spots.

These two areas also represent the most likely places in which the
adoption of a policy of expansion on the part of the USSR is
likely to bring her into conflict with UK and USA interests.

36. Probably the largest single factor in determining the future
time at which a war with the USSR is likely to take place is the
ability of Soviet economy to support a major war. At present
Soviet economy is not in a position to do this as it is engaged in
the process of rehabilitating itself after the exhausting struggle
of World War II. The overall economic objective has been
officially stated as being to increase its military-economic
potential to such a degree that the country will be safe in the
future against any contingencies. All effort under the present
five year plan is being directed towards this end, with special
emphasis on heavy industry, in which sphere the USSR hopes to
reach the USA output level of 1939 by 1960. In the all-out drive
to step up production in heavy industry the output of light
industry has suffered considerably, since the five year plan
cannot produce the consumer commodities the USSR requires and at
the same time maintain the target set for it in heavy industry. in
an attempt to supply the much needed consumer goods, without
unduly retarding her overall programme, the Soviet Government has
made, and is continuing to make, trade agreements with Eastern
European and Scandinavian countries. At the present rate of
progress there appears to be little chance of the Soviet economy
being able to achieve its ultimate aim until 1955 at the very
earliest, with the possibility however, that at the end of the
current five year plan in 1950, it may be sufficiently far
advanced for the Soviet Government to become somewhat bolder in
its foreign policy. In addition, the USSR is having its own share
of internal problems, the cumulative effect of which may be to
retard production and so lengthen the period required to reach the
ultimate economic goal. The main internal problems of the USSR
are:-

(a) The intense ideological campaign which is in progress to
ensure that all branches of the intelligentsia are solidly behind
the Soviet regime.

(b) The necessity for an extensive overhaul of the Communist Party
to eliminate the laxity and corruption that wartime relaxation of
party controls allowed to flourish, and to ensure that all members
of the party, which has doubled its strength since 1939, receive
an adequate political education.

(c) The shift of Soviet industrial centres eastward has caused
unrest in the Urals due to the enforced retention of large numbers
of workers in that area under severe weather conditions and with
poor housing facilities.

(d) Unrest in the Ukraine which is deeply bound up with the
nationalist aims of the Ukrainians and in the last 18 months has
caused the replacement of over half the leading workers in that
area.

37. While it is impossible to judge accurately to what extent the
development of atomic and biological weapons has progressed in the
USSR, her espionage attempts and her recent support of the
principle of disarmament indicate that she has not as yet
developed these weapons. The Soviet Government is however
expending considerable money and energy on atomic research and it
appears a reasonable assumption that by 1951 she will be in a
position to produce atomic weapons. This view is supported by
American atomic experts and has been stated by Mr. Bernard M.

Baruch who was until recently a member of the U.N. Atomic Energy
Commission. It is unlikely that the USSR would risk war without
possessing atomic weapons, since the disadvantage at which this
would place her might well prove insurmountable.

38. Another minor factor which may reduce the possibility of an
early war with the USSR is the British withdrawal from India by
30th June, 1948. This will enable Soviet propaganda to be greatly
increased in that country and will afford opportunities for the
USSR to develop friendly relations with India. A friendly or
neutral India is essential to the USSR should she see fit to
extend her influence in the Middle East by military means.

39. From a consideration of the above, it will be seen that the
possibility of war with the USSR does exist, particularly if that
country continues to indulge in an expansionist foreign policy.

The possibility of the USSR precipitating a war before 1950-51,
however, appears remote, although after that date the possibility
of war will increase and will continue to increase until 1960,
when, if her economic plans are successful she will consider
herself in a position to support economically an aggressive
foreign policy backed by military force.

B LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION BY THE USSR SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR
WITH THE WESTERN POWERS

General:

40. It is proposed in this section to discuss the possible course
of military action that the USSR might follow in the event of
hostilities with the Western Powers. This will be confined to a
consideration from the point of view of the USSR and does not
include any reference to possible counter measures by the Western
Powers.

[matter omitted]

General Strategy:

44. From the foregoing, it will be seen that any aggression on the
part of the USSR in the immediate future would, of necessity, be
primarily confined to land advances supported by the air forces,
both of which will be supplemented by intense submarine activity
against our trade communications and seaborne troop movements.

