Canberra, undated¹

Top Secret

The Political Problems of a Korean Armistice

Introduction

The prospect of an armistice in Korea makes it urgently necessary to consider the Australian attitude on the scope and substance of the post armistice political conference to be held within 90 days of the signature of the Armistice Agreement.

[matter omitted]

It is suggested that Australia's main objective should be to ensure the greatest possible measure of agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States since the views of these two Governments on Far Eastern problems and the timing of moves in relation to the Far East are often divergent. In this connexion the possibility of a public clash between the United Kingdom and United States on Far Eastern policy and problems, and the dangers inherent in such a clash, should not be overlooked.

[matter omitted]

4. Future of Formosa

We should agree with the United States that [at this time]² it would be undesirable for Formosa to be under the control of Peking.

The United Kingdom should, if necessary, be persuaded to view the question realistically in the light of the pitch of United States opinion on this issue and the impracticability of [the U.S. being a party to the [sic]] handing over territory and lives to a Communist State.

5. Formosa: Status of Chinese National³ Government

The United States should be privately encouraged to accord a more limited recognition to the Chinese National Government.

The United States might be assisted in such a step if other friendly Governments (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) were to give 'a lead' after discussion with the United States on the timing of this step. It should be made clear to the United States that Australia did not propose to make this move if it would cause embarrassment to the United States.

6. Admission of Communist China to United Nations

It should be suggested to the United States that they endeavour to avoid an intransigent attitude on this issue, and that the objective might be the admission of Communist China in the General Assembly of 1954.

The United Kingdom should be advised to play this issue quietly since badly timed pressure (particularly public pressure) would freeze the United States position.

Within three to six months after the conclusion of an armistice some consideration might be given to admitting Communist China to certain of the Specialised Agencies as a preliminary step.

Should the occasion arise after an armistice for extending an invitation to Communist China to be heard by the United Nations, the issuance of such an invitation might be supported.

7. Recognition of Communist China

This is largely an individual matter by Governments and it is not suggested that views should be communicated on this issue. The Canadian Government might, however, take this step within three to six months after an armistice provided they could make acceptable arrangements with Peking. Such a step by a neighbouring State would serve to get the American people 'used to the idea' of recognition.

So far as Australia is concerned there is no urgency about considering recognition particularly as the United Kingdom still does not have diplomatic relations with Peking. This question should however be borne in mind, and, if signs of a rift between Peking and Moscow appeared, there might be some advantage in having representation in Peking.

8. Limited Embargo on Trade with China

In the event of an armistice some Governments (United Kingdom, India, Indonesia, Burma, Japan) will be so anxious to increase their trade with China that they would probably disregard the embargo⁴ if it were not relaxed. It could be argued, therefore, that it might be better to relax the embargo than have Governments breaking the law.

On the other hand the United States will point up Chinese assistance to the Vietminh as a valid reason for continuing the embargo.

The United Kingdom will feel strongly on this question. Perhaps the most that could be done would be to suggest to the United Kingdom that they should not press for the immediate relaxation of the embargo and that a decision on this question should be taken in the light of the Communists' observance of the armistice and of developments in Indo–China.

[matter omitted]

[NAA: A1838, TS852/20/4/2, v]

1 The paper was evidently written in External Affairs, but was neither signed nor dated.

2 Text in parentheses is handwritten in the original.

3 The word 'National' was typed where the meaning was 'Nationalist'.

4 In a further measure in 1951 against the PRC, the UN General Assembly had passed a resolution calling for an embargo on the provision of strategic materials to China and North Korea.