Canberra, 11 December 1950

734. Top Secret Immediate

For Officer¹ from Spender.

We have now received from various sources reports regarding the Truman–Attlee talks.² Our estimate of the significance of these talks is as follows:–

(a) Points of Agreement

(i) United Nations forces will not voluntarily evacuate Korea.

(ii) It is anticipated with some confidence that a defence line can be held by the United Nations, at least so long as Russian air power is not thrown into the scale.

(iii) Every effort will be made to avoid a full–scale war with China.

(iv) The atom bomb will not be used, at least without prior consultation between the United States and the United Kingdom.

(v) There appears to be no immediate prospect of strategic bombing of targets in Manchuria.

(b) Points of Disagreement

(i) The United Kingdom thinks that Communist China should be recognized immediately; the United States thinks this would be placing a premium on aggression.

(ii) The United Kingdom is prepared to discuss some quite unspecified settlement in regard to Formosa; the United States strongly disagree.

2. If the analysis given above is correct, it seems to us that the points of disagreement are so important that they constitute a serious danger. The underlying differences are due not only to different estimates of the probable future policy of Communist China if an immediate settlement can be negotiated: it is due also to a serious divergence in the approach to the present Far Eastern problems which probably reflects the views of public opinion in European countries on the one hand and the United States on the other. Europe, including the United Kingdom, is not unnaturally preoccupied with its defence against possible Russian aggression and is alarmed at the possibility of substantial military resources being tied up in the Far East. It would not be unnatural therefore if there were a tendency amongst European countries to adopt a more 'optimistic' interpretation of Chinese Communist activity and to assume that, if the present problems of Korea, Formosa and recognition were solved, China could be weaned away from Russia and need not be regarded as a present danger to peace. The United States, on the other hand, takes the view that collective action through the United Nations is being tested in Korea. The geographic place where it is being tested is, so to speak, accidental–the important principle underlying United Nations action wherever it takes place is determination to resist aggression. If the United Nations proves effective only against small powers like North Korea, but immediately admits defeat when a large power becomes involved, then faith in the United Nations as a whole may seriously diminish in the United States and in the long run one might have a return to a new kind of 'isolationism'. It is therefore essential, in the American view, not to allow the Chinese to secure concessions regarding Formosa or recognition as a price of agreement on the Korean issue–in other words, at the point of the pistol.

3. These two different approaches appear most important and extremely difficult to reconcile. While European preoccupations are understandable, the American argument must be faced up to. If Communist Chinese demands for Formosa and recognition are accepted, what guarantee is there that she will not press in Indo–China or elsewhere? Again, is there not some risk sufficiently real to be taken into account that the American people, frustrated for the time being in their desires for a successful outcome of the hostilities in Korea and disappointed at what they may regard as insufficient support from their allies, may decide to move away from collective action?

4. In answering the question, what steps should be taken other than the passage by the Assembly of the resolution at present before it,³ much, of course, depends upon what the People's Government does. In considering the matters above and generally, the following observations are made:–

(1) The need to reassure American opinion as to the determination of those members of the United Nations who are actively participating in Korea. To give support to the United States in securing a settlement of the Korean issue consistent with the purpose of the United Nations intervention. (This should be interpreted as leaving us full freedom to restrain or refuse our assent to any particular course of action which we regard as injudicious.)

(2) The danger of 'bargaining' with Communist China on issues other than the Korean, at least until such time as Communist China gives some specific evidence of readiness to accept a reasonable compromise in relation to Korea. (Consideration may soon need to be given as to whether it would be of use to warn Communist China, through diplomatic channels, that the present readiness of various governments to 'lean over backwards' to reassure her cannot be expected to continue indefinitely in the face of continued silence or intransigence.)

(3) On the question of ultimate recognition of Communist China, the door should not be barred. It might be indicated to her by a suitable and informal manner that, if a reasonable settlement can be arranged regarding Korea, the question of recognition of Communist China as the legitimate representative of China in the United Nations will be reconsidered. This might have to be dealt with in two stages, namely–

(a) De–recognition of the Nationalist Government;

(b) Recognition of the Government of Communist China.

(In the event of de–recognition of the Nationalist Government, I have no reliable information as to what are the likely military and political consequences. This must have been considered by the United Kingdom and United States Governments.)

(4) An endeavour to solve the Formosan issue through the United Nations.

5. It seems to me that easily the most difficult problem to solve is the question of Formosa. It now appears that not only General MacArthur but other military advisers hold the view that it is essential to deny the use of Formosa to a potential enemy. It is of the first importance to have confirmation or otherwise of this military appreciation. If it is not correct, it should be possible to find a solution of the Formosan problem without undue difficulty. If it is correct, however, a solution may be extremely difficult to find. One factor which Australia must keep constantly in mind is that a mistaken decision in relation to Formosa, which might initially have only remote consequences for Europe, could have direct consequences of a serious character for Australia.

6. The above analysis is transmitted, not for communication direct to representatives of other governments, but for your confidential background information as an indication of how I presently view the problem and of my current thinking. With these points in mind, it should assist you in sounding out other delegations without committing Australia. I would appreciate your own urgent comments and information as to any reaction you may be able to obtain from other governments.

[NAA: A11537, i]

DEVELOPMENTS ON KOREA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

On 12 December 1950, shortly after the Truman–Attlee discussions, thirteen Arab and Asian countries introduced a draft resolution in the First Committee of the UN GeneralAssembly¹ which called for the formation of a committee of three that would 'determine the basis on which a cease–fire in Korea could be arranged and [would] make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible'. The United States opposed the idea of a cease–fire group, believing that UN forces in Korea–who at the time were suffering major reverses on the Peninsula–would be seen as trying to negotiate from a position of weakness. Indeed, the United States soon demonstrated a preference for a resolution condemning China as an aggressor for crossing the 38th parallel, and it chose to acquiesce in the institution of the cease–fire group in order to demonstrate the futility of the exercise; the United States expected that the PRC would reject the group's proposals.

1 Sir (Frank) Keith Officer, Australian Ambassador to France, temporarily seconded to work with the Permanent Australian Mission to the United Nations.

2 Attlee met with Harry S. Truman, the President of the United States, between 4 and 8 December.

3 On 7 December, a US–sponsored six–power draft resolution had been introduced into the UN General Assembly calling for 'all States and authorities' to prevent their forces from supporting North Korea, and asking that such forces be withdrawn. The resolution also affirmed that it was UN policy to 'hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone'.

1 The function of this Committee is to consider questions from, and prepare recommendations for, the General Assembly on issues involving, inter alia, membership of the Organization, political matters, and the maintenance of international peace and security. The Committee is also referred to as the Political Committee.