When considering these aspects it is likely that our anti-
submarine measures will need to be on a far larger scale than
those which were necessary during World War II against Germany and
Japan.

45. From the point of view of available manpower, it would be
possible for the USSR to take aggressive action simultaneously on
her Eastern, Southern and Western frontiers. However, in view of
the present limitations of her communications, and the disposition
and development of her economic resources in the Far East, it is
considered that full scale aggression on all fronts would be
unsound. It is thought, therefore, that as a general plan the USSR
would fight an aggressive war on her Western and Southern flanks
with the object of overrunning Europe-including Great Britain and
the Middle East, while fighting a holding war in the Far East
after the initial occupation of Manchuria (should China be an
unfriendly neutral) and Korea.

Probable Military Action:

46. In view of the above overall strategy that the USSR is likely
to adopt, the following more detailed moves in the various areas
are within her scope and are considered to represent the probable
manner in which she will achieve that strategy:-

(a) Europe-
Immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, the USSR could occupy
Eastern Europe, at the same time advancing westwards to overrun
France and Spain. The present strength of the Western Powers'
armies of occupation on the continent would preclude any serious
resistance to this move. These steps would include the eventual
isolation of United Kingdom and, if possible, an invasion of that
island. In these moves the forces of her satellite states could be
given an important role such as an assault on Greece. With this
accomplished, the USSR would control the Mediterranean and
effectively seal the Dardanelles.

(b) Middle East-
In the Middle East the USSR could seize Persia, Iraq and Palestine
and occupy Arabia to a line between the head of the Persian Gulf
and the Suez Canal. This would give her control of 90% of the
existent Middle East oilfields and complete the isolation of
Turkey which could be reduced at leisure. Should India prove
unfriendly the USSR could occupy Afghanistan to guard against the
possibility of a counter-offensive being mounted from India, and
for use as a propaganda base to further disrupt Indian unity.

(c) Far East-
The USSR while desirous of occupying Japan might be unable to do
so provided the Occupation Forces remained, and retained their
comparative naval and air superiority. If denied the possession of
Japan, the USSR would attempt to neutralise, as much as possible,
its effectiveness as an Allied base, and to this end would
probably make use of what atomic and biological weapons she had at
her disposal. The USSR would also occupy Sinkiang, Manchuria and
Korea, and probably the Inner Mongolian Province of Chahar, in
order to make use of the war potential of these areas
(particularly Manchuria), to lessen the strain on her rather weak
Trans-Siberian communications and to assure her of a buffer area
on her otherwise unprotected frontier. In this former respect it
is noteworthy that Manchuria is estimated to be the only area in
the Far East which is capable of supporting a large population
other than its indigenous people. This figure is considered to be
approximately 1,500,000- On the other hand, the USSR Far Eastern
provinces are at present incapable of supporting themselves in
essential commodities, much less a large striking force in
addition.

Should China prove friendly towards the USSR, however, the
foregoing move would not be necessary.

PART 3

SHORT SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

47. The following is a summary of the main conclusions reached by
Joint Intelligence Committee as a result of the Appreciation of
the Strategical Position of Australia:-

(a) In the foreseeable future Australia's physical security is not
likely to be seriously endangered, as the result of any hostile or
unfriendly action in her own theatre.

(b) The USSR is the only major power against whom the British
Commonwealth of Nations is likely to be involved in a war.

(c) The possibility of the USSR precipitating a war within the
immediate future appears remote, although the possibility of war
will increase as time elapses, and continue to increase. By 1960
her economic development could be sufficiently advanced to support
an aggressive foreign policy backed by military force, plus all
advanced scientific aids.

(d) In the event of such a war Britain might be in the position of
an island fortress because of the use of guided missiles and
biological warfare. Empire defence might therefore become the
primary responsibility of the Dominions and British possessions
overseas.

(e) Likely areas of Australian participation would be the Middle
East and the Far East.

(f) It is considered that as a general plan the USSR would fight
an aggressive war in Europe and the Middle East, with the object
of overrunning both areas, while fighting a holding war in the Far
East after the initial occupation of North China (Sinkiang,
Manchuria and Korea) should China prove an unfriendly neutral.