CASE FOR WITHDRAWAL

This is case you asked for.

A case can also be made against.

Both will be a priori until we know more about the actual
situation. Probably nobody knows. But Critchley ought to be asked,
particularly as Cochran has made his own judgement.

ATTACHMENT

INDONESIA

CASE FOR DUTCH WITHDRAWAL

The demand for the withdrawal of Dutch troops and Civil
authorities from areas occupied as the result of military action
can be supported by the following:-

(i) The Dutch action was undertaken in violation of the Security
Council's cease fire order of 1st August, 1947 [1] as interpreted
by the resolution of October 31st 1947 [2], the Renville Truce
Agreement [3], and the United Nations Charter. Withdrawal is
therefore required in order to uphold the United Nations and in
the interests of simple justice. Advantages gained by the Dutch as
a result of unlawful military action should not be retained.

(ii) While the Dutch continue to occupy areas recently acquired,
Indonesian guerilla activity is likely to result in the
destruction of material resources and prevent normal economic and
commercial development. Resultant poverty is likely to encourage
growth of extremism.

(iii) The failure of mediation is likely to persuade former
moderate elements to extremism. Withdrawal may in some degree
restore confidence in more moderate procedures of attaining
national independence.

(iv) The Dutch action if not successfully opposed may unite
extreme Nationalist and Communist elements throughout South East
Asia in a widespread racial campaign.

(v) Australian support for withdrawal is likely to cement friendly
relations with the peoples of South East Asia. Strong ties of
friendship with Australia's neighbours in the north would be an
invaluable safeguard in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.

[(vi) Elections conducted under Dutch occupation could not
reasonably be represented as unrestricted.]

On the other hand the United Kingdom [and United States] have
claimed that withdrawal of Dutch troops now would not be justified
for the following reasons:-

(i) the demand would be ignored;

(ii) withdrawal would result in chaos and further bloodshed.

A demand for withdrawal which could not be backed with force might
succeed only in strengthening the Dutch position. Since the
Security Council has failed to adopt proposals for a withdrawal it
may be assumed that such a demand would not be backed by the
Council and in any event the application of sanctions to enforce
any move of this nature could not be relied upon.

The contention that the resumption of occupied areas by the
Republic would entail chaos and bloodshed is not supported by the
facts. The Republic has proved itself capable of restraining
dissident elements and maintaining effective government in spite
of the difficult conditions resulting from prolonged Dutch
blockade. A withdrawal observed by the U.N. should [not be] open
to abuse. The withdrawal of Republican troops through the status
quo line following the Renville Agreement was not in fact
accompanied by the abuses feared by the United Kingdom.

It is concluded that while a demand for withdrawal is both just
and in the best interests of Australia, it would not be effective
unless [failing Security Council action], supported by determined
enforcement action by those countries neighbouring upon Indonesia
[as a measure of collective self defence under Article 51]. [4]
Nevertheless, if Australia were not to continue to support such a
demand, the existing goodwill of the Governments and peoples of
South East Asia would be forfeited.